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This collection of essays is dedicated to Barry Smith by his 
friends, some of whom are former students, and all of whom 
are admiring colleagues.1 The goal of our Festschift is to cel-
ebrate Barry Smith, an outstanding man who also happens 
to be a philosopher, a mathematician, and a scientist in bio-
medical informatics. It thus assembles contributions that are 
both personal in nature and intertwined with the deep ideas 
that Barry inspired or provoked in our respective lives.
Barry’s extraordinarily creative and productive scholar-
ship record (detailed in the bibliography at the end of this 
volume) marks an exemplary career that few scholars can 
match. Indeed, to learn of the full breadth of his work, one 
must search under such subject headings as Austrian philos-
ophy, Austrian economics, phenomenology, Gestalt psychol-
ogy, mereology, truth makers, states of affairs, apriorism, 
realism, social ontology, formal ontology, and applied ontol-
ogies, to name just a few. But those privileged to know Barry 
closely believe that his professional work, impressive as it 
is, pales in comparison to the personal impact he has had 
in our lives. This is the seed idea for our Festschrift, and we 
hope to provide here some significant testimony on Barry’s 
impact as a colleague, mentor, teacher, and friend.
This does not mean, of course, that his impact has always 
produced a conversion to his ideas. Above all, Barry pro-
motes and respects independent thought, and he encourages 
both students and colleagues alike to pursue the distinct in-
tellectual directions that motivate each of us. To be sure, his 
encouragement will include a vigorous argument supporting 
his own views, always with humor and often in a venue with 
good food, good wine, and sometimes even good music, too. 
This is the man we wish to celebrate here. In doing so, we will 
share personal insights about Barry that we hope will pres-
ent a fuller picture of the man revealed only in part by his 
scholarly writings.
Our motivation to organize and edit this Festschrift for 
Barry is also very personal. We are among those privileged to 
be former graduate students of his, and we forged our friend-
ship around the profound delight of his seminars, which set 
our minds ablaze with questions and ideas. Not surpris-
ingly, we both chose Barry to direct our respective disserta-
tion projects. After reuniting again last year to organize this 
Festschrift, we have enjoyed recalling fond memories of our 
time as graduate students at the University at Buffalo. We 
thought that in sharing some of these stories we could offer 
a glimpse of what it is like to be a student of Barry’s for those 
who do not know his teaching. And we hope that as other 
students of Barry’s read this—those who studied with him 
in the United Kingdom, Liechtenstein, and Germany, as well 
as former and present students of his in Buffalo—they will 
smile as they recognize situations that ring similar to ours. 
Our Barryesque education began when we both registered 
for Barry’s Cognitive Metaphysics course at the University 
at Buffalo in New York. As first-year graduate students, we 
privately wondered what the title of the course could even 
mean. We did not yet know to expect the unexpected, but we 
soon began an intellectual adventure with Barry that would 
last for the next five years. During this time, we enrolled 
in his seminars and tutorials on Cognitive Metaphysics 
(whatever that was), Austrian Philosophy, Husserl, Social 
Ontology, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of 
Economics, Value Theory, Law and Ontology, Research 
Ethics, and Social Objects (from Meinong to Searle). We 
thus examined such a wide range of fascinating subjects that 
we were often tempted to change our dissertation topics, or 
even to remain students permanently.
With so much ground to cover, this was a time when 
sleep was reserved for semester breaks. Luckily, our gradu-
ate seminars were typically scheduled in the afternoon, per-
fect for the night-owl writing schedules that most students 
kept. One such afternoon, in a very warm classroom, Barry 
arrived in a stylish turtleneck and blazer. As he taught he 
seemed to be the only one in the room unaffected by the 
heat. One student, wiping sweat from her brow, asked him 
“Aren’t you hot?” He replied, “No, I’m English.” 
Beneath this cool English appearance, however, lay the 
passionate heart of a philosopher with the unrelenting goal 
of directing us in a quest for truth, whatever the object of 
our examination. Students were drawn to his lectures in part 
because of his animated discussions with hilarious or shock-
ing examples. For example, to explain the Husserlian notion 
of unfulfilled intentionality, Barry suggested the following. 
Suppose that you have the expectation of an apple pie fresh 
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from the oven, an expectation fueled by the aroma of baking 
apples and cinnamon. But then you discover, upon remov-
ing the pie from the oven, that it was instead: a dog pie! That 
is unfulfilled intentionality, explained in a way that cements 
the idea clearly in a student’s mind forever.
An integral part of studying with Barry was his boot-camp 
training in clear and precise thought as papers were written 
and re-written. He returned drafts with comments such as 
“not English,” “sloppy,” “sounds confused,” and “muddled 
thought.” He also insisted that we “write in plain and simple 
language,” “avoid bulbous sentences,” and “do, not, use, too, 
many, commas.” And in the especially long-winded passages 
all-too-common in philosophical writing, we would find: 
“bla, bla, bla” or “eh?” Some students might have been un-
settled by such comments, but we appreciated their role in 
our development, and we also understood the English hu-
mor cleverly built into them to soften the blow. Even today, 
we both agree that we can hear his voice in our heads, still 
ghost editing as we write. This boot-camp training focused 
our efforts on articulating clearer arguments, transforming 
us into better writers and better thinkers. It also prepared us 
to confront disagreement comfortably, even eagerly, but also 
charitably. And these, of course, are some of the key practical 
benefits of studying philosophy.
Finally, we should remember that philosophy cannot 
be done in complete isolation, at least not all of the time. 
Indeed, it is fueled by conversation and dialogue with oth-
ers. Barry recognizes this as well, and as evidence we offer 
the many wonderful parties to which Barry invited his stu-
dents, former students, and colleagues at all stages of their 
lives and careers. Whether elegant garden parties, small din-
ner parties, casual get-togethers at the end of the semester, 
or even Thanksgiving gatherings, Barry was always a willing, 
gracious, and entertaining host. Beyond the great conversa-
tions, these moments were especially meaningful to us be-
cause they allowed us to see the carefree and joyful side of 
Barry’s personality. We hope that this Festschrift will, above 
all, bring out this carefree and joyful side again, for this is 
our party for you. 
Happy Birthday, Barry!
Gloria and Jerry
Photograph: Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo and Gerald J. Erion
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NOTES
1 We would like to thank the editors of COSMOS + 
TAXIS, Leslie Marsh and David Andersson, for their 
enthusiastic support of this Festschrift honoring 
Professor Barry Smith. Leslie and David immediately 
recognized our vision for this project’s fitness within 
the journal’s distinctive thematic frame of spontaneous 
orders. Of course, the study of spontaneous orders 
extends far beyond the walls of the university, and it is 
hardly limited to abstract academic discussion. Rather, 
spontaneous orders occur in our daily social experiences 
all the time—e.g., the ambiance of a café created by 
those who frequent it, or the many unintended effects 
of other people in our everyday lives. This special issue 
of COSMOS + TAXIS documents the latter. In fact, we 
could say that each of the contributions in this volume 
recounts one or more instances of spontaneous orders 
emerging from the author’s interactions with Professor 
Barry Smith. But we prefer to say that the authors in 
this Festschrift will present unique stories about how 
knowing Barry has led them toward interesting paths 
and unexpected discoveries. 
 We are grateful also to Sandra Smith, Professor Barry 
Smith’s wonderful wife, who wrote the distinctively 
evocative biography for this issue. She is not only an apt 
collaborator in Barry’s work, but she has also proved to 
be a great accomplice in our secret plans to produce this 
Festschrift and to organize the ceremony at which we 
presented it. 
 We would like to express our special admiration for the 
indomitable spirit of Professor Wolfgang Grassl, who 
without hesitation accepted the task of writing a trib-
ute for Barry that is now part of this Festschrift despite 
the serious medical challenges he has recently faced, 
and from which he is still recovering. His loving wife, 
Rebecca Proefrock, tells us that this tribute for his be-
loved friend Barry is his first writing since August 26, 
2014. We are honored to have it as part of this volume. 
 Without our contributing authors, this project would 
not have been possible. Each met the challenges of time 
(a scarce good for all writers) with cheer, good will, 
and great affection for Barry. We are deeply indebted to 
them for their generous efforts, with the promise in re-
turn to respond in kind by producing a manuscript on 
short notice should there ever be such a need. 
 Great teaching can help students to appreciate philo-
sophical ideas even as it fosters a willingness to question 
those ideas. By this criterion, and in our experience, 
Barry Smith is a truly great teacher, and part of a group 
of outstanding professors with whom we were fortunate 
to study at our respective universities. We would like 
to recognize these outstanding educators here as well. 
At the State University of New York at Geneseo, Jerry 
was profoundly influenced by Professors Stacey Edgar 
and Elias Savellos, who together helped to stoke his ini-
tial interest in philosophy and who continue to inspire 
him today. And at California State University, Professor 
Kurt Leube led Gloria’s graduate examinations beyond 
the disciplinary boundaries of economics and into phi-
losophy, changing the direction of her studies. Pursuing 
this new path at the University of California at Berkeley, 
Gloria had the privilege of being introduced to philoso-
phy by Professor John Searle, who fueled her interest 
in social ontology. At Buffalo, Professor John Kearns 
proved a favorite not only because of his warmth and 
kindness, but because he is a fantastic teacher as well. 
He leads demanding logic seminars that are popular 
with students because of the life he infuses even into 
discussions of the most technical complexity, enriched 
with charming vignettes that add a personal dimension 
and make formal logic exciting. To each of these out-
standing educators, and of course to Barry, we are grate-
ful; they opened our eyes in different ways and thereby 
helped us to carve our individual paths in philosophy. 
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Biography of Barry Smith
SANDRA SMITH
Email: SmithSandraG@gmail.com
The eldest of three children, Barry Smith was born on June 
4, 1952 in Bury, England to Reg and Jean Smith. His early 
education began at a primary school in Chesham before 
transferring to Bolton Boys’ School for the balance of his 
schooling. While growing up, he and his two sisters enjoyed 
family holidays to Southport, the Lake District, or camping 
in Cornwall each summer, but it was Barry’s love of reading 
and his inquisitive mind that stand out most vividly amongst 
his childhood memories. While the other kids were off play-
ing football or a game of rounders, it would not be unusual 
to find Barry surrounded by a stack of books in the library. 
It was this deep desire to learn from a very young age that 
would ultimately shape his future. 
Barry’s early interests focused greatly on pure mathemat-
ics, rather than applied mathematics or physics; he “en-
joyed the possibilities for manipulating abstract structures 
which math provided.” After expressing an interest to read 
for Oxford University’s newly established joint degree in 
Mathematics and Philosophy, one of his grammar school 
teachers at Bolton lent him copies of Russell’s Introduction 
to Mathematical Philosophy and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
He did not, at that stage, “have the foggiest idea about what 
studying philosophy might involve, but was immediately 
taken by Tractatus.” It was this that in large part led to the 
notion—and to his ultimate decision—to enrol in Oxford 
University in 1970.
Prior to beginning his studies at Oxford, Barry spent 3 
months hitching his way around Europe. In addition to pick-
ing up odd jobs along the way, his travels were funded by 
savings acquired from Saturday afternoon outings with his 
father, purchasing books from area second-hand bookshops 
and then reselling them for a profit to other used book stores 
down the road.
Upon receiving a First Class Honours Degree of BA in 
Mathematics and Philosophy from Oxford in 1973 (which 
was later converted to MA in 1977), Barry continued his 
studies at the University of Manchester. Under the supervi-
sion of Wolfe Mays, he successfully defended his disserta-
tion titled The Ontology of Reference: Studies in Logic and 
Phenomenology, and was awarded a PhD in Philosophy in 
1976.
From 1976 to 1994, Barry held appointments in the phi-
losophy departments of the University of Sheffield, England 
(1976–1979), the University of Manchester, England 
(1979–1989) and the International Academy for Philosophy, 
Liechtenstein (1989–1994). In 1994 he moved to the United 
States and began teaching at the University at Buffalo, where 
he is currently SUNY Distinguished Professor and Julian 
Park Chair of Philosophy as well as an Affiliate Professor 
in the departments of Neurology, Computer Science and 
Engineering, Biomedical Informatics, and the universi-
ty’s Division of Biomedical Ontology. The latter, which he 
helped to found, is the first academic unit in the world with 
the word “ontology” in its title. 
During his career, Smith has directed over 30 PhD disser-
tations, supervised more than 30 postdoctoral researchers, 
organized in excess of 130 workshops and conferences, col-
laborated with hundreds of individuals, delivered upwards 
of a thousand presentations at various department colloquia, 
professional meetings, and symposia, and formed scores and 
scores of professional bonds with people in a multitude of 
disciplines throughout the world. 
Barry  is a prominent contributor to both theoretical 
and applied research in ontology, a multidisciplinary field 
concerned with the creation of interoperability between 
information systems both within and between different or-
ganizations, and with the institutional and technical strate-
BIOGRAPHY OF BARRY SMITH
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gies for achieving such interoperability. His pioneering work 
on the science of ontology led to the establishment of Basic 
Formal Ontology  (BFO) as the most commonly adopted 
upper-level ontology development framework, used by over 
200 ontology development groups. His work led also to 
the formation of the  OBO (Open Biomedical Ontologies) 
Foundry, a suite of interoperable ontology modules designed 
to support information-driven research in biology and bio-
medicine. The methodology underlying BFO and the OBO 
Foundry is now being applied in a range of different do-
mains, including military intelligence, defense logistics, in-
dustrial engineering, and sustainable development.
When asked to describe Barry, one of his colleagues re-
plied, “There are people who work in applied philosophy, 
and then there is Barry Smith who applies philosophy to ev-
erything.” To Barry, philosophy is not a discipline, but a way 
of life.
Throughout the past 30+ years, Barry’s varied career has 
been filled with an overwhelming number of honors, acco-
lades and accomplishments. To support his research, he has 
received combined funding in excess of $13 million from a 
number of organizations including the National Institutes 
of Health, the US, Swiss, and Austrian National Science 
Foundations, the Humboldt and Volkswagen Foundations, 
the European Union, and the US Department of Defense. He 
is the author of some 500+ peer-reviewed publications, in-
cluding 19 authored or edited books on ontology and related 
topics. To date, his publications have earned nearly 24,000 
citations and a current h-index of 76. He served as editor of 
The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General 
Philosophical Inquiry for 25 years (from 1991 to 2016), 
and he is the Associate Editor of Applied Ontology and the 
Journal of Biomedical Semantics. In addition, he is a member 
of the Editorial Board of 22 other journals and 5 book series.
Since 2000 he has served as consultant to Hernando de 
Soto, Director of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy in 
Lima, Peru, on projects relating to the advancement of 
property and business rights among the poor in developing 
countries. Barry often tells the story of sitting in de Soto’s of-
fice when de Soto received a telephone call from former US 
president Bill Clinton. Explaining that he was in a meeting, 
de Soto told Clinton that “everyone should have their own 
personal ontologist.”
In recognition of his scientific achievements, Smith re-
ceived a €2 million Wolfgang Paul Award of the Alexander 
von Humboldt Foundation in 2001. Utilizing this prize mon-
ey, he founded the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical 
Information Science (IFOMIS) in Leipzig, Germany. At the 
time, this was the most valuable award ever given in the aca-
demic history of Germany. It also is believed to be the largest 
single prize ever awarded to a philosopher. In order to take 
advantage of the greater opportunities for cross-disciplinary 
collaboration at the forefront of information-based research, 
the Institute was relocated to Saarbrücken, Germany in 2004. 
Smith served as IFOMIS’ Director until 2006, and currently 
serves as its Scientific Director. 
In 2005 Smith founded the National Center for Ontological 
Research (NCOR), under the auspices of which he initiated 
the Ontology for the Intelligence Community (OIC) annual 
conference series in 2006. (This conference has since been 
renamed Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, 
and Security  (STIDS).) Smith was also responsible for ini-
tiating the annual International Conference on Biomedical 
Ontology (ICBO) series in 2009.
Smith was awarded the first  Paolo Bozzi Prize in 
Ontology  from the University of Turin, Italy in 2011, and 
was elected Fellow of the American College of Medical 
Informatics (FACMI) in 2013.
The Best Schools, a leading resource for campus and on-
line education, named Smith as one of the 50 most influen-
tial living philosophers  in 2016. When interviewed shortly 
after receiving this recognition, Smith humbly said, “Most 
of my work now is in collaboration with people outside of 
philosophy…I sometimes tell people I’m not a philosopher 
anymore; I’m just an ontologist.”
Fluent in English and German (and able to speak French, 
Spanish and Italian “restaurant talk”), Barry’s invited speak-
ing engagements throughout his career have spanned the 
globe. He has traveled to every continent sans Antarctica, 
has taught seminars in dozens of countries, and has delivered 
papers to the most diverse audiences. Whether addressing 
marine biologists at Oxford, plant scientists at the New York 
Botanical Gardens, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR) in San Diego, the Department of 
Defense at the Pentagon, CIA agents at Langley, attendees 
of a vast number of conferences or members of various or-
ganizations such as the International Association for Dental 
Research, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
American Philosophical Association, and National 
Association of Scholars—to name just a few—Barry’s plate is 
overflowing. And he would want it no other way.
As Barry continues to rack up frequent flyer miles (which 
he is keeping in reserve should he ever decide to retire), he is 
enjoying the challenge of achieving the goal that he set out to 
accomplish more than 30 years ago: to change the world, one 
ontology at a time.
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Briefly, On Brevity
GERALD J. ERION
Division of Humanities
Medaille College
18 Agassiz Circle
Buffalo NY 14214-2601
USA
Email: gerald.j.erion@medaille.edu
Web: www.medaille.edu/gerion
Keywords: Barry Smith, ontology, communication, digital media, brevity
1. INTRODUCTION
Barry Smith’s reputation as a scholar is, of course, indisput-
able.1 But in a Festschrift such as this, aimed at exploring and 
celebrating the remarkable person behind the remarkable 
scholar, we should also address a lesser known (yet no less 
significant) dimension of Barry’s life and work: his teaching 
and mentoring.
I had the privilege of studying philosophy and ontology 
with Barry for several years at Buffalo, and I completed my 
Ph.D. under his supervision. In many, many ways, he is a 
stellar teacher and mentor, inspiring the kind of learning 
that has in turn shaped my own life and work. Through this 
short paper, and by my co-editor’s special request, I will re-
count just one of the many deep and important insights that 
Barry offers to his students. Briefly then, let us consider his 
lessons on brevity.
2. THE OPPOSITE OF BREVITY
Now, philosophers and non-philosophers alike will know 
of our field’s long-standing reputation for whatever might 
be the opposite of brevity.2 One could even argue that this 
is philosophy’s disciplinary bias. And so rather than seeking 
concision, we tend to draw out, through extended discus-
sion, our philosophical analyses and arguments.
This can be a great thing, certainly; for as we often tell our-
selves, the rest of the world seems predisposed to dispense 
with philosophical questions far too quickly. But our bias to 
verbosity also produces unfortunate communication barri-
ers for those outside the field. Our colleagues, our students, 
even our friends and family members cannot understand 
why we do not simply get to the point. For example, here is 
a passage that—forgive me!—I inflicted upon my own stu-
dents earlier this term, courtesy of the German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
The practical imperative will therefore be the follow-
ing: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether 
in your own person or in the person of another, al-
ways at the same time as an end and never simply as a 
means. (Kant, 1785/1993, p. 429)
Kant, for sure, is trying to capture complex ideas with his 
words here, and the situation is further complicated by the 
translation to English from the original German. But if this 
is the type of sentence that philosophers compose when giv-
en free range to express our ideas, then we can see why our 
colleagues, students, and others might find our work inac-
cessible.
3. BREVITY
But for as long as I have known him, Barry has seemed un-
affected by this philosopher’s bias, exhibiting instead a kind 
of logical elegance in his work. From our very first meeting, 
my admissions interview at Buffalo, I was struck by the re-
markable clarity of his thinking and speaking. Cutting to the 
chase, he asked me almost immediately what dissertation 
topic I planned to pursue. Caught off guard with no clear 
answer yet myself, I bumbled through something about cog-
nitive science and ethics, my principal research interests at 
BRIEFLY, ON BREVITY
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the time. Barry kindly helped to straighten out my response, 
simultaneously demonstrating both the value of brevity and 
the excellence of his teaching. After a few more minutes of 
cheerful conversation, I think that we both sensed what was 
inevitable: I would eventually be writing an ontology disser-
tation with him.
In the years that followed I took every seminar Barry of-
fered. When that was not enough, I loaded up on a series of 
tutorials to which he graciously consented. By the time I was 
ABD, I was even auditing his undergraduate classes, look-
ing for (and finding) ways in which I could improve my own 
teaching. Barry’s classroom performances were brilliant, but 
there would be many more office-hour discussions as well, 
each one as warm, effective, and efficient as the first. In my 
heart, I worried that Barry was too busy for this, with too 
many other, more important projects and colleagues and 
students. And yet he always found time to answer my silly 
questions and keep me on track, and always with his charac-
teristic brevity, clarity, and good cheer.
Barry’s feedback on seminar papers also reflected and re-
inforced these important lessons. Looking back through the 
pieces I asked him to read, I can cringe at my weak argu-
ments and dreary prose. And yet Barry ploughed through 
it all, providing smart suggestions that helped to turn my 
first drafts into my first publications. Long-winded sections 
would be flagged for revision: “bla bla,” or “yeah yeah, get 
on with it.” Weak arguments? “Assertion is cheap.” General 
disorder? “Sounds confused,” “sloppy,” or simply “doesn’t 
make sense.” Sure, it stung a bit, but his spirit was kind and 
supportive, and he was always right. So, Barry’s concise notes 
never failed to make my papers better, my arguments tighter 
and stronger. As a newcomer to philosophy, I could not have 
asked for a more patient and helpful reader, and to this day I 
still find myself recalling his wise advice.
These themes extended, in noteworthy ways, to the online 
world as well. During my studies at Buffalo each of Barry’s 
seminars featured a concurrent email discussion list, which 
allowed students to continue our conversations between 
class meetings. The pace here was often frantic, and our con-
tributions (like our paper drafts) were often rambling and 
confused. And yet Barry somehow kept up with everything, 
correcting us with one-line replies that he crafted when he 
probably should have been sleeping. It was, again, an impres-
sive demonstration, and one that he continues to perform 
when I pester him with correspondence today.
Eventually, I came to see how fundamental these logic and 
communication lessons could be, and how widely we could 
apply them. Barry’s most powerful papers and presentations, 
for instance, are remarkable examples of clarity and brevity. 
Indeed, his unique brand of ontology would probably be im-
possible for the more typical philosopher who is challenged 
to connect with those outside the field. For Barry, brevity 
provides a clear link to others, and to other academic disci-
plines. And thus, the principles of ontology, like the princi-
ples of logic and good writing, become very useful in a very 
wide range of applications. Barry himself has used them to 
make significant contributions to biology, computer science, 
geography, legal studies, and medicine (among other fields). 
But we can also use them (as I have) to study ethics, human 
communication, and urban design and planning, and we can 
apply them to curriculum development projects, grant pro-
posals, job applications, and so on. An appreciation for brev-
ity is, then, a remarkable gift that Barry’s teaching helps to 
inspire for his students.
4.  BREVITY AND THE DIGITAL MEDIA  
 ENVIRONMENT
Finally, we should recognize that Barry’s lessons are especial-
ly useful in the digital world, a space that can pose particu-
lar challenges to philosophers. Nearly all of us now live and 
work in a digital media environment that encourages—and 
in some cases requires—brief messages in a wide variety of 
forms. Brevity may in fact be a key feature of electronic me-
dia, demonstrated first by the terse text typical of the elec-
trical telegraph. (Postman, 1985, pp. 64–71; Wills, 1992, pp. 
169–175) But in the digital age, we place an especially high 
value on brevity in all kinds of content.
Thus, the language of social media (for instance) is often 
restricted in length, whether for technical reasons or sim-
ply through user expectation and convention. Some social 
platforms dispense with language entirely, focusing instead 
on visual imagery, even imagery that is by its very design 
temporary and ephemeral. These forces now shape our non-
digital exchanges as well; at a recent conference I found my-
self giving a talk in the Japanese pecha kucha format, where 
20 slides automatically advance every 20 seconds for a to-
tal runtime of just 6 minutes, 40 seconds. American com-
munication theorist Neil Postman (1931–2003), describing 
television’s electronic media environment, calls such a space 
“a peek-a-boo world, where now this event, now that, pops 
into view for a moment, then vanishes again.” (Postman, 
1985, pp. 77) The “peek-a-boo” character that Postman sees 
in television is even clearer today in cases of (say) SMS text 
messaging or Twitter.
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Philosophers, with our bias to verbosity, may be especially 
ill suited for such a media environment. If we tend to extend 
discussion with careful, thoughtful language, our analyses 
and arguments can lose their impact in the world of digi-
tal peek-a-boo. But Barry’s lessons about clarity and brevity 
can help to solve this problem. Indeed, from his papers and 
presentations to his editorial notes to his late-night email 
messages, he provides models of clarity and brevity that phi-
losophers everywhere can use to reach and reason with col-
leagues, students, and yes, even friends and family members. 
As a graduate student, I remember finding this dimension 
of Barry’s work striking, even if I lacked the language to ar-
ticulate it. But looking back now, I see that Barry’s brevity 
reflected his prescient mastery of our new media environ-
ment. At a time when many philosophers approached email 
messages as if they were postal letters from the 19th century, 
Barry’s email read like a text message from the future. That 
he could do this without sacrificing the sound reasoning es-
sential to our academic work makes his lessons about phi-
losophizing in the digital media environment even more 
important; brevity can be compatible with logical argument.
5. CONCLUSION
I will close with one last anecdote here. After the whirlwind 
that was my dissertation defence, I sent Barry an anxious 
late-night email message asking for additional feedback. His 
response was characteristically brief, making it all the more 
memorable.
You did excellently.
I am duly proud.
Naturally, this stands as my favourite bit of feedback, and 
so it is a special pleasure to return the sentiment here: Barry, 
you have done excellently. We are duly proud of all that you 
have accomplished, and we are most grateful for all of your 
help and support, as a friend, colleague, mentor, and teacher. 
Cheers!
NOTES
1 See, for example, “Social Orders: A Foreword from the 
Editors of this Volume,” “Biography of Barry Smith,” 
and the Appendix in this issue.
2. Even the terms that describe brevity’s opposite feel awk-
ward and unwieldy: “verbosity,” “prolixity,” “wordiness,” 
“long-windedness,” etc.
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Barry Smith is known for his work; very well known, in 
fact. But I would like to pay tribute to my friend Barry in 
this Festschrift with a few words that attempt to clarify that 
he is not reducible to his work, even if his life seems dedi-
cated only to this work. Indeed, his successes are no doubt 
attributable in large part to his prodigious productivity. But 
none of us can really know what it’s like to be Barry Smith 
in toto: as a son, brother, husband, friend, teacher, jazz afi-
cionado, gastronomist, Aristotelian political animal, and all 
the other interesting dimensions of his consciousness. This 
is the subjective nature of experience, as Thomas Nagel so 
aptly pointed out in his famous article, “What Is It Like to 
Be a Bat?.” We may infer from our own experience but can-
not know the full extent of Barryhood. And I dare say that 
his experiences in our profession are perhaps much less like 
ours than we think.  
Barry could have accepted offers for many faculty posi-
tions, research professorships, and distinguished university 
lectureships during his career. While any of us, his closest 
friends, would have been honored to be considered for such 
positions in the first place, Barry was in the happy position 
of being selective. In light of his enviable circumstances, it 
was all the more surprising when he revealed to us that the 
offer he received from the University at Buffalo was too se-
ductive to let pass. He could have stayed in Liechtenstein, 
where in the 1990s he was made a Research Professor at the 
Internationale Akademie für Philosophie. But he took up the 
position of Julian Park Professor at the University at Buffalo. 
He did this because he felt that, there, he would be finally 
independent, no longer subject to anybody’s whim or will, 
and in a collegial atmosphere of colleagues and friends. This 
decision involved not only a change in location yet again, as 
he had done so many times in his life before; this was a sig-
nificant relocation. Not being in his shoes, the change could 
have appeared to be a departure from a very comfortable po-
sition with papal privileges and ducal prerogatives. Yet only 
Barry knew what he was leaving behind, and fortunately, he 
was a very good fit for his new job.
Aside from the work for which Barry is known, colleagues, 
students, and collaborators of his also know him for his nev-
er-ending generosity. He is never too busy to write a letter 
of recommendation, read a paper and provide ample com-
ments, or connect one person with another for their mutual 
benefit. Barry bestows random acts of kindness even upon 
those who have been unkind to him, as if he viewed them 
as having a right to ask him for favors, treating them in the 
same way as those one would think are truly deserving of his 
time and good will. It is always surprising to me how much 
he can do for others and still manage to maintain the high 
level of productivity that he has. I don’t think that I know 
anyone busier than he, nor anyone who accomplishes as 
much as he does, yet he always has time to attend to others 
who seek his help.  I cannot say how one becomes such an 
extraordinary person. I can only say that it makes me very 
happy and proud to call him my friend, and that my experi-
ence in this life has been the richer by knowing him.
REFERENCE
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1. A BIT OF PERSONAL HISTORY
Let me start with a confession: I feel responsible for the fact 
that Barry Smith is not a philosopher anymore. “I used to 
be a philosopher,” he keeps saying, “now I am an ontologist.” 
On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Barry is defi-
nitely responsible for the fact that (as some people say) I am 
not an engineer anymore, being irreversibly contaminated 
by philosophy.1
Everything started almost 30 years ago, in the late 1980s, 
when I was struggling with the knowledge representation 
problems of medical expert systems, working in the domain 
of arrhythmia management. Obviously, one of the first prob-
lems I had to face was the proper representation of parthood 
relations. At that time, knowledge representation systems 
were already affected by the belonging fallacy (Wilensky 
1987)—unfortunately still so frequent nowadays—which 
consists of aggregating together pieces of information (at-
tributes) that may somehow belong to a particular object, 
without being explicit about the nature of the attribute rela-
tionship (Guarino 1992). Yet the importance of an explicit, 
proper modeling of the parthood relation seemed to me of 
utmost importance, especially for the medical domain. So, 
I started reading everything I was able to find on that topic. 
Fortunately, the lab where I was working at that time, despite 
being mainly devoted to systems dynamics and biomedical 
engineering, had a pretty good library covering also cogni-
tive science and artificial intelligence, so I had the opportu-
nity to discover the seminal paper on part-whole relations by 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann (1987), which was really 
illuminating to me. Among the references listed there, an 
obscure but intriguing title captured my attention: 
Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal 
Ontology, edited by Barry Smith (1982)
The financial status of CNR at that time was much better 
than the present miserable situation, so I managed to or-
der that expensive book. When I finally grabbed it, a whole 
new world opened up to me. The introduction “Pieces of 
a Theory” by Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan (1982) was 
fascinating, although not an easy read for a person with an 
engineering background. In particular, what grabbed my at-
tention was the passionate defense of
an ontological approach to the problem of the a priori, 
—an approach which stands in opposition to the logi-
co-linguistic approach, inspired above all by Frege, 
which has come to be accepted as orthodoxy by Anglo-
Saxon philosophers (Smith and Mulligan 1982).
While reading these words, I realized that the very same 
contrast between the logico-linguistic approach and the on-
tological approach was manifesting itself in the knowledge 
representation literature, which in that period was sacrific-
ing expressivity in exchange of computational tractability. 
Stimulated by such discovery, I started a radical re-visitation 
of the literature, which ended up some years later in the 
proposal of a specific ontological level for knowledge repre-
sentation primitives (1994; 2009), contrasted with the episte-
mological level proposed by Brachman (1979).2
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At the same time, I went on reading “The Formalization 
of Husserl’s Theory of Wholes and Parts,” published by Peter 
Simons in the same collection (1982), and then Simons’ book 
on parts (1987),  a milestone in my personal discovery of 
formal ontology. I guess it was through these readings that I 
became aware of the Center for the Study of Mitteleuropean 
Philosophy, led by Roberto Poli. I went to Trento to visit him 
in 1992, and in the following year we organized together 
the first International Workshop on Formal Ontology in 
Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, held 
in Padova in March 1993. This was the first interdisciplin-
ary conference on what is now called applied ontology. Barry 
Smith was an invited speaker, and we started cooperating. 
The following year, Barry invited me to the 1994 Wittgenstein 
symposium, organized by him (with Roberto Casati and 
Graham White) on the theme ‘Philosophy and the Cognitive 
Sciences.’ I presented there my first ideas on the ontological 
level, based on an ongoing work with Pierdaniele Giaretta 
and Massimiliano Carrara (1994). Then I relied a lot on his 
comments while writing my first journal paper defending 
“the systematic introduction of formal ontological principles 
in the current practice of knowledge engineering” (1995). In 
a few years, by the time of the Buffalo conference on Applied 
Ontology organized by Barry (1998), and the first conference 
on Formal Ontology in Information Systems held in Trento in 
June of the same year (Guarino 1998), the mutual contami-
nation was consummated.
2. BFO AND DOLCE
After this personal historical note, I would like to comment 
on some work Barry and I started several years after our 
mutual contamination, namely around 2001, when each of 
us was involved in a funded project concerning the devel-
opment of an upper level ontology: BFO and DOLCE were 
born more or less at the same time.3 Since the beginning, we 
had several occasions to interact and compare our approach-
es, but the two projects took different directions. After the 
two ontologies started being adopted worldwide, on several 
occasions4 we agreed in principle on the utility and impor-
tance of attempting some kind of alignment, but for various 
reasons the real work never started. Now, as a gift to Barry 
for this special occasion, I would like to briefly comment in 
this paper on the main differences and similarities between 
the two ontologies, suggesting some possible strategies for 
isolating a common core. At the same time, I will take this 
opportunity to comment on possible DOLCE extensions, 
adjustments or revisions whose need emerged in the past, at 
least in my view. Indeed, differently from BFO, which under-
went two main releases and was maintained more or less as a 
product, the original DOLCE axiomatization (unfortunately 
never published in an official academic venue) remained 
very stable over the years, except for a systematization of its 
core assumptions done by Borgo and Masolo (2009). Yet, I 
believe that a comparison with BFO may motivate a re-visi-
tation of some DOLCE choices.
While doing this comparison between the two ontolo-
gies, let me clarify immediately that I will not attempt here 
to enter into the realist/antirealist debate, which in the last 
years has been at the core of almost all discussions on BFO 
(Merrill 2010; Smith and Ceusters 2010). I must say that, al-
though contaminated with philosophy, I still have the soul 
of a pragmatic engineer, so I evaluate ontological choices on 
the basis of their actual utility, independently of any deep 
metaphysical doctrine. To me, ontologies are useful not 
only for the integration of scientific data, but more in gen-
eral for the integration of software systems and databases. 
To this purpose, the specific role of ontologies is to make 
explicit people’s assumptions about the domain of interest 
of software applications, independently of the metaphysi-
cal nature of such assumptions, and even independently of 
their scientific accuracy. In this perspective, the main utility 
criterion I adopt is based on language, namely on the degree 
an ontological distinction reflects a distinction in the way 
people talk of a particular domain. That’s why DOLCE takes 
a descriptive approach towards language, avoiding any deep 
metaphysical commitment. That said, I am convinced that 
many of the choices made by BFO may be useful under the 
DOLCE perspective, and vice versa.
2.1  Objects
While analyzing the basic notion of object, BFO and DOLCE 
took different directions from the beginning. Although both 
ontologies agree that objects are “endurants with unity,” 
DOLCE puts a lot of attention in characterizing the differ-
ences and the relationships between physical objects and 
amounts of matter, without investigating the notion of unity 
in detail, mainly because different subtypes of objects may 
have different unity criteria. BFO, on the contrary, adopts a 
common notion of causal unification and maximal self-con-
nection for all objects, and develops on this basis a sophisti-
cated theory of fiat parts, outer boundaries and sites. Letting 
aside a radical difference concerning DOLCE’s multiplica-
tive approach to deal with the relationship between objects 
and amounts of matter,5  this is certainly an area where some 
integration may be achieved, in the sense that some BFO 
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axioms and definitions may be somehow incorporated in 
DOLCE, and efforts may be joined to further develop some 
useful notions which are still weakly characterized, such as 
the notion of a site.6 A lot of literature exists already on plac-
es, boundaries and topological unity, while in my opinion 
further unity criteria concerning morphological, functional, 
and social wholes might be considered. Also, a further anal-
ysis of the notion of causal unification defined in terms of 
relative movement might be particularly useful for the ontol-
ogy of mechanical assemblies, possibly in connection with 
the notion of degrees of freedom.7
2.2  Qualities, roles, and dispositions
The treatment of individual qualities is probably one of 
DOLCE’s most original contributions. The idea of distin-
guishing the intension of a term like the color of this rose 
from its actual extension, which may change at different 
times, was firm in my mind from my early work on knowl-
edge representation (Guarino 1991). The problem we faced 
with DOLCE was to reconcile this intuition with the notion 
of trope, which is similar but not identical: a standard exam-
ple of a trope is the particular color of this rose, or, in Barry 
Smith’s words, “the particular case of redness of a particular 
fly eye.” This means that tropes are classically understood as 
super-determinate particularized properties. Under this view, 
if the color of this rose denotes a trope, then the only way to 
account for a change in color is to admit a mechanism of 
trope replacement. But if a particular color is replaced by an-
other particular color, then sure, we can say that the rose has 
genuinely changed, but we cannot say that its color has genu-
inely changed! So, we decided to deal with this problem by 
postulating the existence of individual qualities as dependent 
particulars that abstract away from classic tropes, being able 
to genuinely change while “moving” within a quality space. 
Several years later, I discovered that Friederike Moltmann 
(2007; 2013) made a very similar choice while challenging 
the standard trope theory by taking inspiration from Fine’s 
powerful idea of variable embodiment, and treating trope-
referring terms like the color of this rose or the temperature 
of this room as variable tropes, i.e., variable embodiments of 
standard tropes. In a recent paper with Giancarlo Guizzardi 
(2016), I revisited the DOLCE approach to qualities in the 
light of these ideas, proposing a general approach to reifica-
tion and truthmaking according to which qualities are weak 
truth-makers (Parsons  1999) of descriptive properties: it is 
the color of the rose, because of the way it contingently is, 
that makes it true that the rose has a certain color.
In the recent years, BFO has adopted a position7 concern-
ing qualities which is very similar to DOLCE’s: in BFO, the 
color of a rose is a dependent continuant that uniquely in-
heres in the rose, and remains identical to itself throughout 
the rose’s life, while possibly instantiating different determi-
nate universals (like being a red color or a brown color) at 
different times. On the other hand, DOLCE reifies such de-
terminate universals, associating each of them to a region, 
which belongs to a quality space that is characteristic of each 
quality kind. In this way we have two advantages: we are 
able to talk of quality “values” (what we called qualia) since 
they are in the domain of discourse, and we can describe 
the structure of quality spaces. For instance, we can say 
that the red region, in the space of colors, is opposite to the 
green region and close to the brown region. Stefano Borgo 
and Claudio Masolo (2009) have described this approach 
in detail. In conclusion, the ontology of qualities is another 
interesting area where efforts might be joined. I mention 
here some open problems, which in my opinion may be ad-
dressed independently of the philosophical positions of the 
two groups, whose solution may contribute to strengthen 
the applied ontology field.
Local qualities. When we describe extended entities, like a 
vase or a river, we refer to their qualities in different ways. A 
river has (more or less) a definite length, but its width varies 
with the distance from the source, typically getting higher 
towards the end. Similarly, a vase has a definite height, but 
its width may vary. So, at least for certain entities, qual-
ity kinds such as length, height and width don’t behave in 
the same way: length or height just inhere to these objects 
with no need of further qualification, while width requires 
a spatial localization in order to be determined. In my view, 
length and height, in these examples, behave as global quali-
ties, while width behaves as a local quality. A local quality of 
a certain object is a quality which actually inheres to a part 
of that object, but, despite this fact, is somehow considered 
(I would say, from the cognitive point of view) as a qual-
ity of the whole object: so, we rarely say “the width of this 
river stretch is 100 meters,” but we prefer to say “the river’s 
width is 100 meters here.” Analogously, we say “the depth 
of the Adriatic Sea is much higher along the Croatian coast 
than along the Italian coast,” referring to “the sea’s depth” as 
one single entity, although, so to speak, spread out in space. 
Indeed, in many simple cases, we describe the qualitative 
shape of a certain object in terms of the behavior of a local 
spatial quality along a certain dimension. 
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Of course, the distinction between global and local quali-
ties is very general, and goes much beyond purely spatial 
qualities. Consider for instance the mass or volume of a 
physical object vs. its density or its temperature, or the dura-
tion of a rain vs. its intensity. In all these cases, we observe 
different ways qualities of things behave with respect to the 
parts of such things. The problem at hand, therefore, is the 
mereological behavior of qualities. Looking at the philosophi-
cal literature, the phenomenon we have described appears to 
be connected to a more general one, concerning the mereo-
logical behavior of properties. A classic distinction in this re-
spect is that between homoeomerous and anomoeomerous 
properties, based on whether or not a property holding for a 
whole also holds for all its parts, and discussed in particular 
by Armstrong (1978). Ingvar Johansson (1989) built on this 
work in the light of the distinction between determinates 
and determinables, focusing his attention to the case of de-
terminate properties belonging to the same determinable, 
and to the ontological nature of patterns like a distribution 
of colored areas on a surface (Johansson 1998). This was, at 
least in my knowledge, one of the few works addressing in 
some detail the mereological behavior of qualities, and not 
just that of generic properties. I have elaborated on these 
ideas in a workshop paper (2013b), but much more should 
be done in this area, which looks very relevant for many 
practical applications.
Relational and quasi-relational qualities. In BFO, relational 
qualities are qualities that have a plurality of independent 
continuants as their bearers. A classic example is a marriage 
bond. In the BFO 2.0 specification, a relational quality is de-
fined as a quality that inheres in two different individuals. 
This violates a very plausible and important principle con-
cerning inherence, present in DOLCE, which says that if x 
inheres in y and x inheres in z, then y=z. This the so-called 
non migration principle, which says that inherence is func-
tional: a quality only inheres in a single thing. A possibility 
to avoid this problem is to assume that a relational quality 
inheres in a mereological sum of continuants, instead of in-
hering separately in both of them. However, I believe that we 
can get rid of relational qualities so defined, and rather adopt 
a general ontological theory of relationships based on ordi-
nary qualities and what I will call—following Moltmann—
quasi-relational qualities.8 A quasi-relational quality is a 
quality that, besides inhering in a single individual, is also 
specifically dependent on a different individual. For exam-
ple, the commitment towards a partner, in a marriage bond, 
can be seen as a quasi-relational quality that inheres in a 
partner and depends on the other one. 
To accommodate this view, we need to give up an axi-
om—built into DOLCE—saying that a quality inheres in 
an individual throughout its life. Clearly this doesn’t hold 
for quasi-relational qualities, since a commitment towards 
a person comes into being only after somebody becomes at 
least acquainted with that person, and may last only for a 
short time. Once we add quasi-relational qualities to ordi-
nary (non-relational) qualities, we have in our hands a pow-
erful tool to account for the nature of (some) relationships, 
which may be seen just as mereological sums of qualities. 
This is the view developed in my recent work with Giancarlo 
Guizzardi (2015; 2016). In this view, a marriage relationship 
is seen as a mereological sum of quasi-relational qualities 
(the mutual commitments), while a comparative relation-
ship, such as the height relationship between a father and 
his son, is just a sum of ordinary qualities: the two heights. 
Note that, despite the fact that the two relations involved in 
these examples (say, married-with and taller-than) have a 
different nature, still it is important for both of them to have 
a clear ontological account for their instances, namely the 
corresponding relationships.9 A practical advantage of see-
ing relationships as sums of qualities is that we can talk of 
them, describing for instance their behavior in time or their 
causal interactions with the world. Note that this picture 
only works for certain kinds of relations, namely those that 
Guizzardi and I called descriptive relations, which hold in 
virtue of some qualities of their relata. Non-descriptive rela-
tions, such as the formal relations of inherence, dependence 
or parthood, just hold between their relata as such, without 
the need for qualities.
In conclusion, coming back to BFO, I don’t think there is 
a need to introduce relational qualities inhering in a plural-
ity of bearers: their respective (ordinary or quasi-relational) 
qualities will do.
Qualities and dispositions. Within specifically dependent 
continuants, BFO makes a sharp distinction between quali-
ties and realizable entities. The former “are fully exhibited or 
manifested or realized” within the entity they inhere in. The 
latter, in contrast, “can inhere without being realized,” and 
“are exhibited only through certain characteristic processes 
of realization.” In turn, a process of realization is defined in 
the present BFO 2.0 specification (Smith 2016) as a process 
which has as participant the bearer of a realizable entity, so 
that it seems to me there is a circularity which should some-
how be fixed.
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Anyway, within realizable entities, BFO distinguishes be-
tween roles and dispositions. I will postpone the discussion 
on roles, focusing here on the distinction between qualities 
and dispositions, which I must say I find very confusing. My 
point is that there is a reasonably clear difference between 
dispositional and non-dispositional (so-called categorical) 
properties, but this difference is not reflected, at the onto-
logical level, in a distinction among specifically dependent 
continuants of different kinds.10 In other words, the truth-
maker of the property being fragile seems to be the same as 
the truth-maker of the property having a certain crystalline 
structure. This means that there is a certain quality inhering 
in an object—its crystalline structure—that is responsible for 
a certain conditional behavior. The connection between a 
particular kind of crystalline structure and the correspond-
ing conditional behavior is given by a law of nature, whose 
ontological presuppositions do not require the existence of 
other specifically dependent continuants besides the crystal-
line structure itself. Of course, it may be important, for sci-
entific reasons, to be able to represent such laws of nature, 
but this is not a good reason to introduce an ad hoc ontolog-
ical category. After all, the very fact that the same material 
basis may be responsible of many different dispositions, and 
the difficulty of distinguishing one disposition from another 
(Arp et al. 2016) is a good evidence of their problematic on-
tological status.
Another reason for not postulating a further kind of spe-
cifically dependent continuants besides qualities is that 
many—if not all—ordinary qualities may be described as 
dispositions: colors are an obvious case, but also an individ-
ual mass can be understood as a disposition to maintain a 
body’s velocity, a size as a disposition to pass through holes, 
a happiness as a disposition to interact with people in a cer-
tain way, and so on. Finally, a further reason for being suspi-
cious about dispositions conceived as a genuine ontological 
category is bound to the notion of realization. The possibility 
to participate to certain “characteristic processes” is alleg-
edly reserved only to dispositions, but I would say that all 
ordinary qualities do participate to characteristic processes, 
where they manifest themselves in various ways. For ex-
ample, a body’s temperature may manifest itself in a heating 
process, and a body’s shape may manifest itself in a deforma-
tion process.
In conclusion, I believe that it is enough, for our purposes, 
to admit qualities of different degrees of complexity: there 
are simple qualities like mass or length, more complex quali-
ties like color or taste, and very complex qualities like fragil-
ity. Complex qualities are specifically dependent on simpler 
qualities. Each of these qualities can be described in a dispo-
sitional or non-dispositional way.
Roles. Given the semi-personal nature of this essay, let me 
say that I have been always obsessed by roles. One of my ear-
liest papers in knowledge representation is entitled “What’s 
in a role?” (1990), and yet I confess that I don’t have a fully 
satisfactory answer to this question, although I have certain-
ly learned a lot since then. I have been always fascinated by 
the subtle aspects of this notion, and by its ubiquitous rel-
evance for practical applications. Yet, differently from dispo-
sitions, roles haven’t been much considered in the analytic 
ontology literature, while of course they have been studied 
by linguistics and sociology, and play a prominent role (al-
low me the pun) in applied ontology.
It is not a surprise therefore to see roles appearing in 
BFO, but their characterization as realizable specifically-de-
pendent continuants reflects a very peculiar understanding 
of the role notion which, although useful, would require a 
broader framework. Let me first clarify some terminological 
issues. In the past (2009; 2000), I have always used the term 
‘role’ to refer to anti-rigid externally-dependent properties. 
However, I acknowledge it makes sense to reserve this term 
to particulars, so I agree with the distinction between roles 
and role-related defined classes (role properties) adopted in 
BFO (Arp et al. 2016). Of course, we have to clarify what 
kind of particulars we are talking of. In this respect, a use-
ful analysis of different kinds of roles has been proposed by 
Frank Loebe (2007), who distinguishes among three role 
types: relational roles, processual roles, and social roles. Now, I 
think that BFO roles may be adequate to represent relational 
roles, but fall short of accounting for processual roles and so-
cial roles. Let me informally discuss the three cases, present-
ing a view which is slightly different from that discussed by 
Loebe, and is still largely work in progress.
Relational roles are those aspects of an entity that are actu-
ally involved in a relationship. In a love relationship between 
John and Mary, John’s love towards Mary is the role he has. 
Describing his role in the relationship means describing his 
love (which may change in time). Such love inheres in John 
and is externally dependent on Mary, so it is an externally 
dependent continuant, that is, a BFO role. The actual role of 
a doctor in a treatment relationship with a patient is again 
a (complex) externally dependent continuant, including his 
actual competencies, commitment, and so on. According to 
the discussion above, the treatment relationship itself is the 
mereological sum of the doctor’s (relational) role and the 
patient’s (relational) role. Note that ‘externally dependent 
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continuant’ is just a synonym of what I have called ‘quasi-
relational quality’ in the above discussion on relationships.
Processual roles are defined by Loebe as ‘slices’ of pro-
cesses with respect to the dimension of participants. Using 
his example, when John moves his pen, he and the pen are 
the participants to that process, and the processual role John 
has in the process captures what John does in that partici-
pation (“Thinking of a mime who moves an imaginary pen 
should be a good illustration of the notion of a processual 
role.”) Clearly, processual roles are not externally dependent 
continuants, so they do not fall under the category of BFO 
roles. Yet, a great practical relevance have the various kinds 
of processual roles (not mentioned by Loebe), which in my 
opinion correspond exactly to what in linguistics are called 
thematic roles: ways of participation in a process (or an 
event). Classic examples are agent, patient, instrument, and 
so on. A continuant is the agent of a process (that is, it has 
the agent role-property) if and only if its participation in that 
process (i.e., its processual role) is of the kind agent.
Finally, social roles11 differ in my opinion from the previ-
ous cases since they are conventional behaviors (so, behavior 
kinds) reflecting social expectations or intentional goals. The 
etymology of ‘role’ is illuminating in this respect: the term 
comes from the French rôle, which in turn comes from the 
old French rolle, used to denote the roll (of paper) on which 
an actor’s part was written. So, we can assume that behind 
each social role there is an (implicit or explicit) role descrip-
tion stating certain behavioral rules. Having a social role 
means being expected or being wanted to comply to such 
rules. The distinction between wanted and expected behav-
iors marks a radical difference between social roles, which 
I have discussed in some detail in a paper (2013a) on func-
tional roles and replaceability in the light of Anscombe’s 
(and Searle’s) notion of direction of fit (Anscombe  1957). 
To put it shortly, there is a difference between the customer 
role and the employee role: the former’s behavior is expected, 
while the latter’s is wanted. A striking consequence of this 
difference is that you can replace an employee, but you can’t 
replace a customer (you can get another customer, or change 
your customer, but—at least in the ordinary way of speak-
ing—you don’t replace customers). A further linguistic evi-
dence is that only for wanted roles12 we can properly say that 
they are played: it makes perfect sense to play the employee 
role, but it is a bit strange to play the customer role or the 
friend role. This is the reason why previously I emphasized 
the fact that things do not play relational or processual roles, 
but they just have those roles.
Going back to BFO roles, it is clear that, being specifically-
dependent externally-grounded continuants (that is, quasi-
relational qualities), they are very similar to the relational 
roles I have discussed above. The difference is that they are 
assumed as being realizable entities, while this notion of re-
alizability is not present (or at least not necessary) for rela-
tional roles, and seems to be somehow related to social roles, 
which presuppose the realization of an expected or wanted 
behavior. However, social roles, in the way I defined them, 
cannot inhere in continuants, simply because they are not 
particulars, but universals (behavior kinds). Of course, hav-
ing a social role implies having a number of quasi-relational 
qualities (such as commitments, claims, duties, and expec-
tations) but these are not social roles in the ordinary sense: 
they are rather relational roles, whose manifestations (the 
actual behavior) may or not be in agreement with the expect-
ed or wanted behavior. In conclusion, it seems that BFO can 
only account for a notion that is related to the ordinary no-
tion of social role, namely the actual attitude/commitment/
disposition to exhibit a social behavior, but is not a social 
role in the ordinary sense.13 Indeed, only for social roles, but 
not for the other roles, it makes sense (and is relevant) to 
express the distance between an actual relational behaviour 
and the expected or wanted behavior characteristic of a giv-
en social role. This distance is usually expressed by a compli-
ance relationship.
2.3 SNAP and SPAN
While concluding this essay,14 which has given me a nice 
opportunity to better understand Barry’s philosophical po-
sitions and practical motivations, I cannot avoid mention-
ing one of the aspects of BFO that mostly puzzles me: the 
choice to consider objects and processes as alternative ways 
of describing reality, and not as complementary aspects of 
the same reality. Fortunately, it seems to me that this choice 
is more a concern of theå old philosopher than a preoc-
cupation of the present applied ontologist, and has almost 
disappeared now: while participation was presented as a 
“trans-ontological relation” by Grenon and Smith (2004), 
in the present BFO 2.0 specification it appears as an ordi-
nary relation. Indeed, without seeing objects and processes 
as parts of the same ontology, it would have been difficult 
to define realizable entities in terms of realized processes of 
certain kind.
A further, subtler evidence of the unavoidable entangle-
ment of objects and processes lies in the choice (in practice, 
the need) to distinguish among multiple processes occurring 
in the same space-time. In deciding about SNAP and SPAN, 
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Barry Smith drew on an intuition of Zemach that “a spatio-
temporal world can be cut in several radically different ways” 
(Zemach 1970). However, as clarified in the BFO 2.0 speci-
fication, “where events, for Zemach, are identified with the 
entire contents of some given spatiotemporal region, BFO 
allows that the same spatiotemporal region may be occupied 
by multiple different processes (as for example your running 
process and your simultaneous process of getting warmer)” 
(Smith 2016, p. 16). But how would these different pro-
cesses be isolated from the global process occurring in that 
spatiotemporal region? The boundaries of a spatiotemporal 
region are very reasonable individuation criteria for ‘global’ 
processes, but if we want a more fine-grained granularity we 
need to adopt suitable criteria to distinguish a running pro-
cess from a warming process. A natural way to do this is to 
consider processes as manifestations of qualities inhering in 
continuants: for example, a warming process is a manifesta-
tion of a temperature quality inhering in a particular con-
tinuant. So, being able to isolate a warming process from a 
global process occurring in a spatiotemporal region requires 
being able to focus (Guarino and Guizzardi 2016) on such 
specific quality and continuant. But this requires an ontol-
ogy that admits continuants and occurrents as parts of the 
same reality.
I think that this idea of processes as manifestation of qual-
ities (or, vice-versa, as qualities as the focus of processes) 
is something that can hopefully inspire, together with the 
other suggestions I made in this paper, for the various foun-
dational ontologies (such as DOLCE, BFO, GFO, and UFO) 
that are more or less based on the Aristotelian square and 
on Lowe’s four-category ontology. I am convinced that Barry 
and I can agree on a common core, and I really hope we can 
mutually understand the different reasons for extending 
such core in different directions.
NOTES
1 Despite this, I am still a proud engineer, especially since 
I am more interested in finding solutions than finding 
problems (supposedly the key difference between 
philosophers and engineers). That’s why, while being 
enormously grateful to philosophy for helping me 
to understand problems, I tend to be very agnostic 
towards deep metaphysical positions, picking up in a 
very eclectic way just what I need to find solutions that 
work enough.
2 In retrospect, the position I defended then was very 
much similar to the one advocated by Barry with his 
criticism of “fantology” (Smith 2005).
3 The first version of BFO was published in the DOLCE 
deliverable (Masolo, Borgo, Gangemi, Guarino, and 
Oltramari 2003).
4 Most notably, in a workshop on applied ontology 
organized by Jonathan Lowe in May 2013, shortly 
before his early departure.
5 Amounts of matter seem to be absent in BFO. There is a 
notion of ‘object aggregate’ (say, a collection of bricks), 
but—as far as I understand—if this collection of bricks 
forms a house, the relationship between the house and 
the collection of bricks (which would be a constitution 
relation in DOLCE), is not analysed in BFO.
6 The BFO 2.0 specification (Smith 2016) defines a site as 
“a three-dimensional immaterial entity that is (partially 
or wholly) bounded by a material entity or it is a 
three-dimensional immaterial part thereof.” I wonder 
whether all immaterial entities included within the 
convex hull of a material object but not being part of it 
would count as sites. For instance, is the space between 
your neck and your shoulder a site? 
7 This position is clearly documented in the BFO V2.0 
specification. Previously it was less clear, and on several 
occasions I had the feeling that BFO qualities were 
super-determinate tropes. For instance, “the particular 
case of redness of a particular fly eye” example is taken 
from a lecture on “Towards a Standard Upper Level 
Ontology” given by Barry Smith in September 2011. In 
any case, I am glad for the convergence now.
8 In the past, I have often used the term relational 
qualities to denote what I now call quasi-relational 
qualities.
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9 So I disagree with the view adopted by BFO that 
comparative relationships are not entities in their own 
right (Arp, Smith, and Spear 2016).
10 As far as I understand, this is the position held by 
Mumford in his book on dispositions (1998).
11 I refer here to social roles in the strict sense, not in the 
very general sense discussed in (Masolo et al. 2004).
12 It seems to me that all wanted roles are functional roles, 
but I will not touch this aspect here.
13 I must add however that even this interpretation 
of BFO roles is problematic, since their definition 
prescribes that a role “is not such that, if it ceases to 
exist, then the physical make-up of the bearer is thereby 
changed” (Smith 2016, p. 57). I think that, especially for 
social roles, the corresponding attitudes/commitments/
dispositions are not independent from the physical 
make-up of their bearer. For instance, the commitment 
to realize a student role of course requires some 
changes in the brain’s “make-up” of its bearer. I would 
say that, in general, active role-properties (being the 
lover of Mary) presuppose some (non-essential) change 
in the physical make-up of their role bearers, while this 
is not required for passive roles (being loved by John).
14 I am thankful to Giancarlo Guizzardi for his useful 
comments on a previous draft of this paper.
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1.  BARRY COMES TO UB
Barry Smith joined the philosophy department about the 
time I began my first term as chair. His coming to UB had 
already been arranged, for I wasn’t involved in recruiting 
him and I didn’t know him. But he soon made everyone’s 
acquaintance. Peter Hare and Jorge Gracia each considered 
himself responsible for bringing Barry to the department, 
and I have no knowledge of which of them was right.
Anyway, Barry’s joining us changed the character of the 
department, and he made the department a more intellectu-
ally lively place. He brought the editorship of the Monist with 
him, although that didn’t impact the department so much, 
and he got involved with people and programs around the 
campus. At talks, he characteristically took it upon himself 
to show speakers what was wrong with whatever view they 
had presented, and his criticisms were frequently deserved. 
Barry also had philosophers whom he favored, and cham-
pioned, especially David Armstrong and John Searle, even if 
they did occasionally get things wrong.
Barry became a member of the Center for Cognitive 
Science and, together with Len Talmy and Robert Van 
Valin, organized the First International Summer Institute in 
Cognitive Science. That was an intellectual success, but, as 
the dean regretted, not a financial one. Over the years Barry 
has organized many conferences, and brought many inter-
esting faculty and students to campus from this country and 
abroad—sometimes to pursue degrees here, sometimes to 
work here as faculty, and sometimes to do research and to 
interact with us for shorter periods. He also organized one of 
the annual Wittgenstein conferences in Kirchberg, Austria. 
Besides making the department more interesting and 
more fun, Barry’s interests and activities, including his own 
work, have been quite helpful to me in my own philosophical 
projects. Barry is a “quick study;” he can take in a position 
or an argument quite quickly, and provide useful comments 
and criticisms. He is also good at seeing problems that need 
to be addressed, often addressing these himself, or trying to. 
His enthusiasm for philosophy and for doing philosophy is 
infectious. Philosophy probably is worthwhile!
At some point, Barry’s interest in ontology became a pas-
sion for ontology, and he has since become something like 
the world’s Chief Executive Ontologist (the world’s CEO). In 
the past I have attended talks in which Barry claimed that 
ontology is the successor discipline to philosophy, and that 
he is an ontologist but no longer a philosopher. I think those 
claims were excessive, and that even Barry must realize this 
by now. For Barry is certainly still a philosopher, an insight-
ful and successful philosopher, and it is also certainly ok to 
be a philosopher without being an ontologist or ontologer.
In connection with his ontological studies, Barry has had 
amazing success in obtaining grants to support research in 
ontology, including applied ontology, and in organizing 
and guiding the research of large numbers of people. He is 
the manager of a large and thriving ontological enterprise. 
Once, the dean of our faculty (who is now a former dean) 
remarked to me that Barry’s research profile, in terms of 
publications and grants, was entirely comparable to those of 
leading faculty in natural science departments. Who would 
have thought that a philosopher could accomplish so much?
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2. LOGICAL BEGINNINGS FOR ONTOLOGY
When Aristotle invented logic as a field of study, he seems 
to have been primarily concerned with proof or demonstra-
tion. He didn’t design, or have any idea of, an artificial logical 
language, but instead made do with ordinary Greek expres-
sions, which he both studied and employed. Aristotle want-
ed to understand how it is that simply by reasoning, often 
from what we know already, and sometimes from “scratch,” 
we can obtain new knowledge. Although Aristotle was inter-
ested in determining (finding out) what things and kinds of 
things the world contains, that wasn’t the focus of his logic.
Aristotle found, and focused on, sentences or statements 
such that if we use some of them to express what we know, 
this commits us to admit or grant or concede others of them 
to also be correct. From what we know, by reflecting on how 
the premiss statements are related to the others, we recog-
nize that we can use the others to say what we then come 
to know. As it happened, Aristotle began by noticing the 
statements and the relations that are characteristic of what 
we now call syllogistic logic. And he seems to have thought 
that the middle term that occurs in the premisses but not 
the conclusion of a deductively correct syllogism plays an 
important role in extending a person’s knowledge from the 
premisses to the conclusions of these arguments.
When Frege invented modern logic, he designed a per-
spicuous language for making factual statements which 
represent things as being this way or that, and formulated 
a deductive system for establishing that some sentences or 
schemas of this language are used to state logical laws (logical 
truths). Frege doesn’t seem to have thought that his language 
reveals hidden features of ordinary language, for his logical 
language is based on his analyses of and reflections on ordi-
nary language. But he was willing, in his formal language, to 
eliminate some natural-language features which complicate 
logical studies of language. For example, he thought it was 
convenient to have every singular term denote a real object. 
If we regard Frege’s logical language as a canonical lan-
guage that might be used to represent things in the world, 
then this language is perspicuous in various respects. Its 
simple or atomic sentences are ontologically perspicuous, 
because categories of expressions correspond to kinds, or 
categories, of things in the world and the sentences represent 
things as being combined in ontologically appropriate ways. 
Frege’s basic ontology is represented by singular terms and 
predicates. The singular terms represent (or pick out) ob-
jects, while the predicates indicate features of objects. These 
predicates, one-place, two-place,..., n-place,..., provided a 
notational solution to philosophical problems and perplexi-
ties about making sense of relations. 
The formal language is logically perspicuous for having 
both an ontologically perspicuous substructure and read-
ily apparent logical expressions to be used for constructing 
compound sentences. (Frege’s clumsy notation could have 
been more perspicuous logically, and was soon replaced by 
more convenient expressions.) The perspicuity of Frege’s log-
ical language is visible or visual. We can tell from the sym-
bols used and their spatial arrangement what they are being 
used to do. Artificial logical languages are primarily written 
languages, while ordinary language, natural languages, are 
primarily spoken. Think how difficult it would be to teach 
modern logic to students blind since birth; syllogistic logic 
would not present similar difficulties.
Although Frege’s logical language is ontologically per-
spicuous with respect to what its atomic sentences are used 
to represent, it might not be ontologically complete. It could 
fail to provide expressions, or kinds of expressions, for ev-
ery kind or category of thing that needs representing. We 
know from various of his writings that Frege thinks objects 
and functions, which include concepts, are fundamental. 
Singular terms pick out objects, while predicates function in 
sentences or statements much like concepts behave in real-
ity. When functional expressions are combined with names, 
or object expressions, the combinations represent functions 
“completed” by objects.
But does he think events are just another kind of object, or 
do they constitute a distinctive category which should have a 
corresponding syntactic or grammatical category of expres-
sions? How should his language be adapted or enlarged to 
accommodate tenses, and to represent temporal relations? 
I doubt if we can answer these questions for Frege, but we 
can say that, as far as it goes, his language is ontologically 
and logically perspicuous. He has shown us what a visu-
ally perspicuous logical language looks like. Going beyond 
Aristotle’s interest in proof and demonstration, Frege has 
made it a goal for logic to develop ontologically and logically 
perspicuous artificial languages. 
This new goal is a further development of Aristotle’s goal 
or goals. Frege, like Aristotle, is concerned with proof and 
demonstration. But Frege is particularly concerned with 
what we might call the logical structure of language. What 
he wants to prove are logical principles, or logical truths. As 
it turns out, ontological and logical perspicuity are helpful 
both for pursuing Aristotle’s more limited goals and Frege’s 
more general ones. Middle terms in syllogisms are not the 
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key to understanding how it is that deductively correct argu-
ments can enlarge our knowledge. The logical structure of 
our language depends on more than the ontology it encodes, 
but this structure is based on the ontology.
Ordinary language doesn’t conceal, or camouflage, its 
logical structure. Frege was content, in “On Sense and 
Reference,” say, to analyze ordinary expressions which aren’t 
somehow “fronting” for a concealed logical substructure that 
is what really matters. The logical language is more repre-
sentationally perspicuous than ordinary language because it 
highlights the logical structure visually, although it doesn’t 
uncover this structure. The perspicuous language facilitates 
the deductive reasoning that Frege carries out with sentences 
of the language.
Frege’s formal language can be explored by starting with 
evident logical principles, and proceeding from these by in-
ferences that evidently preserve both truth and logical truth, 
to establish further logical principles. For Frege, an impor-
tant feature of his language was that proofs of logical prin-
ciples can be checked mechanically, eliminating any need for 
appeals to intuition as one proceeds. 
3. LEŚNIEWSkI’S LOGICAL SYSTEM
When I was an undergraduate at Notre Dame, I took a 
symbolic logic course taught by Bołeslaw Sobociński. He 
had taken one or more courses from Leśniewski before the 
Second World War, and had made his way to the United 
States following the war. Sobociński’s course was devoted to 
a presentation of Leśniewski’s system Ontology, although I 
think Sobociński preferred to call it the Calculus of Names. 
At the time, I had no idea what ‘ontology’ meant, or why the 
logical system was called that, and, as far as I can remember, 
Sobociński never told us. Speaking English wasn’t so easy for 
Sobociński at that time, and he had very few conversational 
exchanges with members of the class. If he was asked to ex-
plain something, whatever he said was likely to be difficult to 
understand. His preferred method of teaching involved writ-
ing things on the board, which we copied. He wrote formu-
las and theorems and proofs.
I came to have a better understanding of Leśniewski’s work 
when I was a graduate student, for I discussed his logical 
work in my dissertation, and was helped a lot by being able 
to borrow a copy of Eugene Luschei’s then-recent disserta-
tion about Leśniewski’s logical systems. Luschei presented, 
and commented on, Leśniewski’s rules (or directions) for 
constructing a system of Ontology. From Leśniewski’s nomi-
nalistic perspective, there wasn’t such a thing as the system of 
Ontology. There were as many systems of Ontology as peo-
ple actually constructed. The only systems of Ontology that 
there are are systems that one or another person constructs 
by writing them according to Leśniewski’s directions. And 
each constructor is free to make her own choices of many 
of the symbols to be used. My better understanding of what 
Leśniewski was up to did not include understanding why the 
word ‘Ontology’ was a good one for him to use for labeling 
his logical system.
Now I think I do understand. Following Frege, coming 
up with an ontologically and logically perspicuous formal 
language came to be regarded as an important part of in-
vestigating modern logic. Since Leśniewski was a dedicated 
nominalist rather than an upper or lower case ‘p’ platonist, 
he designed a logical language suited for representing the 
world as he understood it to be, and he formulated a deduc-
tive system that facilitated making perspicuous derivations 
of logical principles “governing” the logical language. The 
syntax for his language and deductive system was presented 
in his Terminological Explanations, which are really direc-
tions for someone to follow in constructing (writing down) 
a system of Ontology. The directions provided for both the 
language and its development in the deductive system.
In Leśniewski’s formal language, the basic category of ex-
pressions for objects is common nouns, or names, that stand 
for zero or more objects. The most basic atomic sentences 
are obtained by combining two names with the Greek letter 
epsilon: ε. This is not the epsilon of set membership, which I 
will write like this: 𝛜. The Ontological epsilon is written be-
tween two nouns to make a sentence like this: [a ε b], which 
is used to say that the single a is a b. If there are no a’s, or if 
there is more than one a, the sentence is false. The sentence 
is true if there is exactly one a, which is also a b. There is no 
fundamental category of singular terms, but when the writer 
understands a common noun of Ontology to stand for just 
one object, he can indicate this informally by using an upper 
case letter as a noun like this: [A ε b]. If both ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
names of single objects, then we can write ‘[A ε B]’ to indi-
cate that these are the same object.
The Ontological epsilon is the only primitive symbol in 
Lesniewski’s formal language that can be used to say that 
an object exists. Ontology has indefinitely many semantic, 
or grammatical, categories, and for each category there are 
variables belonging to that category, and universally and 
particularly quantified phrases which contain variables be-
longing to that category. A single quantified phrase can con-
tain more than one variable, and the variables it contains can 
belong to different categories. Leśniewski understood quan-
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tification substitutionally rather than referentially, which 
seems appropriate for a nominalist.
I don’t think Ontology provides as convenient a formal 
language as do familiar systems of first-order, or higher-or-
der, logic, at least not if we wish to capture features of natural 
languages. In English and other familiar natural languages, 
names and perhaps all singular terms constitute a distinctive 
category of expressions. In describing the world and its go-
ings on, we pick out particular objects and characterize these 
objects, as well as indicating how they are related to one an-
other. It is important to distinguish names and descriptive 
singular terms from ordinary common nouns. Names and 
other singular terms aren’t common nouns that just happen 
to denote exactly one object. They are the very expressions 
we need for picking out the particular objects we want to 
characterize.
We can say things like the following:
There are two Arnolds in this class.
I never met an Arnold whom I liked.
but in these cases, the name isn’t used in a typical way. In 
these cases, the speaker is using the name to mean person 
named “Arnold.”
Leśniewski may not have cared about “capturing” the logic 
of ordinary language. By choosing the name ‘Ontology’ for 
his own system, Leśniewski was simply signaling his inten-
tion that the languages of those systems reflect or represent 
his own philosophical view. But no one anymore employs 
Leśniewski’s formal language or deductive system. 
4. FREGE’S BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT
In this work, Frege presented his fundamental logical sys-
tem (or systems). In the language on which his system is 
based, the simple, or atomic, sentences are composed of 
names, or singular terms, and predicates. Frege doesn’t in 
Begriffsschrift say anything about this language being onto-
logically perspicuous, but the language is surely intended to 
accommodate the kinds of expressions we use to pick out 
and characterize objects in our ordinary languages. For he 
provides us with singular terms for objects, and with n-place 
predicates for the concepts that objects in the world fall un-
der. These predicates accommodate relations easily, some-
thing that Aristotle’s logic couldn’t accomplish.
Frege takes more care to ensure that his logical language 
provides a perspicuous representation of the speech acts, or 
language acts, that we perform than he does to let us know 
that he has captured or represented the basic kinds of things 
that the world contains. He doesn’t provide just names and 
predicates, connectives and quantifiers, but he also prefixes 
his sentences with content strokes and judgment strokes. An 
earlier analysis of our mental operations had recognized 
only three operations: conception, judgment, and reasoning. 
On this understanding, we begin by conceiving of objects 
and their features, then we combine our concepts to make 
judgments about the ways things are, and finally we reason 
from some judgments to further judgments. 
Frege was sure that more than three operations are in-
volved. After we conceive of objects and their features, we 
must assemble propositional items we can simply consider 
before we judge these to be or not be the case, then we pass 
judgment, and then we reason. Frege designed his formal 
language to reflect the mental operations we perform with 
expressions of that language. The vocabulary represents the 
conceptual element. When expressions are combined to 
form a sentence, that sentence is prefixed with the content 
stroke which represents the act of combining them. Once 
the sentence or statement is judged to be the case, the con-
tent stroke is prefixed with the judgment stroke. The content 
stroke and judgment stroke together constitute the sign of 
assertion: ⊢. 
In providing the content stroke and the judgment stroke 
for his logical language, Frege was attempting to increase the 
ontological perspicuity of his formal language. His design of 
simple sentences provided ontologically perspicuous repre-
sentations of objects as having properties and being related. 
His logical symbols were not entirely perspicuous presenta-
tions of the logical structures of his compound sentences, 
and his strokes were his attempt to provide ontologically 
perspicuous presentations of the speech acts or language acts 
being performed by the speaker, or language user.
But Frege’s content stroke isn’t needed, for the effect of us-
ing that stroke is achieved by assembling component expres-
sions to produce a well-formed sentence (or schema). The 
assertion sign does have a role to play, however, for it makes 
the assertive force of the speaker’s act explicit.
When Frege developed his logical system, each axiom and 
theorem was prefixed with the sign of assertion. But this 
sign was generally not understood, and eventually became 
used to signal other things than Frege had intended. The 
real problem is that, when Frege develops his deductive sys-
tem by proving results, the content stroke and the judgment 
stroke don’t do any work. The work of the content stroke is 
accomplished simply by writing a well-formed sentence or 
sentential expression. All of Frege’s axioms and theorems are 
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either schemas whose instances are logical truths or general 
statements to the effect that all sentences/statements hav-
ing the form displayed are logical truths. The system codi-
fies logical truths, and providing a notation to indicate that 
Frege judges his theorems to be the case is unnecessary.
But Frege did have a good idea when he introduced 
symbols for making explicit the ontological status of the 
speech acts, or language acts, that the speaker is perform-
ing. Borrowing Austin’s terminology, we can say that the act 
indicated by Frege’s content stroke, the act of assembling 
expressions to make a significant statement, is a locutionary 
act, and the act of asserting that statement is an illocutionary 
act. In speaking, writing, or even thinking with words, we 
perform many different types of illocutionary acts. We assert 
statements, deny statements, and suppose statements to be 
or not to be the case. Assertions, denials, and suppositions 
are all illocutionary acts.
We also use sentences to make requests, to make sugges-
tions, to give orders, to give advice, to make promises, to get 
married, to christen ships, and on and on. These are all dif-
ferent kinds of illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts are the 
“units” of significant speech, of the significant use of lan-
guage more generally. Long before Austin, Frege recognized 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, and provided for them in 
his notation. This was insightful, but went largely unnoticed, 
and didn’t play an important role in Frege’s own thought.
Since in Frege’s logical system, he was only concerned to 
assert logically true statements, it wasn’t instructive or en-
lightening to make this explicit. But if Frege had formulated a 
natural-deduction system instead of his axiomatic deductive 
system, then he might have helpfully introduced different 
symbols to indicate whether a statement is being asserted, or 
denied, or merely supposed to be the case. Making and dis-
charging suppositions are essential to reasoning by natural 
deduction, and in that context it is enlightening to notation-
ally distinguish assertions (or denials) from suppositions.
That is actually what I am trying to accomplish in my own 
work dealing with illocutionary logic. Until I set out to write 
this little essay, I wasn’t particularly conscious of the onto-
logical character, or the ontologically explicit character of my 
research. Now I see that in future work, I should highlight this 
character.
5. SPEECH ACTS, LANGUAGE ACTS,  
 DOCUMENT ACTS?
We use language when we speak out loud, or when we write 
things, or even when we think using words and sentences. 
When we speak out loud, we make sounds, when we write 
or type we make marks or visual patterns of some sort, and 
when we think with words, we presumably produce and em-
ploy neural events (without being consciously aware of those 
events). We also use language when we listen with under-
standing to someone else, or when we read. These are all ex-
amples of what I call speech acts, or language acts. The word 
‘speech’ may be slightly misleading, but this isn’t an obstacle 
to communication. In discussions of speech acts, it is com-
mon to restrict one’s attention to those acts performed by 
the person who produces the expressions that are used, but I 
won’t do that here.
Some philosophers think that people use language to in-
troduce conceptual structure into the world, and to impose 
this structure on the world. I am sympathetic to that view, 
but I won’t defend it here. However, I do think it is evident 
that people do, and must, perform acts when they say mean-
ingful things by producing expressions and when they use 
expressions they encounter, for example when they hear 
or read these expressions, in appropriate meaningful ways. 
We can utter a name to refer to a particular object, and we 
can respond to someone else’s utterance of that name by di-
recting our attention to the referent. In either case we are 
performing a meaningful act. In either case, the act we are 
performing is a concrete entity, not an abstract one.
John Searle has developed a theory of how people create 
institutions, or institutional reality, by producing expressions 
and using them to perform certain types of collective speech 
acts. Barry Smith thinks that Searle has trouble reconciling 
that account of institutional reality with Searle’s naturalism. 
According to Searle (as reported by Barry in Smith 2014), 
“Everything in the universe ‘consists entirely of physical par-
ticles in fields of force’.” So, apparently, Searle really thinks 
that all of social reality is the product of “massive fantasy.” 
Social reality isn’t really real. 
Barry is certainly right that such a view isn’t satisfacto-
ry. But Barry thinks that the way to get out of, or around, 
Searle’s difficulty is to introduce “quasi-abstract” entities into 
our ontology. I’m not sure I even understand this, but it does 
seem to be the case that what Barry calls “document acts” 
have some important role to play in producing and main-
taining social institutional reality. What can these acts be?
In his paper “Document Acts” (Smith 2014, p. 19), Barry 
explains that document acts are “acts in which people use 
documents, not only to record information, but also to bring 
about a variety of further ends.” Later in that page, he says 
that by ‘document act’ he means “what humans (or other 
agents) do with documents, ranging from signing or stamp-
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ing them, or depositing them in registries, to using them to 
grant or withhold permission, to establish or verify identity, 
or to set down rules for declaring a state of martial law. Acts 
of these sorts deal with documents in ways which reflect the 
status of the latter as documents (rather than as, for example, 
mere pieces of paper)” (ibid).
I am willing to agree that documents are both interest-
ing and important. But can the same be said of document 
acts? We could also recognize a kind of act we call ‘automo-
tive acts’ or ‘automobile acts,’ which include all the things 
that people do with cars: start them, drive them, turn left 
in them, change their oil, repair them, run over people with 
them, go to the movies in them. Wouldn’t it be simpler just 
to talk about cars instead of dealing with this strange catego-
ry of acts?
Barry talks about document acts in some of the same ways 
that Searle talks about speech acts, especially in ways that 
Searle talks about those acts that give rise to institutions. In a 
chart with two columns, one for types of document and the 
other of entities created by document acts performed with 
those types of document, Barry indicates that contract acts 
create obligations, marriage license acts produce the bond of 
matrimony, and that a registration of baptism act creates a 
legal name. Can any of these things be true?
What is a contract act anyway? It can’t be the act of two 
or more parties signing a contract, for that is a more ordi-
nary kind of speech act/language act. And that act only ex-
ists while the signing is going on. Isn’t it more accurate to say 
that the parties’ signing the contract signal their agreement 
to abide by the terms of the contract, and that the signed 
contract is a record of that agreement? Their agreement it-
self is legally binding, but we need the contract to record and 
remind us of that agreement, and of what exactly was agreed 
to. We can, of course, do different things with the contract, 
but is it useful or helpful to lump together all the things we 
can do under the heading ‘contract act’? A contract act isn’t a 
very specific kind of act, although many of the things we can 
do with a contract are more ordinary types of speech acts or 
language acts.
Consider the marriage license I have to record my mar-
riage to Jane. If that license is lost or destroyed, do we cease 
to be married? Suppose further that all records of our getting 
married are lost or destroyed. Would that end the marriage? 
No one thinks so. Documents and records of various sorts 
are certainly essential for our highly complex modern soci-
eties. These are often documents and records which concern 
one or another type of language act. But the documents and 
records are not themselves acts of some kind. We keep docu-
ments, but we don’t perform them.
It was a big advance for human beings when they invented 
language and learned to perform speech acts. It was another 
big advance, but not quite as big as the first, when people 
developed written languages. That made it possible to record 
information, save it, transmit it to people at distant locations, 
and so on. It was also an advance when material to write 
on and instruments to write with became readily available. 
Each of these advances made it possible for people to do new 
things, to perform new kinds of act or action. But the ad-
vances themselves aren’t acts of some kind, and neither are 
the documents that record acts already performed or enable 
acts that will or might be performed. 
REFERENCES
Austin, J. L. (1965). How to Do Things with Words. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Frege, G. (1879/1967). Begriffsschrift: A Formula Language, Modeled 
Upon That of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought. In: J. van Heijenoort 
(Ed.) From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 
1879-1931. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–82.
Kearns, J. T. (1997). Propositional Logic of Supposition and Assertion. 
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 325–349.
Kearns, J. T. (2006). Conditional Assertion, Denial, and Supposition as 
Illocutionary Acts. Linguistics and Philosophy, 29: 455–485.
Kearns, J. T. (2016). The Larger Logical Picture. In P. Arazim and 
M. Dancak (Eds.) The Logica Yearbook 2015. London: College 
Publications, pp. 107–116.
Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free 
Press.
Smith, B. 2014. Document Acts. In: A. Konzelmann-Ziv and  
H. B. Schmidt (Eds.) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: 
Contributions to Social Ontology (Philosophical Studies Series). 
Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 19–31.
ON NOT BEING INFLUENCED BY BARRY SMITH’S ONTOLOGISM
25
COSMOS + TAXIS
CO
SM
O
S 
+ 
TA
X
IS
 
On Not Being Influenced by Barry Smith’s Ontologism
RUDOLF LÜTHE
Philosophisches Institut
Aachen University (RWTH Aachen)
Eilfschornsteinstr. 16 
52062 Aachen
Germany
Email: rluethe@gmx.net
Web: http://www.philosophie.rwth-aachen.de/aw/cms/home/themen/praktische-philosophie/copy-of-personen/~ttn/rudolf-
luethe/?lang=de
Keywords: Barry Smith, Kant, idealism, skepticism, realist phenomenology, ontology
Barry Smith is an honourable man. And I must add: he 
was—and probably still is—ambitious. It is this ambition 
that made him travel from England to continental Europe 
each summer, when he was still a young scholar of philoso-
phy. On these occasions he soon developed the habit of hav-
ing his first stop on the continent at our house in Aachen 
before he went on to meet more important and influential 
phenomenologists in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland 
and Hungary. Then on his way back to England, our home 
generally was his last stop on the continent.
This is how we met, and how we started our discussions 
on many different subjects, only to find that we disagreed 
about nearly every issue. Strangely enough, this structural 
disagreement became the basis of a longstanding friend-
ship that was, at least for me, inspiring in a very special way: 
the more Barry attacked my philosophical positions and my 
political views, the more I was convinced that I was right, 
for even his brilliant mind could not convincingly prove 
that I was wrong. Barry has probably felt somewhat simi-
lar. Therefore, neither of us changed our views in spite of 
all these discussions and arguments. He remained a realis-
tic phenomenologist and a formal ontologist, while I stayed 
what I had been before he entered my intellectual life: a tran-
scendental philosopher in the Kantian tradition and a skep-
tic.
I know that Barry regarded some of the convictions he 
(wrongly) attributed to Kant’s idealism as proof of some 
mental disease, while I thought of his realism as an instance 
of an astonishing naivety. I never really understood the fun-
damental value of formal ontology, but I was deeply im-
pressed by how successfully Barry operated in this area of 
research. I always thought of him as a dogmatic realist, while 
he regarded me as a skeptical idealist. On this basis we got 
along very well with each other. 
Although we did not live and work together in a very close 
way during the first years of our friendship, we met regu-
larly at small conferences that Barry (in cooperation with 
Peter Simons and Kevin Mulligan) organized in England, 
Scotland, and all over Western and middle Europe. I was 
grateful for the chance to participate in these lively intellec-
tual endeavors, and also for the opportunity to practice my 
English. Indeed, on some of our common travels, I spoke in 
English to Barry while he answered in German.
There have been, however, two occasions in which we 
worked together at the same academic institutions. The first 
of these was the two years we spent together at the very small 
and very special International Academy for Philosophy in 
the Principality of Liechtenstein (July 1991–June 1993). 
The director of this (not officially) Catholic institution, the 
Austrian scholar Josef Seifert, defended the most question-
able positions of Catholic theology by making specific use 
of Husserl’s realistic phenomenology. So during those two 
years in Liechtenstein, the friendship between Barry and I 
proved vital to our academic and intellectual survival. Only 
a few months after my arrival we were both under attack, 
though for very different reasons: I was brandmarked as a 
dangerous skeptic, while Barry was regarded as too ambi-
tious, striving towards a higher position within the hierar-
chy of the “Academy.” In our not-chosen roles as academic 
warriors, we helped each other in our different fights. Here 
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Barry proved (as he would in other situations as well) to 
be a very good friend, reliable and supportive. In the end 
we both left Liechtenstein in the middle of the year 1993. 
I accepted visiting professorships in Zurich (Switzerland) 
and at Emory University in Atlanta (Georgia) before going 
back to Germany for a full professorship at the University 
of Koblenz. Barry, however, did not go back to England. 
Instead, he accepted a full professorship at SUNY Buffalo, 
where he still teaches today.
Some years after this forced separation, we used our new 
power to invite each other to visiting professorships at our 
respective universities. So Barry came to Koblenz for the 
spring term of 2000, while I spent the fall term of 2001 at 
SUNY Buffalo. On several other occasions Barry has also 
invited me to give talks at Buffalo. He came to visit us at 
our private home when he was traveling through Western 
Europe as well.
Despite our longstanding friendship, however, there is not 
a single book in which essays from both Barry and I are pub-
lished together. Philosophically, we do not fit together easily. 
Barry nonetheless managed to place two of my early essays 
into the British Journal for Phenomenology; he was and still is 
a very gifted organizer.
Meanwhile, I somewhat lost track of his recent work. From 
my specific point of view some of it seems far from what my 
traditional conception of philosophy expects a philosopher 
to do. But as Barry once told me, by giving formal ontology 
a pragmatist turn, his work has become influential in areas 
like medical information and geography (and maybe many 
others). So, Barry obviously has found his specific position 
in our modern times in general and in the academic world 
in particular. I am convinced that he deserves his success, 
and I hope that it will finally satisfy his ambition.
I cannot, however, finish this short essay in honor of 
Professor Barry Smith without mentioning that, according 
to my own theory of friendship, Barry—in spite of being a 
very good friend—is at the same time a very difficult one. 
On the one hand he is absolutely reliable, trustworthy and 
supportive. On the other hand, he does not have much time 
for cultivating friendships; there are always more important 
things that urgently need to be done, all of them parts of his 
work. In general, “work” seems to be the key word in Barry’s 
life. He has achieved a lot by being such a diligent and dedi-
cated scholar. Nonetheless, as a friend, I truly look forward 
to a possible period of time when Dr. Barry Smith will feel 
important enough without hopping from conference to talk 
and back again, before flying home only to place himself in 
his private or his official office to start with even more im-
portant work. 
I know for sure how entertaining Barry can be when he 
takes the time to socialize. On one occasion during his stay 
in Koblenz, we were having a party, probably his farewell 
party. In its course we started a competition in the spontane-
ous creation of limericks in English. Here Barry very quickly 
came up with a “prize winning” poem that surprised every-
body with both its comical strength and its daring rhymes. 
Please allow me to quote this masterpiece of stand-up comi-
cal rhyming by heart:
There was a young man from Koblenzy
Who fell into the Rhine in a frenzy
They dragged him out fine
He was full of red wine
And drove home in his Mercedes Benzy.
I could cite many other examples of Barry’s talent for com-
ical entertainment. They would convincingly prove that he is 
not a man with only one sort of competence. It would be so 
good if Barry, at some stage in his life, used more of his time 
to cultivate all of his other non-academic talents. But then 
again, every human being has his one specific road to happi-
ness. And in this respect, too, our personalities and convic-
tions are widely different.
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INTRODUCTION
Barry Smith is a man of such strong views that his greatest 
impact on other researchers, especially if these are equally 
opinionated, may be the often forceful resistance his ideas 
are met with. Occasionally, however, after having interacted 
with him, with hindsight one realizes that he changed one’s 
mind after all, even though one’s first reaction may have 
been one of loathing. Thus, it is to Barry that I owe my hav-
ing become an Aristotelian, but before anything else, he 
may have prevented me from abandoning philosophy for 
computing science. It was in 2001, during my stay as re-
search associate at the Italian National Research Council in 
picturesque Padua, and while I was involved in the develop-
ment of the foundational ontology DOLCE,1 that I became 
aware of the work of the Mancunian brothers-in-arms Barry 
Smith, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, as exemplified in 
particular by the volume Parts and Moments edited by Barry 
in 1982. I was immediately charmed and won over by their 
staunch and apt defense of a rich Aristotelian metaphysic 
which not only allows for universals and particulars alike, 
but recognizes substances as well as dependent entia minora 
or moments. The contrast with the Quine-Davidson tradi-
tion in which I had been previously raised as a philosophy 
student was truly mind-blowing, and when Barry founded 
the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information 
Science at the University of Leipzig, I gladly seized the op-
portunity to join him there as a Humboldt fellow in 2002. 
This decision marked a turning point in my life, even though 
I was definitively converted to a rich Aristotelian ontol-
ogy only later, while writing my Ph.D. under the joint su-
pervision of Barry and Kevin Mulligan at the University of 
Geneva between 2003 and 2007.
If there is one paper among the whole body of Smith’s 
work I would have to cite as having had the most last-
ing influence on the orientation of my research, it is his 
1997 article “On Substances, Accidents and Universals: In 
Defence of a Constituent Ontology.” Indeed, with this es-
say Barry revived an ancient conceptual framework that 
Ignacio Angelelli (1967, p. 11ff; 1991, p. 12) has named the 
“Ontological Square,”2 a four-fold division of entities sug-
gested3 in Aristotle’s Categories 1a20–1b10 which is based on 
two orthogonal distinctions, namely:
1 being in a subject vs. not being in a subject,  
i.e. attributes vs. substances, and
2 being said of a subject vs. not being said of a subject,  
i.e. universals vs. particulars.
The cross-wise combination of these dichotomies results 
in a categorial scheme which comprises universal and par-
ticular substances, i.e. kinds and objects, as well as universal 
and particular attributes, i.e. characters and moments:
Substances Attributes
Universals Kinds
e.g. Man
Characters
e.g. Wisdom
Particulars Objects
e.g. Socrates
Moments
e.g. Socrates’  
wisdom
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Universal substances or kinds (e.g. Man) are instantiated 
by particular substances or objects (e.g. Socrates). Particular 
attributes or moments (e.g. Socrates’ wisdom) are cases or 
tokens of universal attributes or characters (e.g. Wisdom). 
Moments are said to inhere in objects, e.g. Socrates’ wisdom 
inheres in Socrates. 
The Aristotelian Ontological Square has been later on ad-
vocated as a foundation for natural science by the late E. J. 
Lowe, notably in his “The Four Category Ontology” (2006). 
Though this book greatly inspired me, it is Smith’s 1997 es-
say which has started my own obsession with the subject. 
And if I have developed a Logic of the Ontological Square 
(Schneider 2009; 2010), this is also due to Barry’s consistent 
attacks against fantology (Smith, 2005), the idea that ontol-
ogy can be simply read off the logical form of standard pred-
icate calculus. 
Meanwhile, Barry himself, however, has moved on to a Six 
Category Ontology consisting of objects, moments and pro-
cesses as well as their respective universals (Smith 2005; Arp, 
Smith, and Spear 2015). I believe that the most appropriate 
way to acknowledge my deep indebtedness to Barry’s work 
and encouragement is to revisit some issues that have always 
troubled me and with respect to which I respectfully beg to 
differ with Barry as his loyal, if slightly dissident, student.
The topics related to the Ontological Square I will discuss 
in this contribution are the following:
1. How can the choice of such a rich ontological scheme 
be motivated beyond mere considerations as to its ap-
plicability within information science?
2. How can the Ontological Square be formally recon-
structed?
3. How can we do justice to time and change within the 
Ontological Square?
The first question is intimately tied to the issue of realism 
dear to Barry, and my heretical answer will be a combination 
of Carnapian deflationism and Strawsonian descriptivism. It 
is also in the spirit of ontological deflationism or minimal-
ism that the second question will be tackled, i.e. by providing 
a set of uncontroversial introduction and elimination rules 
for the various ontological categories. Thus, pace Barry, the 
completeness of the Aristotelian Ontological Square can be 
shown in a purely formal manner. Finally, my response to the 
third problem will commit me to a form of fragmentalism 
(cf. Fine 2005, 281–284), for the general framework of the 
Ontological Square has to be instantiated in infinitely many 
temporal ontologies which merely differ in the reference of 
the uniquely designating expression “the present moment.” 
To use Barry’s terminology, I declare my latish conversion to 
SNAP (Grenon and Smith 2004), without however adopting 
SPAN (ibid.). In fact I will argue that, pace Barry Smith, the 
passage or flow of time cannot be captured, but shows itself 
exclusively in the succession of presentist ontologies.
2. JUSTIFYING THE ARISTOTELIAN  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
2.1 The question of realism and ontological minimalism
The most immediate way of arguing for the choice of a given 
theory, respectively ontology, is to maintain (putting one’s 
foot down) that it corresponds to reality, that it describes 
how reality is. Barry has tirelessly defended this position 
throughout his career, and even argued that realism is a 
methodological sine qua non for building good scientific on-
tologies (see Smith and Ceusters 2010). However, the realist 
notion of a correspondence to the world is open to anti-real-
ist challenges.4 Unfortunately it does not do to reply to these 
attacks by providing an ontological account of truth as cor-
respondence, since this assay is immediately questioned by 
anti-realists as “yet another theory,” the correspondence of 
which to reality is an open question in turn. It is easy to see 
that these moves initiate a potentially endless argumentation 
game of challenges and parries (cf. Smart 1995) in which 
it remains ultimately undecided whether it is the realist or 
the anti-realist who ends up bearing the burden of proof, let 
alone who eventually wins the argument.
A popular escape from potentially endless debates is to 
deflate them, and I plead guilty of having ended up sitting 
with the deflaters on the question of realism. Indeed, accord-
ing to ontological deflationists or minimalists such as Rudolf 
Carnap (1950/1956) and Amie Thomasson (2015), existence 
questions fall into two sorts:
• they are either answerable by trivial inferences from un-
controversial empirical or conceptual premisses (such as 
the inference from “there are tables” to “there are material 
objects”), or
• they are really questions about the appropriateness to 
adopt a certain linguistic framework in which such exis-
tence claims can be stated.
This strategy has the advantage that objections to certain 
existence claims can be countered in two ways: either they 
can be rejected as plainly conflicting with the rules of use 
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that authorize the introduction of the contested entities, or 
they can be charitably re-interpreted as actually question-
ing the linguistic framework itself of which these meaning- 
constitutive rules are part. Therefore, the problem of justify-
ing ontological commitments is ultimately to be settled by 
pragmatic considerations regarding the advantages and dis-
advantages of choosing a particular language which allows 
to state the existence of disputed entities.
Thus, ontological minimalism does not so much consist 
in deflating existence questions than in defusing ontological 
debates about existence claims regarding contested entities 
inasmuch as these claims are the conclusions of uncontro-
versial inferences within a given linguistic framework. In es-
sence, the contester is being faced with the inconsistency of 
wanting to have the cake and eat it: one cannot dispute the 
existence of entities of a certain class while using a language 
the rules of which allow referring to or quantifying over 
these entities.
Ontological minimalism goes hand in hand with a modest 
view of the role of philosophy in general and of ontology in 
particular that was dominant before the second half of the 
last century both within phenomenology and within analytic 
philosophy (Thomasson 2015, pp. 4–13). Briefly stated, the 
division of work between philosophy and science was per-
ceived as follows: while the former uses conceptual methods, 
i.e. recurs to linguistic and/or conceptual analysis in order to 
clarify the meaning of notions that are central to scientific 
inquiry and everyday practice, the latter applies empirical 
methods to the investigation of matters of fact.
According to Thomasson, this modest view of ontology 
is best illustrated by Carnap’s (1950/1956) approach to ex-
istence questions. Carnap distinguished internal questions 
from external questions, a distinction that echoes the di-
chotomy of using vs. mentioning terms. Indeed, while using 
terms referring to certain entities according to the rules of 
a given language, existence questions can be uncontrover-
sially answered either by conceptual analysis or by empiri-
cal methods. So the question of whether a certain biological 
species exists can be tackled by empirical observations, while 
the problem whether there is a prime number between 17 
and 23 can be figured out by mathematical calculation. 
Furthermore, from the statements “there are platypus” or 
“there is a prime number between 17 and 23” one can trivi-
ally infer “there are organisms” respectively “there are num-
bers.” Now, within a language the rules of which license the 
inference to existence claims regarding certain entities such 
as numbers or properties, one cannot sensibly question the 
existence of the very same entities while using the terms that 
are supposed to refer to them. However, the contester may 
be charitably interpreted as mentioning these terms and as 
questioning the rationale of choosing a linguistic frame-
work that permits the statement of those existence claims 
(Thomasson 2015, pp. 12, 39–44). 
Hence Carnap’s treatment of existence claims implies a 
simple realism about any entities the existence of which can 
be established according to the rules of the language that is 
respectively used (Thomasson 2015, p. 145f). Concurrently 
it also leads to a form of deflationism about philosophical 
debates concerning the existence of certain sorts of enti-
ties, since any such debate is spurious, not because the dis-
cussants are talking past each other, but because existence 
questions can be so easily and straightforwardly answered 
(Thomasson 2015, pp. 158–160).
It should be emphasized that Carnapian minimalism does 
not lead to relativism about existence and truth: that the 
meaning of terms like planet is dependent on the linguis-
tic rules that govern the use of these terms does not imply 
that the truth of the statements “there is a planet between 
Mercury and Earth” or “there are planets” is a matter of lin-
guistic convention (Thomasson 2015, p. 60). Furthermore, 
Carnap’s approach does not presuppose a clear-cut distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic propositions, but is com-
patible with there being a spectrum of intermediary cases 
(Thomasson 2015, p. 53 fn. 18). Finally, Carnapian minimal-
ism is not committed to quantifier variance, but embraces 
the idea of existence as a univocal, formal notion governed 
by a fixed set of rules (Thomasson 2015, pp. 63–80).
2.2  Descriptive metaphysics to the rescue of  
 ontological minimalism
The most serious objection to ontological minimalism is 
that it involves an element of arbitrariness as to the linguistic 
or conceptual framework in which existence questions are 
couched. But if it is a matter of arbitrary choice which lan-
guage we adopt, then so is also the range of existence ques-
tions we may ask (Thomasson 2015, pp. 41–42). 
Of course, Carnap and Thomasson do argue that this arbi-
trariness is only apparent, since it is a practical issue which 
language we choose in a certain context (Thomasson 2015, p. 
42). The choice of linguistic or conceptual framework is thus 
determined by our purposes (e.g. to account for biological 
phenomena), but is also informed by theoretical consider-
ations (e.g. as to the simplicity or fruitfulness to use a certain 
language in describing a given range of empirical phenom-
ena). Nonetheless, though the decision to use a linguistic 
framework that allows for stating and answering certain 
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existence questions may not be totally arbitrary, there are 
doubtlessly many sorts of purposes one may want to achieve, 
and also a multitude of theoretical considerations that one 
may consider relevant. Hence, ontological minimalism does 
seem to imply ontological pluralism after all.
This may be a welcome consequence to some—certainly to 
me—since it allows for an equable attitude towards the maze 
of drawn-out debates about minutiae that lately seem to ob-
struct real progress in analytic ontology. Nonetheless, there 
undoubtedly remains the impression of an embarrassment 
of metaphysical choice. This feeling might be mitigated if one 
could identify a linguistic framework that is fundamental in 
some sense to every discourse. Now, it can be argued that 
ordinary language discourse underpins human practice in 
all its forms, and thus is prior to the specialist idioms of arts 
and sciences, which can be regarded as outgrowths of every-
day speech. Therefore, while ontological pluralism seems to 
be an unavoidable consequence of ontological minimalism, 
it is possible to single out ordinary language as a linguistic 
framework presupposed by every kind of specialized talk, be 
it formal or informal. To put it in Austin’s words: Ordinary 
language may not be the last word, but it should be the first 
(Austin 1979, p. 185).
It has to be pointed out, though, that the purpose cannot 
be to simply read off ontology from ordinary language use. It 
is more fruitful to focus on the underlying conceptual struc-
tures that constitute the preconditions of speech acts, in par-
ticular acts of referring and asserting. The task of identifying 
and analyzing these conceptual structures is incumbent 
upon descriptive metaphysics (Strawson 1959, pp. 9–10), 
which perfectly complements ontological minimalism. 
Indeed, ontological minimalism and descriptive meta-
physics agree on the view that the task of philosophy is to 
elucidate the structure of our thought, to trace the connec-
tions between our concepts in order to clarify the latter’s 
function (Strawson 1992, 19), and to uncover the funda-
mental features of our conceptual and linguistic framework 
(ibid., 24). Now, this view starkly contrasts with the stance 
defended also by Barry that formal ontology uncovers the 
structure of the world; according to him, conceptual analysis 
as described above is a form of Kantianism. What is meant 
as an insult would only constitute an objection against de-
scriptivism if the focus on our concepts implied an adop-
tion of anti-realism. However, as already pointed out above, 
Carnapian minimalism does not imply relativism as to exis-
tence and truth. Moreover, conceptual analysis as defended 
by Strawson (and most recently by P. M. S. Hacker 2010) is 
compatible with the tenable core of the correspondence con-
ception of truth, i.e. what Paul Horwich (1998, p. 104f) has 
called “the correspondence intuition”, namely that our be-
liefs, including our ontological presuppositions, are the caus-
al result of our exposure to or interaction with the world, be 
it through observation or through instruction by our peers 
(Strawson 1992, p. 95). Properly understood, Kantianism 
does not conflict with realism.
2.3  Descriptive metaphysics as Aristotelian ontology
As it has already been pointed out by MacMahon (1977), 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics naturally provides the 
tools for reconstructing the Aristotelian Ontological Square. 
In fact, the distinctions within the Ontological Square can 
be motivated by considerations on the nature of acts of as-
sertion (Strawson 1959, pp. 167–170). Asserting a proposi-
tion is tantamount to asserting a non-relational tie between 
terms, thus grounding the unity of the proposition.5
A term can be said to “collect” the entities of which it can 
be assertively tied to (Strawson 1959, p. 167). Each entity re-
ferred to by a term can thus be regarded as a principle of 
collecting other entities. Therefore, basic classes of entities 
can be distinguished in terms of the ways in which they col-
lect other entities. For the purposes of the argument, we only 
need to take into account non-relational ties (1) between 
universals and particulars and (2) between particulars.
Let us first consider the case of universals collecting par-
ticulars and vice versa. A universal (e.g. Man, Wisdom) may 
collect an unlimited number of particulars (e.g. Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle), but a particular (Plato) may equally collect 
innumerably many universals (Wisdom, Man, Philosopher, 
etc.) (Strawson 1959, p. 169). The difference between univer-
sals and particulars consists in the fact that particulars col-
lect universals in virtue of their continuous identity (ibid.), 
while universals collect particulars in virtue of conferring 
them a resemblance (Strawson 1959, pp. 169, 170). In other 
words, a particular collects a set of universals simply by be-
ing the very same subject that the latter can be said of, while 
a universal collects a set of particulars, namely its extension, 
by being a resemblance maker for these particulars.
Amongst particulars we can differentiate between objects 
and moments: objects (e.g. Socrates) can collect an unlimited 
number of other particulars, especially moments (Socrates’ 
wisdom, Socrates’ baldness), while moments can be assert-
ively tied to one particular, namely an object, only. Moments 
are non-transferable in the sense that they are specific to one 
object (or, in the relational case, to one series of objects) only.
Amongst universals we may distinguish between sortal 
universals or kinds and characterising universals or charac-
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ters. A kind (e.g. Man) provides a principle of distinguish-
ing, counting, and grouping together objects which does not 
presuppose the latter being already distinguished, counted 
or grouped together by another principle. A character (e.g. 
Wisdom), by contrast, may only provide a principle of 
counting and grouping together objects in virtue of them be-
ing already grouped together by another principle, i.e. ulti-
mately by a kind (Strawson 1959, p. 168). 
Particulars, whether objects or moments, are akin to char-
acters inasmuch as they may only collect other particulars 
provided these are already distinguished or distinguishable 
by (other) universals.
Finally, characters not only collect objects, but also mo-
ments: indeed, whenever a character is assertively tied to an 
object, a moment that is collected by the character is also as-
sertively tied to that object. Thus, that Socrates died implies 
there having been a moment, namely a particular death, 
that inhered in Socrates (Strawson 1959, p. 168). To sum up, 
then, we can distinguish between four non-relational ties 
that articulate the Ontological Square (cf. Fig. 1):
1. instantiation: an object instantiates or is an instance of a 
kind;
2. tokenization: a moment is a case or a token of some  
character;
3. exemplification: an object exemplifies a character;
4. inherence: a moment inheres in an object.
Fig. 1: The Ontological Square
The preceding reflections only constitute an informal mo-
tivation of the distinctions that make up the Ontological 
Square. A formal justification shall be provided in the shape 
of introduction and elimination rules of respective existence 
claims within a formalisation of the fragment of ordinary 
language discussed above.
3. RECONSTRUCTING THE ARISTOTELIAN  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
3.1  From features to objects
The deflationist approach to ontology sketched above is 
spelled out in a series of languages, each member of which, 
with the exception of the starting point, is a conservative ex-
tension of its predecessor in virtue of two operations:
1. the addition of individual terms of a new category to the 
alphabet of the predecessor,
2. the addition of introduction/elimination rules for state-
ments involving these new terms, supplemented by 
further auxiliary rules governing the predicates that 
occur in these statements as well as by definitions.
The introduction/elimination rules play the same role in 
our version of neo-Carnapian deflationism as the instances 
of Thomasson’s (2015, p. 86) core rule for the term “exists,” 
according to which Ks exist if, and only if, the application 
conditions actually associated with the term “K” hold. These 
rules are certainly at the heart of ontological deflationism, 
but I agree with Evnine (2016) that they are not sufficient 
for providing a complete basis for the use of the terms that 
are introduced. In order to be able to infer properties of the 
admitted entities beyond those explicitly stated on the right-
hand side of the introduction/elimination rules, one needs 
to adopt further rules and definitions. Here one may draw 
an analogy to the fact that deflationism about truth needs 
recursive rules in addition to the instances of the T-schema 
“<p> is true if and only if p” in order to offer a satisfactory 
framework for semantics.
The logical starting point for this successive enlargement 
is a language LF in which no individual terms occur altogeth-
er. This would be a feature-placing language the well-formed 
formulae of which correspond to statements of a “naming 
game” such as:
• Rain(ing) here now!
• Water here now!
• Coal here now!
• Rabbit here now!
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• Scent of roses here now!
• Red here now! 
that simply protocol the apparition of subjectless features 
within the sphere of conscious experience (Strawson 1959, 
pp. 202–203). These features may be that of homogeneous 
stuffs, as in the case of “water” or “coal,” of heterogeneous 
patterns of spatial or temporal occupation, as in the case of 
“rabbit,” or of qualia such as “scent of roses” or “red.” 
It should be emphasized that features are not properties 
of space-time points, since the spatial and temporal adverbs 
appearing in the statements of a feature-placing language 
are to be regarded as sentential, namely modal operators. I 
shall return to the issue of temporal modality further below. 
So let us consider the atomic well-formed formulae of LF as 
corresponding to single-word phrases in natural language. 
More precisely, the predicates of LF are all anadic, and thus 
by themselves constitute the atomic sentences of LF. 
The feature-placing language LF can be extended to an 
object-centered language LO, which in addition to anadic 
predicates or single-word sentences comprises predicates of 
any adicity, with argument places for variables ranging over 
the domain of objects (xo,x1o,x2o, etc., yo,y1o,y2o, etc., zo,z1o,z2o, etc.). 
A mapping μ associates to each LF-predicate a set of Lo-
predicates of non-zero adicity. Indeed, some features, e.g. 
those corresponding to homogeneous stuffs such as “coal,” 
may be associated to more than one predicate of objects, 
e.g. “lump of coal,” “grain of coal,” or “veins of coal,” since 
they may be subject to arbitrary (de-)compositions. Other 
features, in particular  those that are tantamount to patterns 
of spatial and temporal distribution, may generally be asso-
ciated with single predicates of objects only, since they may 
not undergo arbitrary fusions. 
Given the mapping μ, one can, for each pair of predicates 
ϕ of LF and ψ of LO, such that ψ∈μ(ϕ), propose an introduc-
tion/elimination rule, which has ϕ as its single premiss and a 
full existential quantification of the open formula ψ(x1o,…,xno) 
as its conclusion: 
 IE1    [ψ∈μ(ϕ):]    ϕ⊣⊢∃x1o…∃xno  ψ(x1o,…,xno)
Those LO-predicates, for which holds
 ⊢ ∃x1o…∃xno  ψ(x1o,…,xno)
are referred to as satisfiable predicates. There is a subset S of 
monadic predicates of LO such that identity statements about 
objects presuppose that these objects jointly satisfy at least 
one member of S: these predicates are called sortals.6 I write 
“ψ+s” for “ is a sortal” and “ψ-s” for “ is a non-sortal.”
Note that by no means the passage from a feature-placing 
language to an object-centered language sketched here is 
claimed to be cognitively plausible in any way. Far from pre-
supposing that each speaker of English or any other natural 
language ever consciously goes through the stage of feature-
placing, this step merely serves as a starting point for a logi-
cal construction.
3.2 Universals: kinds and characters
The language LO can be extended to the language LU by in-
troducing individual variables ranging over universals, i.e. 
kinds (marked by the superscript “k”) or characters (marked 
by the superscript “c.i”, where i is a number indicating the 
adicity of the character):
 
• Xk, Yk, Zk, X1k,Y1k,Z1k, X2k, Y2k, Z2k,…
• Xc.i,Yc.i, Zc.i, X1c.i,Y1c.i, Z1c.i, X2c.i,Y2c.i, Z2c.i,…
Furthermore, I adopt a dyadic predicate “Xk/c.i⋮ψ+/-s” (read-
ing: “Xk/c.i is the abstraction of ψ+/-s”), which holds between 
universal variables and satisfiable predicates of LO, such that 
sortal predicates are always associated with kind variables 
and n-place non-sortal predicates always with character 
variables of (non-zero) adicity n. Thus one can stipulate in-
troduction and elimination rules for existential claims about 
kinds and characters:
IE2 ψ+s (xo)⊣⊢∃Xk (Xk⋮ψ+s ∧xo  ι Xk)
IE3 ψ-s (x1o,…,xno)⊣⊢ ∃Xc.n (Xc.n⋮ψ-s ∧x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n)
where “xo ι Xk” means that the object xo instantiates or is an 
instance of the kind Xk, and “x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n” means that the 
objects  exemplify the (n-adic) character Xc.n.
3.3 Moments
The language of universals LU can be expanded into the lan-
guage of moments LM by introducing variables ranging over 
moments of any (non-zero) adicity i, i.e.
x m.i, y m.i, z m.i, x1 m.i, y1 m.i, z1 m.i, x2 m.i, y2 m.i, z2 m.i…
and by adopting the introduction/elimination rule
IE4 x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n ⊣⊢∃xm.n (xm.n τ Xc.n∧xm.n ⟨x1o,…,xno)
where 
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1. “xm.n τ Xc.n” means that the moment xm.n is a token of 
 the character , and 
2. “xm.n ⟨x1o,…,xno” means that the moment xm.n inheres 
 in the objects x1o,…,xno.
It is commonly assumed that moments are not transfer-
able from one object to another. In other words, no moment 
may inhere in more than one object or tuple of objects:
R1  xm ⟨x1o,…,xno, xm ⟨y1o,…,yno ⊢x1o = y1o ∧...∧ xno = yno
In the process of introducing terms for entities of the vari-
ous categories within the Aristotelian Ontological Square, 
we have also added predicates for instantiation, exempli-
fication, inherence and tokenization. These predicates may 
aptly be called “transcendentals”’ inasmuch as they cross the 
categorial borders between kinds, characters, objects and 
moments. For this reason, it is only a matter of caution not 
to augment the Language of the Ontological Square with 
introduction rules that would allow the reification of those 
predicates, a choice which amounts to a form of nominalism 
about purported higher-order universals.
3.3 Grounding and the ontological priority of objects
Using the introduction and elimination rules stated above, a 
partial order of grounding relations between ontological cat-
egories can be defined and a class of entities can be identified 
as ontologically basic in the sense of being the least element 
in that partial order.
Now, the reader should be reminded that according to 
ontological deflationism all existence statements are equally 
deep or shallow. This means that an ontological deflationist 
cannot, on pain of incoherence, both maintain that items of 
certain categories exist and that they are “nothing over and 
above” whatever category of entities that may be considered 
ontologically basic. In ontological minimalism, as pretty 
much elsewhere, there ain’t such a thing as a free lunch. 
However, while “free lunch” double-talk is not permissible 
within ontological minimalism, the ontological commitment 
to entities of a basic category may be considered to be more 
fundamental than the ontological commitment to classes of 
entities that are higher up in the grounding hierarchy.
Let the notions of “immediate grounding” and “ground-
ing” be defined as follows. A class of entities C1 immediately 
grounds a class of entities C2 if, and only if C1 appears in the 
introduction and elimination rule for C2. A class of entities 
C1 grounds another class of entities C2 if, and only if there is 
a third class of entities C3 such that C1 grounds C3 and C3 
immediately grounds C2.
By this definition, and in consideration of the succession 
of introduction and elimination rules described in the pre-
vious section, one can say that objects immediately ground 
kinds as well as characters, and thus also ground moments. 
Characters immediately ground moments, but neither kinds 
nor moments ground any other class of entities (cf. Fig. 2).
Fig. 2:  Grounding between the elements of the 
Ontological Square
The fact that objects ground all other classes of entities 
within the Ontological Square represents a “victory of sub-
stantial particularity,” inasmuch as both universals and mo-
ments are grounded on objects. However, the present view 
also supports realism in the sense that the introduction rules 
ensure the existence of all classes of entities that belong to the 
Ontological Square. So the present approach emphasizes the 
primacy of objects without denying the existence of kinds, 
characters and moments, which is certainly Aristotelian in 
spirit if not in letter.
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4. TAkING TIME SERIOUSLY WITHIN THE  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
4.1 Times as substantial universals
According to Strawson (1959, p. 38f), objects, more specifi-
cally material bodies, are also ontologically prior to other 
particulars in terms of particular-identification. The mem-
bers of a category A are (generically) ontologically prior to 
those of a category B if, and only if the Bs are identifiabil-
ity-dependent on the As, i.e. if, and only if the Bs can only 
be identified provided the As have already been singled out 
(Strawson 1959, p. 17). Objects, being three-dimensional 
particulars with some endurance through time, are identifi-
ability-independent because they alone are suitable for being 
nodes within a single spatiotemporal framework of reference 
on which particular-identification ultimately rests (Strawson 
1959, p. 39).
However, someone could object to this thesis on the 
ground that objects are not fine-grained enough in terms of 
their duration in order to constitute sufficiently many tem-
poral reference points within a spatiotemporal framework of 
reference. This may be one of the main reasons why Barry, 
following Moravcsik (1976), has adopted the view that the 
Aristotelian Ontological Square must be completed by add-
ing two categories, namely processes and processual uni-
versals (see Smith 2005). Nonetheless, I maintain that since 
objects gradually come into and go out of being while their 
durations overlap, there should be enough of classes of con-
temporaneous objects to stand in for times. Let us assume 
that these classes are a special subcategory of kinds: these 
kinds could be regarded as the bearers of temporal relations. 
In other words, I propose to regard times as a special sort of 
substantial universals. So, substances are ontologically prior 
in terms of particular-identification after all, if among sub-
stances one includes universal substances, i.e. kinds, as well 
as particular substances, i.e. objects.
Objects are in time inasmuch as they instantiate times; 
since they endure in time, they may instantiate more than 
one time. But objects are not the only temporal entities. 
Indeed, in order to account for accidental change, one may 
assume moments, including the spatial locations of ob-
jects, to be temporally located, too. Thus, an object’s having 
incompatible properties at different times amounts to mo-
ments with different temporal locations inhering in the very 
same object. There are some significant differences between 
moments and objects with respect to being in time, though. 
On the one hand, temporal location of moments cannot not 
be analyzed in terms of instantiation as in the case of objects. 
On the other hand, it is arguable that, contrary to objects, 
moments may be instantaneous, i.e. temporally unilocated. 
4.2 Elements of a basic theory of time
Assuming that times can be associated with universal sub-
stances or kinds, our task is to find introduction and elimi-
nation rules for existence claims specifically about times, 
kinds having already been introduced at an earlier stage of 
the construction of the Language of the Ontological Square. 
In a Priorian fashion, we may assume that ordinary 
modal idioms are primitive and that modal statements con-
stitute the entry ticket for commitments to times (cf. Prior 
1959/1976). Let us assume a simple, if not simplistic modal 
language for temporal reasoning, namely K4t: The modal op-
erators F (“sometimes in the future”) and P (“sometimes in 
the past”) are assumed to be primitive, while the operators G 
(“it is always going to be the case that”) and H (“it has always 
been the case that”) are defined in a straightforward manner:
D1 Gϕ≣  ~ F ~ ϕ
D2 Hϕ≣  ~ P ~ ϕ
Assuming that each syntactically independent or top-level 
sentence is to be evaluated at the present time, we can for-
mulate two introduction and elimination rules, one for fu-
ture times and another for past times, a commitment to the 
present time being concurrent in both rules. So the sentence 
“sometimes in the future it will be the case that ϕ” is the an-
tecedent for the statement that there is at least one time T 
that is preceded by the present time such that ϕ holds at T.7
IE6a Fϕ ⊣⊢ ∃T (T@ ≺ T ∧ [ϕ]T)
Correspondingly, the sentence “sometimes in the past it is 
the case that ϕ” is the antecedent for the statement that there 
is at least one time T that precedes the present time such that 
ϕ holds at T.
IE6b Pϕ ⊣⊢ ∃T (T@ ≺ T ∧ [ϕ]T)
In order to guarantee that all theorems of K4t turn out to 
be true, the relation of temporal precedence has to be transi-
tive at least. 
R2 T ≺ T', T' ≺ T" ⊢T ≺ T"
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The definition of the expression “ϕ holds at T ” ([ϕ]T) is 
obvious for molecular statements; I focus on atomic state-
ments. Now, I suppose, but will not argue for the stance 
that instantiation of kinds by objects and tokenization of 
characters by moments are temporally invariant, that is, 
an object is an instance of its kinds simpliciter or atemporally 
and a moment is a case or token of its characters simpliciter 
or atemporally.8 This invariance is ensured by stipulating 
that “[xo ι Xk]T is equivalent to “xo ι Xk” and “[xm.n τXc.n]T” is 
equivalent to “xm.n τXc.n.” Therefore, the only atomic state-
ments affected by tense are exemplification claims and in-
herence claims.
Thus, the statement that a moment inheres in a (sequence 
of) object(s) at a certain time is tantamount to the statement 
that the moment inheres in this sequence/object and that it 
is located at or a case of that time.
D3 [xm.n ⟨ x1o...xno]T  ≡ xm.n ⟨ x1o...xno ∧ xm.nλT
The statement that a character is exemplified by a (se-
quence of) object(s) at a certain time is tantamount to the 
statement that the character has a case or token that inheres 
in this sequence/object at that time.
D4  [x1o...xno  ϵ Xc.n]T  ≡ ∃xm (xm.n τ Xc.n ∧ [xm.n ⟨x1o...xno]T)
4.3 Fragmentalism and the ineffability of the passage  
 of time
Presentism is the combination of two views:
1. the ordinary tense idioms are primitive;
2. only present entities exist.9
As far as (2) is concerned, both descriptivism and ontolog-
ical minimalism do not seem to be very accommodating. On 
the one hand, the transcendental account of the conditions 
of possibility for particular-identification posits past and 
future entities within a four-dimensional framework of ref-
erence. On the other hand, within ontological minimalism, 
any reduction turns out to be a straightforward introduction 
of the reduced entities into discourse, not their elimination 
from it. This means that in a deflationist context, any attempt 
to eliminate references to past and future entities by reduc-
ing them to references to presently existing things actually 
ends up providing grounds for existence statements about 
non-present entities, these grounds being exactly those 
statements that are supposed to provide the analyses of exis-
tence claims about past and future things.
The situation is slightly different with respect to (1). I have 
shown above how in a minimalist descriptivist setting modal 
idioms may be used as entry tickets or grounds for existence 
claims about times.10 What is more, the existence state-
ments that are introduced into the language already contain 
one ultimately irreducible modal idiom, namely that of the 
uniquely designating expression of “the present moment.”
If the flow of time is real, it is obvious that the reference 
of “the present time” is by no means rigid. This implies that 
the extensions of the predicates “past time” and “future time” 
are not rigid, either. Now, while Aristotelian Four-Category 
Ontology is incomplete without these notions, it seems to 
be under the threat of incoherence if it contains them: as 
time flees, what is future becomes present and what is pres-
ent becomes past. The only way to preserve coherence is to 
distinguish between an untensed (or eternalist) and thus in-
complete trunk ontology and an infinite sequence of tensed 
(or presentist) ontologies into which the former is succes-
sively instantiated and which only differ in the reference of 
the notion of “the present time” and the extension of the 
predicates “past time” and “future time.” The view that tak-
ing the passage of time seriously enforces a fragmentation of 
ontology and the abandonment of the idea of the unity of re-
ality has been christened “fragmentalism” by Fine (2005, pp. 
281–284),11 but has been anticipated by Barry (see Grenon 
and Smith 2004) under the name of SNAP.12 
Now, the passage of time enforces fragmentalism, but 
strictly speaking is invisible in each single presentist ontol-
ogy. Pace Smith (ibid.), a fortiori this gap cannot be closed 
by adjoining an ontology of processes (which he calls SPAN) 
since this ontology is untensed. Hence neither a presentist 
ontology nor the eternalist trunk ontology can represent the 
passage of time: in this sense it is ineffable. Instead it shows 
itself in the succession of presentist ontologies: the flow of 
time is not ontological, nor meta-ontological, but literally 
dia-ontological.
What holds for the passage of time is even more so true for 
(human) action or activity (in the sense of energeia) as con-
trasted with the act (in the sense of ergon) that is its result. 
The diaontological character of action could be at the root of 
the puzzling problem of free will: the escape route between 
the Scylla of determinism and the Charybdis of indetermin-
ism may be neither within, nor above, but in between on-
tologies.
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CONCLUSION
To sum up, then, I basically agree with Barry on two views:
1. Aristotelian ontology remains a viable option both in 
philosophy and in applied ontology.
2. The nature of time, namely that time passes, suggests 
that there is no overall unitary account of temporal re-
ality, but that its description is fragmented into a suc-
cession of infinitely many presentist ontologies.
Nonetheless, I disagree with him on four issues:
1. The commitment to a methodology that emphasises 
the role of conceptual analysis does not conflict with 
the fundamental assumption of realism.
2. The Aristotelian Ontological Square can be defended 
as a categorial framework of descriptive metaphysics 
using a minimalist methodology. 
3. The Aristotelian Ontological Square as a Four Category 
Ontology is complete insofar as it:
a) accounts for the varieties of ordinary language 
attribution, 
b) can be validated in a formally rigorous manner, 
by showing how, starting from a feature-placing 
language as a fictional “degree zero” of ontology, 
a series of languages can be constructed, each 
resulting from its predecessor by the addition of 
terms referring to or ranging over a new category 
of entities, as well as of introduction/elimination-
rules for existence claims regarding members of 
this category.
Provided the reality of the flow of time is granted, even the 
totality of presentist ontologies or views on reality is incom-
plete in the sense that it cannot capture the passage of time. 
But the ineffable shows itself precisely where, pace Smith, 
ontology fails.
Let me close on a personal note: at the beginning of this 
paper I have described Barry as a man of strongly held opin-
ions. I may add that he defends this views in an uncom-
promising, sometimes formidable manner, especially if he 
fundamentally disagrees with his opponent(s)—in this re-
spect he is only equaled or maybe even surpassed by Kevin 
Mulligan, my other “Doktorvater.” However, I have to ac-
knowledge his immense generosity and even tolerance for 
diverging views if their holder is capable of standing his or 
her ground. In this respect I sincerely recognize my personal 
debt to Barry, since without his support and opposition, I 
would not be the philosopher I am, however minor this sta-
tus may be.
NOTES
1 My only minute claim to fame in the applied ontology 
community is the fact that I am the last-mentioned co-
author of the famous (2002) paper “Sweetening ontolo-
gies with DOLCE.”
2 So called because of its iconographic representation 
which can already be found in Carolingian manuscripts 
of Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories; cf. 
Dufour 2014.
3 At least according to Porphyry’s Commentary (Busse 
1887, pp. 22–79); cf. also Evangeliou 1996, pp. 51–53.
4 In applied ontology, this view has been defended e.g. by 
Gary Merrill (2010).
5 By calling the nexus between the terms a “non-relation-
al tie,” one wishes to convey that it should not be reified 
as a relational universal.
6 In a sense I turn Wiggins’ principle of sortal depen-
dence (cf. his 2001, p. 56) upside down in order to single 
out the class of sortals.
7 For variables over times, I shall ignore the complication 
of category superscripts.
8 I shall ignore the complication of so-called “phase- 
sortals”.
9 These views are classically put forward in Prior’s works 
(cf. Fine 2005, p. 133).
10 Note, however, that while this may be a reduction, it is 
not, by the very nature of the deflationist approach, an 
elimination.
11 It should be pointed out that I beg to differ with Fine 
concerning the ontological commitment to times.
12 It may be an irony that I have ended up admitting a po-
sition with which I used to differ viscerally while staying 
in Leipzig at Barry Smith’s IFOMIS.
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EARLY YEARS
I first met Barry when he came to Manchester in 1973 as a 
postgraduate student to study for a PhD with Wolfe Mays, 
having completed his undergraduate studies in Philosophy 
and Mathematics at Oxford. I had then been studying phi-
losophy for just two years, having transferred into the sub-
ject as a postgrad after getting my own BSc in Mathematics 
at Manchester. Wolfe was also my supervisor, more by de-
fault than choice, because I had started out being interest-
ed in existential philosophy, and he was the go-to person 
in Manchester for that. Barry had enjoyed the benefit of 
an Oxford undergraduate education: the most impressive 
of his teachers, he said, was Michael Dummett, whose first 
big Frege book was just out. I was a tyro by comparison. 
Wolfe was Barry’s deliberate choice as supervisor, because 
he was interested in Husserl and phenomenology, which 
was off the Oxford radar, and Wolfe as founder-editor of the 
Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology was Mr. 
Phenomenology in Britain at that time. 
From the start, it was obvious that Barry was possessed 
of two characteristics that have stayed with him ever since 
and marked his career: a strong passion for the things that 
interested him, including of course but not confined to phi-
losophy, and an amazing capacity for sustained hard work at 
those things, which left the rest of us bobbing in his wake. 
When I say that neither I nor the third partner in our discus-
sions and enterprises, Kevin Mulligan, is particularly slow 
or sparse in our production, this may give some idea of his 
enviable fecundity as a writer, and latterly, as an ontological 
entrepreneur.
Barry is a native of Bury in Lancashire, a few miles north 
of Manchester, and on several occasions my wife Susan and 
I visited him in his house there. What I recall most vividly is 
the extent to which the house was dedicated to the storage 
of vast numbers of books. Bookshelves lined everywhere in 
the main room except doors and windows. When food or a 
bottle of wine was to be produced, books were moved and 
the required article brought out from behind them. We soon 
discovered our political differences: Barry was a Thatcherite, 
Susan and I were what he called ‘Guardian social demo-
crats’—The Guardian (formerly Manchester Guardian) being 
then, as it has remained, a left-leaning quality daily. This dis-
crepancy remains. Avoiding hard-left, hard-right, (and now 
hard-Brexit) views, I wobble around somewhere in what one 
might call, in analogy with chocolate, the Soft Center. We 
have long agreed to disagree about politics.
Barry’s energy exhibited itself not only in his cycling from 
Bury to Manchester, but also in his annual estival philo-
sophical pilgrimages about the continent of Europe. From 
these meetings he returned to Manchester with ideas and 
links from a range of places, most notably Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland and Poland. In Kraków he met the philosopher-
cardinal-archbishop Karol Wojtyła, whom I recall him de-
scribing as “probably some sort of saint.” This was before 
the latter was elected to the papacy. When Wojtyła’s philoso-
phy writings started to appear, we all decided he was a bet-
ter pope than a philosopher; religious phenomenology was 
not for us. However, realistic phenomenology was. It was 
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Barry who evangelized in our circle for Roman Ingarden, 
one of Husserl’s most talented students, and the one who 
most vigorously opposed the latter’s lapse into transcenden-
tal idealism. Barry also admired and praised Adolf Reinach, 
the leader of the Munich and Göttingen realist phenom-
enologists, and, together with Kevin and also the late Karl 
Schuhmann, exerted considerable effort to get Reinach’s 
work edited, documented and more widely known. Together 
with Karl he also publicized the work of the real instigator of 
the phenomenological movement as a movement, the bril-
liant but dysfunctionally perfectionist Johannes Daubert. 
Through their tireless editorial work, much of it channeled 
through Munich’s Philosophia Verlag, many of the less 
well-known figures of realist phenomenology have been 
made more accessible, especially to the English-speaking 
philosophical world, and the same goes for other central 
European realists such as Anton Marty, Brentano’s most 
faithful student, and Christian von Ehrenfels, the father of 
Gestalt psychology.
The most important connections Barry made in central 
Europe, at least for me, were in Austria. In Graz he met 
Rudolf Haller, whose conviction that philosophy in Austria 
had taken a different (and generally better) line of devel-
opment than in Germany (especially the former Prussian 
part—Bavaria was less affected by Kant and post-Kantian 
philosophy) was championed before Haller by Otto Neurath 
and after him by Barry. Kevin had independently arrived 
at a similar opinion, and I was readily persuaded. The oth-
er important Austrian connection was Edgar Morscher in 
Salzburg, of whom more is below.
Wolfe’s weekly seminars, which had always been fairly 
free-wheeling affairs, were turned by Barry, Kevin and my-
self into exercises in presentation and discussion on a wide 
range of topics, with no holds barred, and the three of us 
rather dominated proceedings. We were extremely direct 
and often rude in our criticisms of one another, which no 
doubt helped us to acquire thicker skins for the times ahead, 
to lend our discussions a direct style which has become 
moderately well-known in our circles, but also to align our 
views more closely. Even more than forty years later, we are 
able to predict one another’s views on more or less any phil-
osophical topic, because they are nearly congruent and the 
few differences obvious.
MOVING INTO CAREERS 
Barry’s PhD on reference in Frege and Husserl was a tour 
de force in bringing together these then rather disjunctively 
compared philosopher–mathematicians, and it brimmed 
over with interesting side-topics on such figures as Reinach, 
Ingarden, Schröder and Wittgenstein. It placed ontology sol-
idly in the center of philosophy, and pulled me over from the 
philosophy of language into ontology. After my doctorate I 
was working in the university library in Manchester, while 
Barry got a research fellowship in Sheffield. I then got a lec-
turing job in Bolton, which involved much teaching with 
little time for research. By the later 1970s, the three of us 
were keen to keep our philosophical seminars going, so with 
the support of Barry’s padrone in Sheffield, Peter Nidditch, 
we set up an informal grouping we called the Seminar for 
Austro-German Philosophy, which from March 1977 for 
several years held themed meetings around the UK, and 
occasionally abroad. The meetings were sparsely funded 
and depended mainly on enthusiasm from the participants. 
Many of the more senior figures Barry had encountered on 
his peregrinations were rounded up as Honorary Presidents. 
The people we had as speakers included not just established 
figures, who seemed pleased to participate, but also other 
younger upwardly mobile philosophers, and many a lifelong 
friendship resulted. The doctrinal line of the SAGP was that 
scientific philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries did not 
coincide with analytic philosophy, important though that 
was, but included strands from Austria, Germany, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and occasionally elsewhere. By and large, 
that message has become available in print, although its re-
ception remains patchy; this is especially true among ana-
lytic philosophers, whose knowledge of central European 
thought is often confined to Wittgenstein, himself standard 
by no measure.
When Wolfe Mays retired as Reader in Manchester, Barry 
and I both applied for his position, and Barry got it. At the 
time I was put out, because Manchester was my home and 
I liked the eclectic mix of philosophies in the department. 
There was soon however a side-effect of the appointment 
which proved very advantageous for me. One of Barry’s 
Austrian acquaintances, Edgar Morscher, had just been ap-
pointed in 1979 as Full Professor (Ordinarius), which in 
the Austrian system brought two assistant positions with it. 
Edgar had Barry in mind for one, but Barry had just accepted 
Manchester and felt unable to let them down. Edgar turned 
at Barry’s suggestion to me: we had met in Manchester and 
Sheffield the previous year and had got on well. After tack-
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ing a visit to Salzburg onto the end of a summer trip to Italy 
(staying with Kevin and his wife) and Kirchberg-am-Wechsel 
(my first Wittgenstein Symposium—the fourth—Barry had 
been in on the second), I decided I’d like to try working in 
Austria and managed to persuade Susan to give up her work 
and come too. It was a huge change—and as it turned out, for 
my own work and career, massively advantageous. I learnt 
German, and got to know a whole new and partly alien set 
of institutions and practices, as well as enjoying the cultural 
and natural wonders of Salzburg city and its surroundings. 
Despite knowing about Austria and Austrian philosophy at 
arm’s length, I found the cultural shift involved challenging, 
but mostly very positive. Edgar became not only my Chef but 
also a close friend, and the department was outward-looking 
and welcoming. Employment conditions for foreigners were 
then not good: I had no permanent post and a lower salary 
than natives—this was before Austria joined the EU. Over 
the years, we slowly settled in: our children were born there, 
acquired both languages and went to school, and we made 
great friends. Teaching duties were modest, research was 
strongly supported and encouraged, the philosophers there, 
especially Paul Weingartner, had good connections, and 
the attractions of the city ensured a regular stream of good 
visitors. The stability of Austria at a time when Britain was 
undergoing socio-economic upheaval was welcome, and the 
position of the city in the centre of Europe facilitated easy 
travel to many philosophical destinations. In time I got my 
Habilitation and became an Austrian citizen, returning to 
Britain only in 1995.
In the meantime, Barry, Kevin and I were co-operating at 
long range on several projects, including the large edited vol-
ume Parts and Moments, to which I contributed three essays 
on aspects of formal ontology on which I had been working 
since Manchester days. Kevin and Barry wrote a magnificent 
introductory essay, ‘Pieces of a Theory’, which is a marvel of 
historical acumen and philosophical wisdom, as are their 
later essays in The Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Following 
the 1982 Wittgenstein Symposium we three put together a 
joint paper, ‘Truth-Makers’, which was published in 1984 
and helped to make that notion and the terminology (which 
we discovered had been invented independently by C. B. 
Martin) much more widely known and discussed. The term 
is new, but the notion is old: it is there in embryo in Aristotle 
(like so much else), is commonplace in medieval philosophy 
under the terminology of a proposition’s being verified for 
such and such items. Our immediate inspiration came from 
Husserl and Russell. (That one should be able without blush-
es to mention both in a conjunctive noun-phrase is part of 
the ideology of the SAGP.) Nowadays, instant telecommuni-
cation and exchange of drafts by e-mail is taken for granted, 
but in those days it involved three-way postal exchanges, 
which took much longer. Since that time, while Kevin and 
Barry co-authored several papers, I have only been involved 
in one other triauthorial piece, our short 2006 ‘What’s 
Wrong with Contemporary Philosophy?’, whose strongly 
critical tone we would all not only maintain but amplify in 
the light of later developments. In regard to what one might 
call Bad Philosophy, Barry and Kevin hold strongly evangeli-
cal views, and they have studied specimens of it under the 
title ‘nosology’. My own practice has been less intervention-
ist: when I encounter Bad Philosophy I tend to ignore it and 
get on with something else. Their practice is preferable, since 
it often helps to be told and shown why some things are bad, 
but I do support them from the sidelines. We all three signed 
the famous letter to The Times—drafted first by Barry—de-
ploring Cambridge University’s decision to award an hon-
orary doctorate to Jacques Derrida, and I still consider that 
opposition was right and justified. It helped the cause (but 
not the outcome) that we got famous names such as Quine, 
Armstrong, Marcus, Haller and Bocheński on board, all of 
whom have since sadly accompanied said Derrida into the 
Jenseits.
PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRUENCE IN BIG 
THINGS
Many of the philosophical opinions that I hold most tena-
ciously derived from discussions with Barry and Kevin. Of 
these, perhaps the most important is our implacable op-
position to any form of idealism, whether subjective, tran-
scendental, or other. I was always inclined to realism, but 
being around philosophers of language can mysteriously 
undermine one’s robust sense of reality, especially if one 
spends too much time trying to piece together what the lat-
er Wittgenstein was driving at. Out and out idealists in the 
fashion of Berkeley are few (though I have known some), as 
are latter-day absolute idealists (I met one once), but respon-
sibility for making a weaker, more insidious form of idealism 
acceptable, even normal, lies squarely with Kant, the philos-
opher who did more to ruin German-language philosophy 
than anyone before Heidegger, and whose influence will far 
outlast the latter. It is possible to write philosophy clearly, 
even beautifully, in German just as in other languages—
Bolzano, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Frege and Reinach stand 
as examples—but Kant’s enormous presence made it accept-
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able to write in tortuous sentences with poorly explained or 
inconsistent terminology, leaving those readers (the major-
ity) who flounder in their attempts to understand the Master 
vaguely worried that it’s their fault for being insufficiently 
“deep” to appreciate the subtle points being made. That has 
led historically, as Barry has pointed out, to a plethora of 
commentary literature, which is far less prevalent in ana-
lytic than continental philosophy, with the notable excep-
tion again of Wittgenstein. While our early inspiration came 
from Ingarden and other realist phenomenologists, we later 
found agreement with such unabashed analytical realists as 
Herbert Hochberg and David Armstrong, and it was with 
great pleasure that we discovered the trenchant and witty 
dismissals of idealism by David Stove.
Barry and I do not quite see eye to eye on matters onto-
logical—he is a realist about universals while I (like Kevin) 
am a nominalist; Barry is more of an Aristotelian, while I am 
more of a Whiteheadian—though we do all agree that it is 
incumbent on the ontologist, no matter how revisionary, to 
effect a meeting with the language and beliefs of the aver-
age person as well as the practicing scientist. This does not 
mean accepting or adopting common sense wholesale, but it 
does mean the onus is on the revisionist to provide positive 
reasons to think commonsense beliefs and ordinary ways of 
speaking are wrong or defective. An area in which Barry has 
made this stance very much his own trademark is his work 
on the application of formal ontology to database ontolo-
gies, to the extent that I frequently find myself calling BFO 
not “Basic Formal Ontology” but “Barry’s Formal Ontology.” 
The amount of common sense that he has instilled into IT 
ontologies and their practitioners is inestimable and admi-
rable. The work of clearing up the messes created by earlier 
conceptualist or idealist approaches to such ontologies has 
been very much in the mold of philosophical nosology. It is 
no wonder that BFO and other realist frameworks for on-
tologies, based on solid realist philosophical foundations, are 
proving ever more popular.
Barry has consistently combined philosophical depth with 
a concern to reach out and interact constructively with ex-
perts in other disciplines such as geography and medicine, 
an attitude of which I heartily approve and that I have in a 
smaller way followed in relation to and collaboration with 
engineering. The idea of a philosopher anchored in an arm-
chair, excogitating the structure of the universe a priori, is 
one which we both deride, and it would be otiose to need to 
mention that it has become obsolete since the scientific rev-
olution, were it not that so many philosophers tenaciously 
hold on to that view or some variant of it, (wrongly) anx-
ious no doubt that their discipline would render itself redun-
dant by merging into natural science. The concern to corral 
philosophy into a safe area beyond the reach of potential 
falsification or revision explains much of the appeal of tran-
scendental idealism. To see that philosophers continue to 
have a negative, critical role, it suffices only to read some of 
the more puerile would-be philosophical statements of even 
great scientists. However, a more positive impression of the 
empirically answerable but non-capitulative systematizing 
and structuring role of good philosophy can be gained by ex-
amining the framework of formal ontology for scientific and 
everyday knowledge crafted by Barry Smith.
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I think that one of the most valuable things that I learnt from 
Barry Smith, perhaps by a kind of osmosis, was a particular 
form of naivety. It is strange to say that one has learnt na-
ivety, because we normally think that naivety stops where 
learning begins. But what I mean is a feeling of epistemo-
logical innocence in trusting one’s common, or even not so 
common, sense and in taking whatever presents itself to one 
as a self-evident truth at face-value (while bearing in mind 
that this is just a fallibilistic self-evidence). I do not wish to 
suggest that this is a position of Barry’s, but this is a position 
I worked out for myself on the basis of what Barry passed on 
to me: philosophers should be sometimes more naive than 
they are and are sometimes more naive than they should be. 
The challenge is to be naive at the right moment and place.
Here is an example, which I once again should like to 
stress is not to be regarded as Smithesque but which I would 
not have thought up (and still less thought out) had it not 
been for him. These two sentences: “This sentence is false” 
(the Liar) and “this sentence is true” (the Truth-Teller)1 give 
rise to well-known difficulties. The Liar is, or at least appears, 
paradoxical: supposing it is true it comes out false and the 
other way ‘round. The Truth-Teller is not obviously para-
doxical, because no contradiction seems to follow from the 
hypothesis that it is true: If it is true, it is true, and if it is 
not, then it is not, and that is it. Yet, some philosophers have 
found the Truth-Teller paradoxical, too (see e.g. Woleński 
1993; Billon 2014). I must say that I sincerely admire the 
ingenuity (and the non-ingenuousness) with which the 
philosophers who have taken either sentence seriously at-
tempted to disarm or explain away the (alleged) paradox. 
And ingenuity does not always mean complexity: Joseph W. 
Smith once formulated an astonishingly simple proof that 
the Truth-Teller was true (Smith 1984), which I, too, find 
convincing—except for the initial presupposition that “one 
is prepared to take the self-referential ascriptions of falsity 
[or truth] of a sentence such as the liar sentence […] [or the 
Truth-Teller or their ilk] at all seriously” (p. 219). I am not 
prepared to do so and I can’t imagine how I ever could. And 
the problem is that I, as distinct from Barry, am rather short-
breathed when it comes to arguing from (what I consider) 
patently absurd premises, adopted just “for the sake of argu-
ment.”
The problem, as I see it, is that both the Liar and the Truth-
Teller are poor candidates to the title of genuine truth-bear-
ers. Barry roused my interest in the issue of truth-makers 
(Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984; Simon and Smith 2007) 
but starting from this I developed mine own for truth-bear-
ers. Primary truth-bearers are, this is my position, not sen-
tences as linguistic expressions but thoughts, some of which 
are sometimes expressed in linguistic expressions. Sentences 
as linguistic expressions have no intrinsic intentionality and 
for this reason they cannot be primary bearers of truth-val-
ues (although they may have a truth-value secondarily, as 
expressions of a thought). If you don’t have any Thai, then 
“กุหลาบแดง” or “kuh̄lāb dæng” is bound to remain inar-
ticulate gibberish to you. Now as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a 
Polish philosopher from the once famous Lemberg-Warsaw 
school, put it: A thought (myśl) is true if and only if it rep-
resents things as being thus and so, in the ontological do-
main in which the thought places them,2 and things are thus 
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and so (Ajdukiewicz 1983, p. 39). Which thought does then 
the Truth-Teller (the easier case) express? Going by the lin-
guistic meanings of its constituent expressions and its gram-
mar, it expresses the thought that the thought it expresses 
represents the things (i.e. itself) as being the way they re-
ally are. For this to make (more than just linguistic) sense, 
or to express a thought, while thinking the thought that the 
Truth-Teller allegedly expresses you’d have to think about 
that very thought itself—which appears impossible—but, to 
boot, you’d have to think about it as representing things the 
way they are. But what way does the Truth-Teller represent 
things (i.e., itself) as being? Well, as representing things the 
way they are, and so forth. Our thought, in a desperate at-
tempt to constitute itself, just can’t go beyond this inchoative 
stage. This is what I here mean by “not expressing a thought.”
Let’s compare the Truth-Teller with a sentence seem-
ingly even more absurd than it: “The inhabitants of planet 
Tephlonia worship the good god Elvis” (an example coined 
by Barry). “This [i.e. the one just read] sentence is true, take 
my word for it.” All right, let’s discuss it. For all its weird-
ness, the sentence does represent things as being thus and so, 
i.e. (and here we are transcending the assortment of words 
employed in the sentence itself3) as involving temples, ritu-
als, processions dedicated to Elvis, bowings, genuflections, 
prostrations in front of Elvis’ statues, or equivalent (in the 
widest possible sense) behaviour, or maybe Tephlonians’ in-
ward acts, sorts of orationes iaculatoriae, or perhaps study-
ing some Elvisian holy books. I am not saying that the 
sentence in question can be verified by such findings, yet 
their contemplation gets us one step forward to establishing 
the sentence’s truth-value; it is in the direction of such ex-
amples that we have to grope, trying to find out whether the 
sentence is true, and this will keep us busy for a long time. 
Should we find out that there is no Tephlonia, to start with, 
we would still vaguely know what would have had (not) to 
be the case on it if it had existed for the sentence to have a 
truth-value, and the sentence would have no truth-value yet 
express a thought all the same, even if a merely hypothetical 
one. In the case of the Truth-Teller, by contrast, we can find 
no such considerations, as there is in it, when it comes to 
representing things as being thus and so, no hint as to what 
that “thus and so” could be like. The Truth-Teller, aside from 
the challenge of thinking about the very thought one is now 
thinking, says only “things are as I am saying they are, that 
is, they are the way I am saying they are, that is, they are in 
the manner I am representing them as being, that is… .” 
This gets us absolutely no forr’arder.
As regards the Liar, a current challenge for the “gapper” 
like myself, i.e. one who thinks that the Liar (does not ex-
press a thought and for this reason) has no truth-value at 
all (Goldstein 2000; Żełaniec 2013) is presented in the form 
of the so-called Revenge Liar, which, in its most basic form, 
runs like this:
(1) (1) is not true.
Avenger: you say that (1) lacks truth-value; thus, you will ad-
mit that it is not true, won’t you?
Me: There is a difference between “s is not true” in the sense 
“s is false” and “s is not true” in the sense “it is not the case 
that s is true (because s has no truth-value at all)”4 but OK, I 
grant you the point and assert hereby: (1) is not true.
Avenger: So you also concede that “(1) is not true” is true?
Me: I do: “(1) is not true” is true.
Avenger: Now, “(1)” and “ ‘(1) is not true’ ” are two names of 
the same thing, namely (1), aren’t they?
Me: Depends, but go on!
Avenger: Well, you said just now that “(1) is not true” was 
true, so substituting synonyms for synonyms you’d get “(1) 
is true,” thereby contradicting yourself. The Liar has been 
avenged!
Such mishaps accrue to those who are excessively fixated 
on expressions as material beings.5 The expression “ ‘(1) is 
not true’ ” is, qua (a type of) material entity, the very same 
expression wherever it crops up, just as “amor matris” is the 
same expression regardless of whether it is used in the sense 
of “love for the mother” (an objective genetive) or in that of 
“love of the mother (for her child or children)” (a subjective 
genetive). But exactly like “amor matris”, “ ‘(1) is not true’ ” 
can be used in two different senses: once as another name 
of (1), another time as the name of a sentence expressing 
the thought that (1) (does not express a thought and for this 
reason) is not true (or false). The Avenger, urging that “(1)” 
and “‘(1) is not true’ ” are two names of the same thing, uses 
the latter expression in the first sense. I, by contrast, when I 
use “ ‘(1) is not true’ ” in the subject position in the sentence 
printed in italics above, use it in the second sense, that is, 
as a name of a sentence which is homographic with (1), but 
not identical with (1); the latter does not express a thought, 
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while the former expresses the thought that (1) does not ex-
press any.
Suppose, to make the above consideration clearer by 
means of an analogy, that “(1)” and “ ‘(1) is not true’ ” were 
two names of an object which quite obviously and indisput-
ably was neither true nor false, for instance, a chair. Then, 
the reasoning just proposed by the Avenger would no less 
seem to go through. I should say: “(1) is not true” (meaning: 
the chair called “(1)” is not true), and pressed by the Avenger 
I should concede that that commits me to saying “ ‘(1) is not 
true’ is true,” and then the Avenger, using the fact that the ex-
pression “ ‘(1) is not true’,” which fills the subject position in 
the sentence I have just asserted, is also a name of the chair, 
would exclaim: Ah, so you are admitting that (1) is true after 
all! But this is wrong, because while saying “ ‘(1) is not true’ 
is true” I was not speaking of the chair (I was not using a 
name of the chair as the subject expression in the sentence 
that I asserted) but of a sentence (which was such that, unfe-
licitously and misleadingly, its standard name is homograph-
ic with one of the chair’s names) expressing the thought that 
the chair was not true. The expression I employed was a kind 
of shorthand for: “The sentence ‘the chair called “(1)” is not 
true’ is true” so that the step to “(1) is true” by dint of the ho-
mography of names is not possible, simply because there are 
no homographic names here.
Similarly, in our case, in saying “  ‘(1) is not true’ is true” 
(the sentence printed in italics above) I am really saying just 
“The sentence ‘the inscription called by the Avenger “(1)” is 
not true’ is true” so that no homography is produced and no 
contradiction follows.
Much of contemporary philosophy, due to its prevalent 
naive materialism, has no conceptual slot available for the 
concept of different, but yet perfectly homographic sen-
tences (unless by endowing their constituent words with 
different meanings or by exploiting a syntactic ambiguity), 
without which the above reasoning makes little sense. Again, 
I do not want to suggest that Barry would have accepted the 
above reasoning or its conclusions, although I hope that he 
would, nor do I intend to gauge the extent to which he ac-
cepts or rejects the premises of contemporary materialism 
(in semantics and philosophy of mind). I remember, howev-
er, from th’ olden days when I knew him, that he would wage 
war on all philosophical schools which he suspected, rightly 
or wrongly, of empty verbalism and rhetorical seductiveness. 
Now the above considerations on the Liar and its ilk are not 
meant, at least not by myself, to remain an exercise in aca-
demic shadow-boxing, but they are meant as serious work 
towards finding tools and means of testing all kinds of dis-
course for having or not much content in terms of assertible 
thoughts. As Barry made me see, by the above-mentioned 
wars he waged, in the time I worked for him, there is deplor-
ably much discourse—in politics, advertisement, morals, 
economics, and other social sciences, “life-styles,” religion 
and much elsewhere, including, yes, philosophy—that is 
less than the Liar or the Truth-Teller obviously, but no less 
truly, thought-free, all the while being linguistically correct 
or even attractive, nice-sounding, spellbinding (though not 
exactly the way in which Keats has been said to have been a 
spellbinder6). One of the most important social tasks, an en-
lightening task, of philosophy is to debunk this “fashionable 
nonsense,”7 which, while not quite as evil as the Hobbesian 
Kingdom of Darkness, is no less demoralising and destruc-
tive. I am sure this was Barry’s position and Barry has ac-
complished very much with regard to that task, and it is to 
be hoped that he will still accomplish much more.
I owe also to Barry the lasting or at least long-time inter-
est in various issues and philosophical areas, such as the 
early Göttingen phenomenology, especially Adolf Reinach; 
among the former I would mention, first of all, the issue of 
the synthetic a priori (in the Husserlian sense rather than in 
the original Kantian) to which I devoted a few publications 
(the latest one is Żełaniec 2013), one of them co-authored 
with Barry (Smith and Żełaniec 2012). The idea was that 
synthetic a priori judgments/sentences/propositions connect 
always two or more8 non-logical concepts in such a way that 
it is enough to have an ever-so-fleeting familiarity with both 
of them to (believe to) see that the judgment in question is 
true. For instance (this is an example from Reinach): every 
promise gives rise to a claim and an obligation, mutually cor-
related. It would be protested, perhaps, that this proposition 
is purely analytic, yet a convincing proof that it is has not 
so far been forthcoming, and I have argued (Zelaniec 1992) 
that it would be harder to produce, should anyone take up 
this task seriously, than one would suppose.
Although I do not in the least wish to pretend that Barry 
was in any way responsible for it, yet I cannot help feeling 
that I in part under his influence grew weary of the tendency 
of some philosophers to let the matter rest at mere assertions 
that something can be done, and not to move on to actually 
doing the thing. A given judgment is analytic, for instance, 
that is (I am presupposing here the Fregean sense of “ana-
lytic”): it can be reduced to a tautology on the strength of the 
definitions of its constituent expressions; well then, let’s try 
to actually carry out the reduction, won’t you, let’s find the 
suitable definitions first, all the while making sure that they 
do not rely, for their correctness, on the judgment in ques-
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tion itself. For while definitions cannot be true or false, yet 
they can be correct or not, in the sense of correctly render-
ing the common usage. If someone, then, suggests that it is 
part of the definition of a promise that a promise gives rise 
to a claim and an obligation, then let him tell us whether he 
thinks a normal English speaker, following common usage, 
would refuse to call a promise an act that happens to be ex-
actly like a promise yet fails to give raise either to any claim 
or any obligation or both.9 “The question is quite pointless, 
as there are no such acts”10 is a likely answer. No sir, there 
are no such acts, because … well … because not only does 
every promise give rise to a claim and an obligation, mutual-
ly correlated,11 but also the claim-and-obligation-generating 
property cannot be removed from the concept of a promise 
arbitrarily.12 At least not in such a way as to make appear 
worth answering the question of an anticipated reaction of 
an English speaker to an instance of the concept so tampered 
with. Pressing such questions, and in general, insisting too 
much on the difference between “in principle feasible” and 
“actually done” does not gain you much popularity with 
most philosophers, but Barry did it with a special, and rare, 
unsurpassable charm.
In this or a similar fashion would I argue in favour of the 
somewhat old-fashioned category of the synthetic a priori. 
In line with Barry, I would call it a fallibilist conception of 
the a priori. That is to say, we should treat judgments syn-
thetic a priori as very well-founded but still “only” hypoth-
eses, and not forget that one day we might encounter facts or 
entities that plainly contradict them, however unbelievable 
this might sound to us at the present moment. Yet still, for 
the sentence “there is no colour that appears as intermedi-
ate between red and green as orange appears intermediate 
between yellow and red,” which looks like a good candidate 
for the title of “synthetic a priori,” empirical data interpre-
table as convincing counter-evidence seems to have been 
found (Crane and Piantanida 1983). It would be tempting 
to compare this theoretical fallibilism with Barry’s personal 
one, and as a person Barry (as I knew him) was not always 
very easy to convince that any of his favourite a priori beliefs 
might after all not fit the facts so well. “All the worse for the 
facts,” one seemed sometimes on the verge of hearing him 
say in the Hegelian (if such it really be) vein. But sometimes 
he was right to be stubborn. I remember a longish discussion 
with him on states of affairs (another topic of his in which 
he roused my interest), in which I argued, against Reinach 
championed by Barry (Smith 1987, p. 201f.) that not all lan-
guages knew the difference between a sentence (“the rose 
is red”) and a nominal group (“the red rose”); for instance 
in Thai, both were “กุหลาบแดง” (“kuh̄lāb dæng” in Latin 
characters, literally: rose red). This is rather strange, be-
cause most languages do make this elementary distinction,13 
but Thai, hardly a “primitive dialect,” does not. “They cer-
tainly utter it with a different voice inflection, depending on 
whether they mean to say ‘the rose is red’ or ‘the red rose,’ ” 
Barry kept asserting intransigently, and I could scarcely 
suppress a certain internal chuckle at his hard-headedness. 
Much later I realised he might have been right, even if he 
was factually wrong as far as the Thai-speaking community 
is concerned: you can utter the same expression and express 
two different thoughts by it, or once express a thought and 
another time not express any. Much of my argumentation 
against the Truth Teller above depended on that possibility 
for its persuasiveness, if it had any. 
With regard to languages and language as such, Barry is, in 
my memory, extraordinarily gifted and sensitive. He spoke 
very good German, so he could hold a lecture on a complex 
philosophical topic in that language freely, i.e. not by reading 
it off a script, and he could read in a few other languages. 
He also was eager to pick up various phrases and expres-
sions in every language he came into contact with. He would 
play small practical jokes on people by throwing in bits like 
“yes, that’s true” in a conversation in a foreign language in 
that language, in his charming way, very much to the amuse-
ment of the interlocutors. I sometimes try to imitate him at 
the University of Gdańsk, where I teach and where there are 
many students from Spain, in that I, passing by a group of 
such students, quickly remark “no, no es verdad lo que dice” 
(no, it’s not true what s/he is saying), but not exactly with 
the Barryesque effects. Yet Barry was, first of all, extremely, 
but also to a large extent self-ironically, proud of his native 
idiom, and would often say “English is language par excel-
lence,” whatever this was supposed to mean. When I teased 
him with John Skelton’s observation (16th century) that:
Our natural tongue is rude
And hard to be ennewed […]
Our language is so rusty
So cankered, and so full
Of frowards, and so dull […]
I wot [know] not where to fynde
Terms to serve my mynde
Barry responded with a variation on Pope:
Our language and its wealth lay hid in night;
God said, “Let Shakespeare be!” and all was light.
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One evening in the mid-nineties Barry “threw a party” (a 
favourite locution of his) at his home; in the middle of a con-
versation a non-Anglophone guest at the party said that he 
had never “shaked” hands with a Mr. So-and-So. In response, 
Barry said: “shook,” in a solemn, teacher-like tone of voice. A 
few minutes later Barry was telling his guests how skillful he 
was as a cook and asserted of a cake: “I baked it myself.” In 
this moment, I cut in and said in an equally solemn tone of 
voice: “book.”14 That was my “revenge,” for which I did not 
fail to harvest amusement.
I sometimes teased Barry’s pride of his “natural tongue” 
beyond due measure—which he bore with apparently un-
shakeable stoicism—confronting him with various seeming-
ly absurd properties of English. Here is an example. This may 
not be obvious to many or most Anglophone readers, but 
in most languages that are “par less-than-excellence” words 
are derivable from one another in a regular fashion. For in-
stance, in Polish “wilk” means “wolf,” while “wilczy” means 
“lupine,” similarly “kot” – “koci” (“cat” – “feline”), and so on. 
In English, by contrast, the adjective is Latinate, while the 
substantive is Saxon, and they are not derived from one an-
other, meaning apart. So I once collected a number of such 
pairs and asked Barry if it was linguistically correct to call 
the thesis defended by a Dr. Hare a “Leporine thesis,” or a 
playful invention by a Winola Cat a “Feline invention,” or 
the conjecture by a Prof. Ben Seal a “Phocine conjecture,” or 
the assertion by a Frederic Gander-Goose an “Anserine as-
sertion,” or the explanation by a Jane Peacocke a “Pavonine 
explanation,” or the transgression perpetrated by a Herbert 
Elk an “Alcine transgression,” or the advance achieved by a 
Donald D. Duck an “Anatine advance,” or the theory formu-
lated by a Dr. Grail Oxe a “Bovine theory” (and a number 
of others)—to which Barry responded with a note of stoic 
resignation: “I am very sorry but none of these would really 
work in English.” Fair enough.
Barry was, too, very good at coining humorous sayings 
that exploited various hidden meanings of familiar words. 
As he was regarded by many of his students and acquain-
tances (non-native speakers of English) as an authority on 
“language par excellence,” he was often asked various ques-
tions on that language. For instance, once he was asked 
whether, given that there were the verbs “to overwhelm” and 
“to underwhelm” (a recent coinage), there existed in English 
a verb like “to whelm.” His answer: “Certainly. I whelm my-
self every day just to the right extent, otherwise I’d be seri-
ously underwhelmed.” I have no doubt that Barry keeps 
whelming himself just to the right extent, I hope, whatever 
that means.15 Another example, this time of Barry’s liter-
ary wit, was his “Old Nordic Saying,” which I have passed 
on to many of my students: “To have history without ideas 
is blind; to have ideas without history is American” (Smith 
1984, p. 311).
Another striking feature of Barry’s, noticed not just by me, 
was his being blessed with an intense emotional attachment 
to his mother-country England and to things English. As he 
once quoted a medieval work, perhaps Confessio amantis by 
John Gower (1330–1408), as (according to its author) “A bok 
for Engelondes sake,” it suddenly occurred to me that practi-
cally every work by Barry could be thus entitled. Only later, 
as I came to know him better, did I realise that Barry’s rela-
tion to England was not as unproblematic as all that (due to 
the class-ridden structure of the English society); yet most 
of the time, it is true, one had the impression of hearing the 
last stanza of Rudyard Kipling’s “Home return” in the back-
ground:
If England was what England seems,
An’ not the England of our dreams,
But only putty, brass, an’ paint,
’Ow quick we’d chuck ’er! But she ain’t!
and one felt like asking “but isn’t she really?” Well, this is 
a sore point, but the last time I talked to Barry about such 
issues I no longer had the impression that, in his eyes, she 
wasn’t. And yet, Barry would say “we” in some contexts, such 
as “we conquered India,” “we ruled half a world,” “we’ve be-
come wimps since WWII” and similar. In imitation, I also 
took to saying “we” with reference to Poland (“we got parti-
tioned between Germany and Russia in 1939”), for a stretch 
of time.
For some reason that escapes me now, I once gave Barry 
a computer file with the famous Nelsonian phrase “England 
expects that every man will do his duty” printed umpteen 
times over in different fonts; some time later, paying him a 
short visit at his place, I discovered that he had printed that 
out and attached it to the wall in front of his desk. Would he 
have done so if the text had read “L’ Angleterre est une nation 
de marchands” or even “The more he looked inside, the more 
Piglet wasn’t there”? Hardly conceivable…
I also remember that Barry was sometimes, if very seldom, 
rather stern and tough on us non-native speakers of English 
with regard to certain words and locutions which he thought 
only English poets were authorised to employ. In my case the 
“sacrilege” consisted of using somewhere in writing the verb 
“to asseverate” with reference to philosophers who solemnly 
affirm, but little more than just affirm, that something can 
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be done or demonstrated. Years later, when I told the story 
to another British person the reaction was: “What a funny 
story about your boss! No right to use certain words? LOL!” 
LOL indeed but, yet, I am proud of having had a “boss” like 
that: English may or may not be “language par excellence,” 
but language is a very valuable tool, and those insufficiently 
competent should not be left meddling with language unat-
tended. I do not know if Heidegger was right in calling man 
the herdsman of being, but Barry was and I am sure contin-
ues being a brilliant and skillful herdsman of Language (par 
excellence). 
More personally, the Barry I know is a very generous, re-
sourceful, efficiently helpful and (at the same time) modest 
man. Even when reporting his many brilliant successes, he 
would never be boastful, arrogant, or presumptuous. There 
is a consistent streak of self-irony, or perhaps of not tak-
ing himself too seriously, present in everything he ever says 
about himself or quoted as said about himself by somebody 
else. Last but not least, he has always been helpful to oth-
ers in a practical sense, not just in the sense of giving moral 
support. He has always read and extensively commented on 
draft manuscripts (even those that were not really worth his 
time) by his students, assistants, and colleagues, providing 
them with oftentimes caustic (“learn how to use a word-pro-
cessor”) but mostly very just remarks. He has also readily en-
gaged in serious philosophical discussion even with persons 
who are by far not his match. Barry’s practical generosity has 
been also demonstrated in his very efficient and reliable re-
plies to letters and emails. He responds almost immediately, 
and always very much to the point and constructively. For 
this reason, a colleague of mine called him once a “philoso-
pher businessman” in good-willed banter. However, while ef-
ficiency and reliability certainly are important traits of good 
businessmen, Barry is not, as I know him, a businessman in 
a very important sense. That is, Barry has never tried, for 
aught I know, to “sell” to anybody ideas he did not himself 
believe in, only to personally profit from another person’s 
being persuaded by his truly formidable eloquence. There 
has always been something of a secular missionary (but not a 
peddlar) about Barry, yet a missionary passionately believing 
in his cause16 (whether Aristotelianism in philosophy or Free 
Market Liberalism in economics), and sincerely convinced 
its adoption is in everybody’s, not just his, best interest.
NOTES
1 Sometimes called the “Veridic.” See (Żełaniec 2013).
2 This proviso by Roman Ingarden (Ingarden 1985, p. 
143) is meant to help to deal with such truths as that 
Polyphemus was blinded by Ulysses.
3 An inability to paraphrase a sentence in quite differ-
ent words is an almost sure sign that the sentence ex-
presses no thought, at least to the speaker. See e.g. Plato’s 
Gorgias, where Callicles is unable to explain the cru-
cial difference between “better” and “stronger” and his 
clumsy efforts are commented upon by Socrates thus: 
“Ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ 
οὐδέν;” (”So you see, you are uttering mere words your-
self, and explaining nothing,” tr. by W.R.M. Lamb 489e). 
Or this passage from Hume on efforts to define causal-
ity: “Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as 
the cause of motion in another. When we consider these 
objects […], we find only that the one body approaches 
the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the 
other, but without any sensible interval. […] We can go 
no farther in considering this particular instance. […] 
Shou’d any one leave this instance, and pretend to de-
fine a cause, by saying it is something productive of an-
other, it is evident he wou’d say nothing. For what does 
he mean by production? Can he give any definition of 
it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he 
can; I desire it may be produced. If he cannot; he here 
runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term instead 
of a definition.” (Treatise, bk. I, pt. III, sect. II). “To say 
and to say nothing” or “to provide synonyms instead of 
a [not merely verbal] definition” is, so I should under-
stand it, to speak and yet express no thoughts.
4 The latter is sometimes called the wide-scope negation, 
see (Horn 2001, p. 226; Brandtler 2006, p. 183).
5 As Hume’s theologians were not, since they “clearly 
perceived, that the external form of words, being mere 
sound, require an intention to make them have any effi-
cacy; and that this intention being once considered as a 
requisite circumstance, its absence must equally prevent 
the effect” (Treatise, bk. III, pt. II, sect. V). But they, pre-
sumably, were no materialists.
6 Cf. these surprisingly highly relevant remarks on style: 
“Does [the given] writer make me more keenly con-
scious […] both of what he is saying and of the events 
and significance of my daily life? Do I see the world in 
clearer details after reading him? Or does he just give 
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me a drowsy feeling in which musical noises agreeably 
peal and reverberate? It is interesting to note that the 
older English writers never did merely this. Even great 
masters of the ornate style like Sir Thomas Browne and 
Jeremy Taylor have a hard core of meaning which keeps 
the reader constantly alert. It is only with the nine-
teenth century that the professional spellbinders appear: 
Coleridge, Keats, much of Shelley, Tennyson, Swinburne, 
Morris, Fletcher […]” (Blackstone 1954, p. 270), a good 
description of what expressing a thought as distinct from 
merely spellbinding by “musical noises” can be like. 
For an interpretation of difficult thoughts contained in 
Euclid’s Elements see (Reed 1990).
7 Sokal and Bricmont 1998. This is as a rule less spellbind-
ing and less musical.
8 In (Smith 1996) Barry mentions just the concept of being 
a part of … . The second one is the second-order concept 
of being transitive.
9 Just as he would deny the name of a brother to everyone 
who were someone’s sibling but not a male one.
10 There seem to be such acts, to be sure, such as e.g. “prom-
ises” given while intoxicated and the like, but as long as 
we consider them promises we normally think they do 
generate a claim and an obligation, and if we discover 
they are no promises after all, we do it not just by seeing 
that they have not generated a claim or an obligation.
11 Attention: while our original synthetic a priori judgment 
could have been understood as possibly vacuously true 
(i.e. if there had not been any promises) this last sentence 
must not be so understood: there are acts that look exact-
ly like promises and … lo and behold, all of them generate 
claims and obligations. To make this clear it is apposite to 
formulate our original judgment as a conditional: “If as 
a matter of empirical fact an instance of the kind prom-
ise  occurs, then there begin to exist enduring states of 
claim and obligation” (Smith 1987, p. 191).
12 By contrast, it is very much possible to separate the prop-
erty of being male from the property of being a sibling, 
without changing anything about the latter.
13 For instance, in Russian “rose red” is the sentence, while 
“red rose” is the nominal group.
14 As a matter of fact, in German, a sister language of 
English, the old past tense “buk”, of “backen”, to bake, still 
survives, even if reputed old-fashioned.
15 As a matter of actual fact, “to whelm” once existed and 
meant “to overturn”, “to capsize” (of a vessel); “over-” in 
“overwhelm” is just an intensifier. The current meaning 
“overcome” is figurative.
16 I sometimes heard him quote the Hussite slogan “Veritas 
praevalebit” or “the truth will prevail” with reference to 
one of his causes.
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I met Barry for the first time at the Ingarden Symposium 
held in Cracow in 1984. We both co-chaired the session in 
formal ontology. At the beginning, Barry said that formal 
ontology must be done in military order. He meant that ev-
erything must be done on time. However, I prefer to replace 
the term ‘military’ with the term ‘logical’ because I believe 
that formal ontology must be done according to logical or-
der. It is not only possible but, I dare say, it is quite certain 
that Barry’s understanding of logic is different than mine. In 
light of this difference, I recognize that I have a challenging 
task ahead since I have chosen to address ‘truth makers’ here 
as my celebratory contribution for Barry’s Festschrift. I hope 
that he will be tolerant with respect to my formalist attitude, 
at least to some respect.
I rather follow a Polish imperative to understand logic in 
a restrictive sense, that is, formal in the traditional sense. 
Thus, I should add that my analysis in this paper follows the 
Polish analytic tradition. I know very well that Barry has al-
ways shown great respect for Polish analytic philosophy as 
a sound mode of philosophizing. But I also know that he 
would object to my identifying the philosophy in Poland as 
Polish analytic philosophy because, to him, good philosophy 
is not characterized by national idiosyncrasies. He used to 
say, “There is no such thing as Polish philosophy; it is just 
good philosophy.” His point was that to qualify analytic phi-
losophy with the term ‘Polish’ renders the phrase ambigu-
ous: it could refer to a particular national philosophy or to 
good philosophy done in Poland. If the latter, then there is 
no need to say anything other than ‘good philosophy.’ 
In genuine observance of logical order and good philo-
sophical fashion, then, I shall start my examination with 
some clarifications. First of all, I do not belong to the ad-
vocates of the theory of truth-makers. More precisely, I fa-
vor the semantic theory of truth (see Woleński 2014) and 
Tarski’s truth-definition over defining the concept of truth 
via truth-makers. Eventually, truth-making may be used 
in explaining the criteria of truth, but I shall skip this here. 
Nonetheless, I will not argue against ‘truth-makerism’ as a 
general account of how the concept of truth should be de-
fined. In other words, I am interested in internal problems of 
Truth-Maker Theory (hereinafter TMT). My only task here 
consists in analyzing the consequences of seeing truth-mak-
ers via the idea that they necessitate truth. 
The view that truth-makers necessitate truth of sentenc-
es—e.g., statements, propositions, judgments, etc.—has 
many advocates in contemporary discussions (see Smith 
1999; Armstrong 2004; Merricks 2007).1 On the other hand, 
the idea of truth-making as a necessary nexus does not oc-
cur in the seminal paper (see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 
1984), which opened the present debate about truth-makers. 
A fundamental intuition in regard to the truth-making rela-
tion is captured by 
(1) A truth-bearer is true if and only if it has a truth-maker.
In a formal language (see Rami 2009, p. 3), (1) as the 
truth-maker principle can by expressed by 
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(2)  For every A, A is true if and only if there is a y such that 
y is a truth maker for A.
 In symbols: ∀A(Tr(A) ⇔ $yTrMkA(y)).
Yet I consider (2) as less convenient for analysis than its 
conversion into something similar to the T-scheme, namely2
(3)  Every instance of the scheme
 (*) Tr(A) ⇔ $yTrMkA(y) is a theorem of TMT (truth-
makers theory)
Now, the problem here is whether the necessity parameter 
must be introduced into (*). The truth-maker necessarists—
i.e., those who believe that truth-making is just necessary—
reply “Yes” and propose various ways in order to justify this 
strong claim. I will examine this claim by using modal logic.
I would like to recognize at this juncture that, in the 
foregoing, I have entirely neglected to address the nature 
of truth-makers as well as the problem of whether (2) suf-
fices for developing a full-blooded theory of truth-makers. 
I only assume that they are things of a sort without decid-
ing whether they are mereological or set-theoretical entities, 
and without considering additional constraints such as the 
principle of projection proposed by Barry Smith (see Smith 
1999). Furthermore, I assume that modal logic—in fact, very 
elementary principles of modality—can be applied to TMT 
independently of the ontological status of truth-makers. 
This assumption is commonly shared by many truth-maker 
theorists, including Barry Smith, who says (see Smith 1999, 
p. 277) that he uses modal logic “in the vicinity of S4.” All 
propositional functors, that is, negation, implication, etc., 
have the classical truth-functional interpretation.3
The simplest way to cope with the problem is to split (3) 
into 
(4)  (a) Tr(A) ⇒ $yTrMkA(y).
  (b) $yTrMkA(y)⇒ Tr(A). 
Now (4a) states that Tr(A) is the sufficient condition for 
$yTrMkA(y))—i.e., being true is sufficient for the existence 
of a truth-maker—but (4b) considers $yTrMkA(y) as the 
necessary condition for Tr(A). One could even say that (4b) 
nicely captures the significant sense in which truth-making 
just necessitates truth itself. However, we can easily see that 
this account appears as artificial and too poor for necessari-
anism. 
Another possibility is to change the succession in (3) in 
order to obtain its equivalent, that is 
(5) $yTrMkA(y)⇔ Tr(A).
Under this move, Tr(A) is necessary for $yTrMkA(y), 
but the latter is sufficient for the former. Clearly, (4) and (5) 
make the entire problem trivial because both $yTrMkA(y)
and Tr(A) mutually co-necessitate and co-suffice. It is not 
surprising that this situation is caused by (3). This constraint 
claims 
(6) TMT ⊦ (or ⊦TMT) Tr(A) ⇔ $yTrMkA(y), for any A. 
This means that instances of (*) are theorems. Assuming 
that we have sufficient deductive resources, for instance 
the ω-rule, we can even say that the formula “A(Tr(A) ⇔ 
$yTrMkA(y)) is provable in TMT. 
We can draw some lessons come from the foregoing el-
ementary observations. The first is that necessary and suf-
ficient conditions can be reversed. The explanation is as 
follows. If a given theory Th proves the formula A ⇔ B (in 
symbols, Th ⊦ (A ⇔ B)), the way of structuring necessary 
and sufficient conditions is conventional to some extent. 
Basically, proving the formula of the type A ⇔ B requires to 
demonstrate two implications, namely A ⇒ B (the sufficient 
condition) and B ⇒ A (the necessary condition). 
Secondly, one might eventually say that (*) is TMT-
necessary or TMT-analytic. Staying with necessity as more 
relevant in the present context than is analyticity, we should 
examine which kind of necessity is involved in the discussed 
issue. Clearly, (*) is not a tautology, similarly as T-scheme 
(see Woleński 2008). Hence, if we agree to speak about 
TMT-necessity, it is of a conditional character. In other 
words, TMT-necessity (and eventually, other modalities) are 
not logical. I will return to this below. 
Thirdly, since according to the principles of propositional 
calculus, we can decompose (*) into the disjunctive formula
 (**) Tr(A) ⋀ $yTrMkA(y)¬ Tr(A) ⋀ $yTrMkA(y),
the following question arises: whether or not ‘being not-
true’ and ‘being false’ are actually equivalent predicates. 
The above considerations suggest that a weakening of (*) 
to (4b) actually helps in analyzing at least some aspects of 
introducing necessity into the logico-philosophical business 
of truth-making. Thus, we should consider how embed the 
sign of necessity into the formula $yTrMkA(y)⇒ Tr(A). I 
begin with a proposal of Trenton Merricks.4 He writes:
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Necessitarianism says that a truthmaker necessitates 
that which it makes true. That is, necesitarianism says 
that, for all x and all p, x is a truthmaker for p only if x’s 
mere existence is metaphysically sufficient for p’s truth. 
Let me try to formalize this definition. It can be done, by 
the formula (and I slightly change letters according to my 
notational conventions; the symbol Nec stands for ‘necessi-
tates’). 
(7) ∀y∀A(Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) Nec Tr(A)).
I take the word ‘only’ as indicating that the formula 
⇒should precede the expression Tr(A), I render ‘mere ex-
istence’ by ‘y exists’ (I skip the problem of the status of this 
expression; one can consider it as a special predicate), and 
‘metaphysically sufficient’ by ‘y belongs to truth-makers of 
A’ without entering into various questions concerning meta-
physical grounding or dependence.
Merricks (2007) adds:
Understood as a necessary condition for making true, 
necessitarianism is now truthmaker orthodoxy. […]. 
Let conditional necessitarianism be the denial of neces-
sarianism conjoined with the claim that for all x and 
p, if x is a truthmaker for p, then, necessarily, if both x 
and p exist, then p is true. […]. Conditional necessari-
anism is equivalent to the claim that if x is truthmaker 
for p, then it is impossible that x exists and p have a 
truth-value other than true (or lacks truth-value alto-
gether).5
 
The first sentence of the last quotation has to be correct-
ed. Independently of what is necessarianism and how this 
view can or should be understood, it cannot be identified 
with functioning as a necessary condition that truth-makers 
produce truth of truth-bearers. It is clear that necessarian-
ism proposes how to define the necessary constraint for the 
relation of making true, for instance, by (7) saying that the 
existence of a truth-maker y necessitates that a proposition 
A is true.
How to formalize the conditional necessarianism? First, it 
has the denial of (7) as its component. Thus, we have the fol-
lowing sequence of formulas:
(8) (a) ¬ (∀y∀A(Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) Nec Tr(A));
 (b) ¬ $y ¬ ∀A(Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) Nec Tr(A));
  (c) ¬ $y ¬ $A ¬ ( Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) Nec Tr(A));
  (d) ¬ ( Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) Nec Tr(A)) ??? 
The steps from (8)(a) to (8)(c) are justified by simple rules 
for negating quantifiers in the classical first-order logic. 
Why does question marks occurs in the assertion (8)(d)? 
The problem refers to the place in which the sign of nega-
tion should occur as related to Nec (for simplicity, I dropped 
quantifiers in (8)(d)). For convenience, let the box □ stand 
for Nec. The first possibility is to convert the problematic 
(8d) to
(9) Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⋀ ¬ □Tr(A),
saying that ¬ (7) means three things: (a) that an item ex-
ists; (b) it belongs to truth-makers of A, and (c) it is still not 
necessary that A is true. The second possibility consists in 
adopting the formula 
(10) (Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⋀ □ ¬ Tr(A),
as the denial of (7). However, one could observe that 
(11) ¬ □(Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⋀ Tr(A)),
(12) □ ¬ ((Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⋀ Tr(A)),
better fit logical intuitions of denying (7), but (12) appears 
as much more coherent with the view of necessarianism for 
maintaining that it is impossible that truth-makers for A ex-
ist, but it is not true. Yet (see comments on (**) above) the 
problem remains whether not-true means false, possessing 
another logical value than being true-or-false or indicates a 
truth-value gap. Thus, the choice of basic logic can be fairly 
relevant. In order to simplify the issue, I interpret ‘A is not 
true’ as ‘A is false’, but nothing depends on this setting in my 
further considerations. 
The positive content of conditional necessarianism has 
its rendering in the formula (proposed by Merricks in the 
above quoted passage) 
(13) ∀A∀y(y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⇒ □((Ex(A) ⋀ Ex(y) ⇒ Tr(A)).
Accordingly, the conditional necessarianism is the con-
junction of (12) ⋀ (10); (12) for the use of impossibility by 
Merricks himself. However, we should check whether this 
conjunction is actually equivalent to
(14) y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⇒ □(Ex(y) ⋀ Tr(A)).
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Merricks is not right, because (14) as a consequence of 
(10) cannot be equivalent with its antecedent conjoined with 
something else, for instance, (13) in the considered case. 
(14) suggests still different interpretation of necessarianism 
to be obtained by weakening (7) understood as a conjunc-
tion Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⋀ □(Tr(A) to the implication
(15) Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⇒ □(Tr(A) 
The weakening in question consists in the fact that (15) is 
a consequence of (7) in the adopted interpretation.
Yet (15) does not close the issue. Having that necessari-
anism (its conditional version is a slight variant of what 
Merrricks simply calls necessarianism) has its proper ren-
dering in the implication Ex(y) ⋀ y ⋲TrMkA(y) ⇒ (Tr(A) 
with the added necessity component, we should decide in 
which place the operator □. We have the following possibili-
ties (for simplicity and work with schemes similar to (*)):
(16) (a) □(y ⋲TrMkA ⇒ Tr(A)) 
 (b) □(y ⋲TrMkA) ⇒ □Tr(A)) 
  (c) □(y ⋲TrMkA) ⇒ (Tr(A)) 
  (d) y ⋲TrMkA ⇒ □Tr(A) 
  (e) y ⋲TrMkA ⇒□ (Tr(A)
Since (16)(b) follows from (16)(a), it is redundant. (16)
(c) is implausible, because its antecedent is stronger than its 
consequent. Using the intuitive possible world semantics, it 
can happen that A is false at some world which verifies the 
sentence y ⋲TrMkA. Due to the modal principle □A ⇒ A, 
necessity of Tr(A) is reducible to the factuality of y ⋲TrMkA, 
unless we adopt a very strong modal logic in which every 
truth is necessary. This logic requires the Gödel rule A ├ □A 
without restriction that A is a tautology. This solution, al-
though possible for necessarianism, obscures the difference 
between truths of logic and factual truths.
In (16)(e), necessity qualifies the relation between the an-
tecedent and the consequent. If we read this formula as ‘y 
⋲TrMkA entails Tr(A)’, we have that y ⋲TrMkA├ Tr(A) and, 
by using the deduction theorem, we obtain ├(y ⋲TrMkA 
⇒Tr(A)). Consequently, the formula y ⋲TrMkA ⇒ Tr(A) 
belongs to theorems. Of course, we should precede ├ by 
TMT, because we assume that we work in the framework 
of the theory of truth-makers. Nothing prevents identifica-
tion of ├TMT with □TMT, that is TMT-entailment with TMT-
necessity. This suggests that (16)(a) can (should?) we written 
as □(y ⋲TrMkA ⇒Tr(A)). 
(17) □TMT(y ⋲TrMkA ⇒Tr(A)). 
The above reasoning shows that 16(e) is equivalent to (16)
(a), provided that TMT-entailment and TMT-necessity are 
co-extensional. 
Logic is a good example for showing that (17) works. If 
the box □ expresses logical necessity, we can drop the up-
per index. So we have □(y ⋲TrMkA ⇒Tr(A)) and, by modal 
logic, □(y ⋲TrMkA) ⇒□Tr(A)). The formula □(y ⋲TrMkA) 
says that every possible world contains a truth-maker for 
A, which is necessary true that is, y is true in every possi-
ble world. So A is a truth of logic. I cannot recommend an 
automatic repetition of this reasoning for the conditional 
necessity instantiated by □TMT. Although I assumed that it 
is co-extensional with ├TMT this assertion requires further 
comments. In particular, although the symbol ├ has the stan-
dard meaning in the context of TMT-entailment, it is prob-
lematic whether logical necessity and conditional necessity 
are species of a general necessity concept. The sign □TMT ex-
presses de dicto modality. 
On the other hand, the necessiarists about truth-makers 
want to speak about necessitation de re. In other words, 
(17) proposes an extensional approach to necessity, but (7) 
invites an intensional theory. Hence, (17) is probably too 
weak for developing the view that truth-makers necessitate 
truth of truth-bearers and make this job de re. Anyway, in 
my opinion, (17) says everything that can be said on the 
necessity of the truth-making relation on the basis of logic. 
In fact, the above analysis allows the conclusion that truth-
making necessitates truth in the sense of being its necessary 
condition. Saying more precisely, the true assertion that y is 
a truth-maker for A acts as a necessary condition for the cor-
rect assertion that A is true. If someone considers a further 
metaphysical or/and ontological analysis of truth-making 
as required, he or has to go beyond logic.6 The question is, 
do we need to go beyond logic with regard to propositions 
about empirically recognized facts? Since I am writing this 
paper to celebrate my friend Barry, consider the sentence
 (18) Barry and Jan are friends.
What is the truth-maker of (18)? Let us say that the in-
stance of the relation of friendship is RF. In other words, this 
relation obtains in the case of Barry and Jan, that is, <Barry, 
Jan> ⋲ RF. What does it mean to say that the truth-maker in 
question necessitates (18)? The first possibility is that there 
is a real connection (metaphysical, ontological, causal, etc.), 
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which necessitates the sentences saying that Barry and Jan 
are friends. I must confess that I am not able to translate this 
nexus into exact semantic terms. Certainly, it is not neces-
sary that <Barry, Jan> ⋲ RF. Although it occurs in the ac-
tual world, but it could be otherwise to my great regret. The 
second possibility is that (18) is a necessary truth. However, 
it is not, because it is not true in all possible worlds, but, 
fortunately, it holds in the actual world. This exactly means 
that (18) and <Barry, Jan> ⋲ RF are connected in a particu-
lar world and perhaps in some conceptual replicas of it. In 
modal semantics of possible worlds, what is so-called the 
real world is distinguished as the point of reference for the 
accessibility relation, and the status of this object is precisely 
the same as any other world. Simply speaking, it is a model 
(or algebraic structure). Any serious talk about truth-makers 
requires an assumption that what is actual, has the privi-
leged metaphysical character as something really existing 
and remaining in some ontological relations, like necessity 
or possibility. Yet the deep difference between ontology and 
formal semantics for modalities must be taken into account, 
otherwise it essentially obscures the entire issue. Since my 
approach uses the second, it is sufficient for me to say that, 
if this mode of speaking is preferred, truth-bearers of sen-
tences have logical values in the real world according to 
truth-makers. Involving necessity does not contribute to 
the discussed issue, unless someone explains the concept of 
metaphysical necessitation. 
My view is that logical necessity is the only well-defined 
kind of the concept expressed by the symbol □ and its 
meaning is captured by truth in all models, that is, validity. 
We can eventually introduce a more general notion, namely 
being valid in a specified class of models, which is deter-
mined by a set of axioms. However, necessity as related to 
a single model, seems to be an oddity. This is the reason to 
skip necessitation as attributed to truth-making. Perhaps my 
friend Barry would agree, or perhaps he would see things 
otherwise. Whatever the case, he will remain my true friend 
regardless.
NOTES
1 I prefer the phrase ‘truth-maker’ over ‘truthmaker’ 
(similarly in the case “truth-making”; this convention 
does not concern quotations employed in this paper.
2 I omit restrictions required for the Liar paradox.
3 See Restall (1996) for an analysis based on relevant con-
ditionals.
4 See Merricks (2007), Chapters 1–2, p. 5.
5 Merricks, 2007, pp. 5, 7.
6 See papers in Beebee and Dodd (2005), Monmoyer 
(2007), and Lowe and Rami (2009) for the present state 
of the debate on truth-makers.
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1. WHAT IS A CHURCH OF SUNk COSTS? 
In economics, a sunk cost is a cost that has been already in-
curred and, thus, is sunk in the sense that it cannot be re-
covered or eliminated even if the purpose for which it was 
committed is gone.1 As such, sunk costs should have no role 
in our future decisions. Setting this economic wisdom aside, 
however, human beings often carry sunk costs into the op-
portunity cost considerations of future decisions. For ex-
ample, we often decide to stay put in a particular situation 
despite how miserable it might make us feel, and we do this 
simply on the basis of the time, effort, or emotion we have al-
ready invested in it. Or, we view future decisions by the filter 
of specific psychological states—sadness or anger—that are 
the result of our unwillingness to abandon thoughts about 
what could have been or should have been the case in a past 
experience had it not turned out the way that it did. 
Such attachments to sunk costs are psychologically prob-
lematic because they can drive us into rabbit holes of our 
own making, bringing about self-reinforcing rounds of dis-
appointment, regret and, sometimes, even depression. Some 
psychologists suggest that our musings about what is not the 
case—more precisely, what should have been or could have 
been the case—may be inevitable given our cognitive abil-
ity to multitask, that is, to think about many things beyond 
the present task before us.2 Our minds might wander when 
we are driving, attending a meeting, or even while talking 
with someone. And a most seductive direction for our multi-
tasking minds seems to be the boundless realm of nostalgia. 
This multitasking feature of our thought is indeed an ex-
traordinary cognitive achievement, but if the content of our 
thoughts is consistently focused on sunk costs, then we are 
set to carve only a path of unhappiness. 
For all the twenty-something years that I have known 
Barry Smith, I have observed him to be a master in the appli-
cation of the principle of sunk costs and, largely as a result, 
to enjoy a fulfilling and meaningful life. If a jealous colleague 
betrayed him, Barry moved past this unpleasantness in full 
acceptance of sunk cost wisdom. Rumour has it that he has 
been observed to return ill will with kindness and generosity. 
If an uninformed audience did not fully grasp the depth of 
his argument, he did not linger in the miasma from the lesser 
in the group, but instead took the objections as fuel for find-
ing new ways of demonstrating (with infectious excitement) 
the idea that he wanted to convey. If someone very close hurt 
him, I have never heard him say a bad thing about it. Since 
he finds wallowing in regret or resentment unnecessary and 
counterproductive, we have never discussed any persons or 
situations that he has discharged as sunk costs. But his gentle 
evangelization for the sunk cost principle when my life was 
at a crossroads on more than one occasion, combined with 
his exemplary application of the principle of sunk costs in 
his own life, have inspired my own musings on the subject 
over the years, mostly for my own personal considerations. 
The occasion of this Festschrift has led me to examine the 
phenomenology of sunk costs in a more formal way. 
What I discovered in writing this essay is that there is more 
to the practical application of the principle of sunk costs than 
meets the eye. The successful application of the sunk cost 
principle as a moral guide seems to require a broader frame-
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work of practical wisdom. And such a framework could not 
be imposed by design because the boundaries of a design are 
demarcated by the particular beliefs of the designers. This 
would present limitations not only to the kind of practical 
wisdom that could be attributable to the framework but also 
to the universal application of the principle of sunk costs. 
The framework of practical wisdom, then, has to be one that 
is discovered as a social order and, over time, perfected and 
shared in community. This latter attribute of sharing is not 
only central to community, it is also the feature that would 
make possible the dissemination of practical wisdom as an 
evolutionary social order. It is in this way that I came to 
think of the notion of a church in relation to sunk costs. 
Although the word ‘church’ is most commonly employed 
as a noun to refer to a building for Catholic or Christian wor-
ship, such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, 
the Biblical meaning for this noun is broader; it refers to an 
assembly of people brought together for a common purpose. 
In addition, the archaic verb ‘to church’ signifies a rite of pu-
rification, which is also fitting to our context. Putting both 
these meanings together in relation to Barry, we can under-
stand the Church of Sunk Costs as an assembly of all those 
of us who have learned and benefitted from Barry’s example 
and advice and who, aware of our human limitations and 
propensity for error, are in pursuit of redemption and a good 
life through a purification from past experiences. Sunk cost 
wisdom indeed involves a purification from past experienc-
es, and this purification is achieved by the application of rea-
son. “Salvation,” Barry observes, “thereby becomes at least 
in part a human enterprise, in which man is called upon to 
measure and exercise his reason.”3 Testimonial after testimo-
nial in this Festschrift, we find the same pattern: Barry has 
affected individuals in ways that always lead to the exami-
nation of ideas—his or theirs—in a different light and with 
special attention to their contribution to a meaningful life. 
According to Barry, “a meaningful life is a life upon which 
some sort of pattern has been imposed—a pattern which is 
not some merely private thing which relates merely to what 
goes on inside your head but rather a pattern which involves 
also, in serious ways, your having an effect upon the world.”4 
I call the pattern for the effect that Barry has had on others 
the Church of Sunk Costs. It is, as I have mentioned, a social 
order and, like any other social order, the existence of the 
Church of Sunk Costs has preceded our complete and clear 
awareness of it and of its ontological structure. This essay is 
thus the first attempt to articulate such a structure in three 
tenets:
1. Faith in the sunk costs principle;
2. Mindfulness in the here and now;
3. The striving for goals that bring about fulfillment and 
flourishing.
Before proceeding with a description for each of the 
above, it is important that I go back to the beginning, when 
I first met Barry, in order to set the proper stage for these 
descriptions.
2. ENCOUNTERING BARRY 
I first met Barry Smith in Liechtenstein and, at that time, 
I was at a crossroads in my education. I was exploring the 
possibility of studying philosophy under his direction at the 
Internationale Akademie für Philosophie. At the time, I was 
in a graduate program in economics and involved in the 
research of economic value when, fortuitously, I had come 
across articles written by Barry. As a non-philosopher at the 
time, I immediately liked the clarity in his exposition. I also 
recognized in some of his writings the thing that I had been 
looking for but could not quite put my finger on. My mind 
was captured by assertions such as:
Austrian economics acknowledges in its fundamental 
axioms the methodological and ontological centrality 
of the economic agent.5 
[About Menger he writes that…] Anyone, he ar-
gues, who has familiarity with economic phenomena 
(be they actions, choices, money, prices, contracts or 
debts) will acknowledge, independently of empirical 
testing, the truth of certain necessary propositions re-
lating to these phenomena, and it is these propositions 
which must form the axioms of the science of econom-
ics. Economics becomes, therefore, an entirely aprior-
istic discipline.6
Necessary laws concerning economic kinds are, for the 
Aristotelian, no more problematic than necessary laws 
concerning natural kinds in other spheres.7
Yet however commonplace Menger’s conception of 
the objects and laws of economics may appear on this 
aprioristic, Aristotelian interpretation, it neverthe-
less stands in radical conflict with one methodologi-
cal principle which has come to prevail as orthodoxy 
amongst philosophers and methodologists of science, 
VOLUME 4   |  ISSUE 4  2017
CO
SM
O
S + TA
X
IS
56
a principle which may be formulated as follows: scien-
tific propositions are either contingent or necessary.8 
The literature in economics is quite fascinating, especially 
the classical contributions from the members of the Chicago 
School, as well as from specialists in public choice theory, 
evolutionary economics, and others. But with regard to the 
philosophical foundations of economics, the literature is less 
satisfactory. So when I started reading Barry’s papers, it felt 
like watching the parting of the clouds in the sky to make 
room for the sun to shine through. He writes, for example,
The ontological grammar of economic reality that is 
sketched by Menger can be seen in this light as pro-
viding a pre-empirical qualitative framework in whose 
terms specific empirical hypotheses can be formulated 
and specific mathematical models be given concrete 
interpretation. Such a foundation cannot itself be de-
rived, on pain of circularity, either from empirical 
investigations of the more usual sort or from math-
ematical analyses. It must rather be derived at least in 
part—or so the apriorist argues—from that familiarity 
with particular economic phenomena which we are all 
of us able to acquire as economic agents.9 
The Austrian economists in today’s Vienna have long for-
gotten Menger, the modern-day Austrian economists were 
not addressing the value theoretical matters that interested 
me, and the mainstream of economics had not even heard 
of the Austrian economists at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury other than in a history of economic thought course. But 
here was a philosopher reminding us with his attention to a 
somewhat forgotten period that these oversights should not 
keep us from recognizing their contemporary significance. 
This was a revelation for me.
3. FAITH
The decision that I was confronting at the time I first meet 
Barry would not only have involved a switch in disciplines 
from economics to philosophy, it would have also included a 
move to another continent and an unfamiliar environment.
For these reasons, I wanted to meet him. As a graduate stu-
dent, I knew that not only was my future intellectual forma-
tion at stake, but that my emotional wellbeing, too, would be 
dependent on the kind of person that he turned out to be. 
Selfish dissertation directors too preoccupied with their own 
personal or professional pursuits can delay one’s progress. 
This is a trap that I wanted to avoid. I also wanted to avoid 
a domineering dissertation director who micromanaged 
every aspect of my research, or expected me to place his or 
her research as central to my investigations. In light of these 
concerns, meeting Barry was a pleasant surprise because he 
was warmer, kinder, and more generous that I had imagined 
him. I am quite certain that I knew when I first met him 
what my decision would be. And I should add that studying 
under Barry’s direction was one of the best decisions that I 
have made in my life. But I am getting ahead of the story, for 
I need to get to the role of faith first.
My disenchantment with economics was not with it as a 
field of study for, as a graduate student, economics was still 
the most exciting discipline I had found until then. Rather, 
I was disenchanted with the prospect of becoming a profes-
sional “mathematoholic”. Nonetheless, it was still unnerv-
ing to consider the possibility of leaving economics behind 
and starting from scratch in philosophy. I had already made 
an investment of time, effort, and emotional commitment 
to economics. For me, philosophy was a new and untested 
territory in which I had no formal training. Moreover, I 
already had a good idea that (and my experience studying 
philosophy has indeed confirmed this): philosophy is hard. 
Fascinating, enthralling, and compelling (to me) but, none-
theless, hard. What if I failed? What if I did not like it and 
found myself stuck with a bad decision? These were indeed 
all the wrong considerations to have with regard to a future 
investment of one’s time, effort, and emotions because sunk 
costs do not—and should not—have a role in the opportu-
nity cost considerations of future choices. Whatever was the 
cost of my education in a discipline that I was not to pursue 
further, this cost was an unrecoverable and unavoidable cost 
and, thus, a sunk cost.
Barry has inspired many to change career directions: en-
gineers and mathematicians have become philosophers, phi-
losophers have become knowledge engineers and biomedical 
ontologists, and so on. This was also the case for me. In mak-
ing my choice to pursue philosophy, Barry’s advice helped 
me to recognize the wisdom of the principle of sunk costs as 
a principle of practical wisdom, and to take a leap of faith in 
the direction of philosophy. As a student of economics, I was 
aware of the principle of sunk costs already. However, I had 
not really thought of applying this principle outside of busi-
ness decisions concerning production and into the personal 
realm of decisions regarding the future deployment of my 
own human capital. This is how I first encountered the first 
bit of Barry’s practical wisdom built on a ground of philo-
sophical foundations of economic theory. Shortly thereafter, 
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I was a graduate student of Barry’s, not in Liechtenstein as I 
had expected, but at the University at Buffalo, where he had 
just accepted a full professorship. In retrospect, I am glad to 
report that my experience as a graduate student in Buffalo 
was not only better than I expected, it ranks among the hap-
piest and most fulfilling times in my life.
I did not discover until many years later, however, that the 
application of the principle of sunk costs is not just a rational 
and mechanical response to future production decisions in 
business or, as I have presented here, in the personal realm of 
decisions. A fortiori, the application of the principle of sunk 
costs demands faith. This requires some explanation.
I was at another crossroads in my life around four years 
after my graduation from Buffalo. I had been offered a po-
sition of Research Director at a large institute in South 
America but, unbeknownst to me, the president of this or-
ganization had made this decision unilaterally and had not 
informed his Board of this decision. This was not the regu-
lar hiring procedure at the institute and, understandably, the 
older directors at this institute felt slighted and made this 
feeling very clear to me. One of these directors asked me to 
sign a contract that was not even close to the offer that the 
president of the institute had made verbally and which I took 
at his word. I remember him handwriting each element of 
the offer as we talked in his mansion, but this agreement was 
not in the contract presented to me. So I specified to the di-
rector the offer that the president had made, and this direc-
tor informed me that such an offer was impossible. When I 
asked to discuss the matter directly with the president, I was 
told that he does not involve himself in such details but that 
he would be informed of my request. The next day I received 
an email indicating that the offer had been rescinded, and I 
never again heard from the president. 
This eleventh hour contract breach was devastating to me 
financially because I had already committed thousands of 
dollars in the arrangements for my move, the transport of 
my belongings, and the three months’ rent for my new place. 
The latter alone was already $6,000 in the rather expensive 
neighborhood of El Olivar, near the institute. But I was un-
able to recover any of these costs. If there ever was a call for 
sunk cost wisdom, this was indeed the most perfect case for 
its application. Barry knew of this situation because he had 
been a supporter of my being hired for this position. In this 
situation, too, Barry reminded me of the principle of sunk 
costs and asked me to refrain from thinking about my finan-
cial loss. But, for me, not even sunk cost wisdom could turn 
my acceptance of this situation into anything other than a 
bitter pill to swallow. In an effort to lift my spirits, Barry told 
me to have faith and promised to send work my way. I was 
not quite sure what he meant by faith at the time but, in ret-
rospect, I think that he was telling me to have faith in what 
the future could bring, that is, to be forward looking. I must 
admit that not until I wrote this essay did I come to the full 
realization of the role of faith in the application of the prin-
ciple of sunk costs. 
I do not have a problem embracing certain things on faith 
and I think that, setting religion aside, we all have faith in 
someone or something at some point in our lives if we are 
courageous enough to take a risk. According to one under-
standing, faith is to accept with certainty that which is hoped 
for and to hold the conviction for what is not yet seen.10 The 
risk is to be wrong in what we accept on faith. Consequently, 
faith cannot be divorced from reason and prudential judg-
ment in order for faith to be distinguishable from a roll-of-
the-dice decision. When I switched disciplines, I had faith 
that I had made the right choice. I couldn’t know for sure, 
but there was sufficient rational support for my making this 
choice, and so I followed this path. So long as what we accept 
on faith is supported by reason and prudential judgment, 
then the faith that we place on, say for example, a friend or 
a spouse is no different from the faith upon which we accept 
rationally defensible scientific theories for which there is 
no definitive proof. We could be wrong in all of these cases, 
of course, and when this happens, the only productive way 
to move forward is to change the bearer of our faith from 
whatever it had been—e.g., a perceived honorable offer of 
employment, in my case—to the principle of sunk costs. The 
challenge is that transferring one’s faith from one bearer to 
another is much more difficult that one can imagine. In the 
most devastating cases, I dare say, this transfer seems almost 
impossible. But there is one other tenet in the structure of 
the Church of Sunk Costs that can facilitate such a transfer, 
and this is the principle of mindfulness. 
4. MINDFULNESS
Mindfulness is the process of bringing one’s attention to the 
present moment. This involves shutting off the mind’s wan-
derings. And there is a particular mechanism for deploying 
mindfulness that is represented by three building blocks of 
consciousness regulation.11
i. Intention—this refers not only to the directedness of the 
present experience but, more specifically, to a directed-
ness that targets the most enlightening aspect of the ex-
perience. The idea of finding the aspect of an experience 
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that is the most conducive to one’s understanding or 
growth is perhaps a difficult concept to grasp within the 
context of intentionality in Western philosophy. In the 
Buddhist tradition, however, the intentional directed-
ness to the present experience goes hand-in-hand with a 
vision for personal growth. As such, the targeted aspect 
of the experience is that which will best enhance the 
path to greater enlightenment. The search for and sub-
sequent discovery of such an aspect of the experience 
is an evolving process given the dynamic nature of our 
experiencing present experiences. 
ii. Attention—this is the focus on the present experience 
as it is presented and, above all, avoiding any interpre-
tation of the present experience that would switch the 
focus to other feeling-states from past experiences (e.g., 
anger, fear, anxiety, excitement, and so on). As such, 
this focus is also critical in setting forth a psychologi-
cal healing process.12 Above all, this focus is essential to 
the success of i (above) and iii (below). More specifically 
to our examination of sunk costs, this focus allows us 
to develop the skill of switching the focus of attention, 
and thus inhibiting negative emotions from past experi-
ences whose sequelae might be in our present experi-
ence. Accordingly, this skill makes possible the transfer 
of faith from a situation that did not work out as hoped 
for to the wisdom of sunk costs that allows us to be for-
ward looking.
iii. Attitude—this refers to how we attend the present ex-
perience. We can bring a positive attitude to our mind-
fulness—e.g., a compassionate attitude, or an attitude of 
peacefulness and forgiveness—but we can also attend to 
our present experience by the filter of sadness or depres-
sion at one extreme to anger and desire for vengeance at 
the other extreme. If we attend to our experience with a 
negative attitude about our present lot, then we attend 
to the experience of feeling negatively about our lives. 
By contrast, when we attend to our present experience 
with compassion (including compassion for oneself), 
then one attends to the experience of feeling restored. 
This self-regulation of attitude is learnable,13 and it is 
reinforced by having a goal that offers a more reward-
ing state of mind than that which is achieved through 
a negative attitude. I shall address this in more detail in 
the next section.
Cognitive psychologists have examined the attentional 
abilities that can be developed from mindfulness, including 
the ability to shift focus from mental states at will.14 This is a 
powerful ability. It is not surprising, then, that many philo-
sophical traditions have reminded us to practice mindful-
ness. The state of mindfulness in Shinkataza, for example, 
is a dedicated awareness of what is happening to us in the 
moment, and also the immediate effects of such happenings 
in us.15 Some claim that this ancient Buddhist practice of 
mindfulness influenced some religious traditions and popu-
lar culture—from those practiced by Catholic monks, rabbis, 
and Episcopal priests, all the way to modern-day yoga and 
martial arts instructors.16 
Barry is as much an urban-Buddhist as he is a socialist, so 
no one could ever attribute to him either a formal Eastern 
philosophical influence, nor its modern-day popularized 
versions. Moreover, I have never heard Barry speak of mind-
fulness. However, Barry is a man who not only accomplishes 
more in the same amount of time as anyone else who is simi-
larly driven, he is also productive on many fronts. On a light 
day for Barry, he may be writing a paper, while reading on 
another topic, teaching a course, and responding to emails 
almost instantaneously. The only way that he can do this is by 
focusing on one task at the time, in full attention and, from 
what I have witnessed, in a joyful way. We could call this dis-
cipline, sure, but mindfulness brings to relief a finer-grained 
description of Barry’s productive efficiency. We might not be 
able to achieve the masterful level of mindfulness that Barry 
can muster, but he has shown us the way by example.
5. THE STRIVING FOR GOALS THAT BRING  
 ABOUT FULFILLMENT AND FLOURISHING
Let us tie together what we have covered so far. The success 
of our application of the principle of sunk costs is depen-
dent on our mindfulness. In other words, placing one’s faith 
on the wisdom of sunk costs and applying mindfulness to 
reinforce this end can help us to shift our minds away from 
past losses and toward the present. Together, these two 
tenets constitute a good assembly of problem-solving skills 
applicable to discrete cases. But without the motivation to 
move forward, that is, something for which to strive, we 
might be tempted to look back at sunk costs again and to 
consider ways in which we could recover what we lost. So 
we must seek for a goal, but not just any goal. We need to 
seek for a goal that brings about fulfillment and flourishing 
because such a goal will keep us looking forward even if we 
have further setbacks and losses. “What makes a life worth 
living,” says Barry, “has something to do with what you do, 
here on Earth…”17 
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[It] depends not on your, or other people’s, beliefs or 
feelings, but on what you do, on what you achieve, and 
thus on the degree to which through your efforts you 
succeed in imposing a pattern on your life which has 
some implications also for the world around you.18
The goals that we strive for, then, should give our lives di-
rection as well as a purpose that is not aimed merely at ful-
filling our desires and abilities. In other words, the purpose 
should be bigger than ourselves. 
6. BARRY’S EFFECT ON OTHERS
Barry has not only followed the principle of sunk costs, he 
has also lived a life focused on the tasks presented before 
him, one at the time, and he has directed his life toward a 
purpose that transcends his own self-interests. I view this 
purpose as threefold: (1) to examine ideas for their own sake, 
(2) to serve others who seek his help, and (3) to live honor-
ably. I would like to address each of these briefly. First, let 
us consider the task of examining ideas for their own sake. 
For those who reach prominence in their own time, it is not 
always easy to demarcate the line that separates their self-
interested motives from their love of ideas. Indeed, it is the 
duty of a scholar to present his or her contributions to the 
circles in which they will be most productive. This demands 
the effort to make one’s contributions known by means of 
teaching, presenting, and publishing. Barry’s speaking skills 
are impressive, combining penetrating analysis with humor 
and, many times, silliness in order to drive a point home. His 
success in teaching and presenting is thus well-known in the 
philosophical circles and institutions in which he has cho-
sen to participate actively. At only 65, Barry’s list of publica-
tions alone (see the Appendix to this volume) is the length of 
an average-size dissertation. It is most certainly longer than 
mine, and let me add parenthetically that I know that Barry 
would have preferred that my dissertation had been even 
shorter given his penchant for brevity.19 
The sheer volume of his contributions, however, is most 
certainly not the measure of his pursuit of ideas for their 
own sake. The mark that Barry has made lies in the ef-
fect that he has had in philosophy. Barry, along with Peter 
Simons and Kevin Mulligan, brought new attention to the 
ontological aspect of the correspondence theory of truth. As 
such, this illustrious trio made an important mark on the 
examination of truth, a central subject in philosophy. Barry 
has also brought attention to Austrian philosophy and the 
philosophy of Austrian economics, which has led to new re-
search in philosophy and economics based on the contribu-
tions of turn-of-the-twentieth century Austrian thought.20 
Barry has also championed thinkers who have been either 
unknown or quite obscured in contemporary philosophical 
literature, such as for example Anton Marty, Christian von 
Ehrenfels, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach, and Roman 
Ingarden. This effort has had a profound impact on many if 
we consider the vast number of citations that his work com-
mands. Moreover, Barry has built the ontology specialty at 
the department of philosophy at the University at Buffalo, 
for which it is best known today. He did this through his 
courses and research interests, as well as by bringing former 
students and colleagues from Germany and elsewhere to add 
to the new ontology specialty of the department. There are 
many other examples of Barry’s contributions to philosophy 
that are mentioned in other articles of this Festschrift, but 
the chief point that I would like to make is that, although 
he has been widely recognized for his professional contri-
butions and has received prestigious awards, the fame that 
Barry has sought has been primarily for the ideas that he has 
pursued rather than for fame itself. 
This brings me to the second aspect of the larger pur-
pose that Barry has pursued: the service to others. All those 
who know Barry, even superficially, know that he is gener-
ous with his time despite his ambitious work schedule. This 
generosity ranges from replying to emails quickly to more 
substantial help such as reading a paper, or making a sig-
nificant impact in someone’s career with support for a grant, 
post-doc, internship, or teaching position. He has helped 
many—students, former students, colleagues, friends and 
strangers alike, most likely even more than the great many 
who already admit to this—and without seeking gratitude 
or quid pro quo conditions. It might be the case that some 
who have been on the receiving end of his generosity do not 
recognize it for what it is. But I do not see such situations 
burdening Barry in the least because he has a broader pur-
pose that motivates him to serve others. Barry helps simply 
because he wants to facilitate the pursuit of other people’s 
plans if it is in his hands to do so. It would seem also that this 
purpose also supports the first aspect of this broader pur-
pose mentioned above—the pursuit of ideas for their own 
sake—because Barry is also a profoundly modest man. He 
would not view his work as being the only important con-
tribution to philosophy. This might come as a surprise to 
those who have witnessed, in a class session or at a confer-
ence, Barry’s demonstrations that pretend to indicate self-
importance. For example, who could forget his unlimited 
praise of the British for all that is good in the world: walls 
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(meaning, property rights), the rule of law, efficient lan-
guage, and good philosophy, with some concessions to the 
contributions by Brentanian-influenced Austrian and Polish 
philosophers, and a few others (a few German and French, 
plus one Nicaraguan). Or, his claims lauding male superior-
ity to such an extreme measure as to make clear to any keen 
observer that he does not hold such an absurd view. It is pre-
cisely his modesty that allows him to set aside his concern 
for how he would be viewed as a person by anyone who is 
not previously aware of his tactics to shock an audience out 
of their uncritical attachment to a cause by questioning their 
own point of view and, thereby, to give them the chance to 
consider an alternative view. Only a modest man recognizes 
that the pursuit of ideas for their own sake is not achievable 
by any one person alone but, rather, only as a purpose car-
ried by many, and the more who can be enlisted, the better. 
The third aspect of Barry’s broader purpose in life is, as I 
see it, his commitment to living honorably. What does this 
mean exactly? We can think of living honorably as acting 
consistently with honesty, generosity, kindness, and loyalty 
and observing morally good behavior such as standing by 
one’s word, promises, and duties. All of these attributions are 
true for Barry. But the point that I want to make here is that 
living honorably also means living well. Despite his legend-
ary capacity for hard work, I have never seen Barry trade an 
opportunity for enjoyment of fine food and wine, good jazz, 
a social gathering with friends, or true love, for work. Barry 
has indeed found true love and good friendships because he 
wants to live a fulfilling life, one that involves his dedication 
to his calling but also a life that is filled with other beautiful 
things that life has to offer. 
We often mistake differences in the lifestyles of others as 
flaws that need correcting. Europeans and Latin Americans, 
in my casual observation, embrace long vacations as not 
only necessary for survival but as activities that must never 
be mixed with any kind of work. People who hold this view 
may see Barry as a workaholic. In the United States, how-
ever, many view vacations as interruptions to their work that 
should be either minimized or mixed with some work in 
order to justify the need to take one. People who hold this 
view may see Barry as hard working. As a Basque-Peruvian 
Catholic, raised in a Methodist-American school in Peru, 
who later moved to the United States to attend college, sub-
sequently to become an American citizen, and then reset-
tling in Europe, I straddle both views. Accordingly, I can 
understand how someone holding any of these views could 
feel horrified at the extreme opposite view. What we must 
recognize, however, is that there is no single script for liv-
ing a happy life. We must discover what is the right balance 
of work and leisure for each one of us. I have no doubt that 
Barry has sought this Aristotelian Golden Mean for leading 
a happy life, and I am even more certain that he has found it. 
And this is how Barry has built what I call the Church of 
Sunk Costs and has, thereby, carved a meaningful life that 
amounts to much more than professional accolades. He has 
shown by example that the Church of Sunk Costs is a sound 
secular guide for practical wisdom. Most notably, and de-
spite his prodigious appetite for work, Barry seems to have 
a good life. As far as the rest of us are concerned, the effects 
of Barry’s Church of Sunk Costs can be as extraordinary as 
we want them to be. Not least of all, we can see sunk costs 
for what they really are: distractions from living a good life. 
Hence, a setback that we may encounter just means that we 
can set our eyes on the opportunities that we have yet to take, 
the people we have yet to meet, and the ideas we have yet to 
entertain. For opening my eyes to all this, I thank you Barry!
  
NOTES
1 Baumol and Willig 1981, p. 406
2 Killingsworth and Gilbert 2010
3 Smith 2002, p. 7
4 Smith 2002, p. 10
5 Smith 1986, p. 2
6 Smith 1986, p. 2
7 Smith 1986, p. 3
8 Smith 1986, p. 3
9 Smith 1990, p. 279
10 Hebrews 11:1
11 Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and Freedman 2006, p. 375
12 Shapiro, et al. 2006, p. 376
13 Shapiro, et al. 2006, p. 377
14 Posner, 1980
15 Scharf 2014, p. 941
16 Scharf 2014, p. 942
17 Smith 2002, p. 10
18 Smith 2002, p. 13, brackets added
19 See Erion 2017, pp. 6-8
20 See Austrian Thought: Philosophy and Economics, 
Zúñiga y Postigo and Williford (forthcoming)
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“One on’t crossbeams gone owt askew on t’treddle.”
Monty Python: The Spanish Inquisition
Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a frame-
work for the ontology of things in space and time involving 
and invoking the distinction between continuants and oc-
currents, which has become a key element of Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO). The terminology of SNAP (from “snap-
shot:” state of a continuant at a time) and SPAN (how an oc-
current develops over an interval or timespan) occurs in that 
paper’s title. While any commonsense ontology will have a 
place for both continuants and occurrents, there is much 
room for philosophical debate on whether one of them is 
more basic than the other, or can be reduced to the other, or 
whether they are equally fundamental, or whether they are 
two different perspectives on the same reality. Grenon and 
Smith opt for the last of these. They call the accounts of con-
tinuants (SNAP) and occurrents (SPAN) both “ontologies.” 
They do not have a single ontology of all that is in space and 
time. This dialog throws a few of the common arguments 
around a bit and comes to no sure conclusion. But one of the 
characters bears a faint resemblance to a certain Buffalonian 
philosopher. 
Abstract, Grenon and Smith (2004): We propose a modular 
ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on 
the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snap-
shot views of the world at successive instants of time and, 
on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of 
change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology 
must combine these two distinct types of inventory of the 
entities and relationships in reality, and we provide charac-
terizations of spatiotemporal reasoning in the light of the in-
terconnections between them. 
[Time: the present. Scene: A Philosophy Department 
Common Room. Four ontologists are discussing change. 
Three-Dimensionalist (3D) and Four-Dimensionalist (4D) 
are disputing, the two others are listening.]
3D [in tweed jacket with leather elbow patches, cord trou-
sers, brown Oxford brogues, checked shirt with striped 
school tie, with chalk-stained fingers, is speaking donnishly 
at the blackboard]: ... so you see I do not need your events at 
all. An event is merely a succession of changes to a substance, 
or what you call a “continuant” (sniffs). Let C be any chang-
ing “continuant,” such as this piece of chalk, a gyrocompass, 
or a chameleon. Now as Aristotle says in the Physics ...
[4D (in shorts and T-shirt with baseball cap and trainers) 
can contain himself no longer. Throwing down the copy of 
Scientific American that he had been browsing, he jumps up 
and excitedly runs through Lewis’s “temporary intrinsics” 
argument from On the Plurality of Worlds, (Lewis 1986, pp. 
202–205) to the effect that because of the threatening incon-
sistencies in the notion of change, it is best to take C to have 
temporal parts, i.e. be an occurrent. 3D sighs: he has heard it 
all so many times before.]
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[At this point a third and smartly dressed ontologist springs 
to 3D’s defence with a “May I?” With deft and practiced 
movements, he sweeps chalk dust from the table, places 
his elegant and state-of-the-art laptop on the clean space, 
plugs it into the projector, pulls a white screen down in 
front of the dusty blackboard and starts to click through a 
large PowerPoint file to reach a slide. He is: SNAP–SPAN 
Metaontologist.]
SSM: I can avoid the inconsistencies by distinguishing be-
tween SPAN, which looks at occurrents over time, and 
SNAP, which is a series of snapshots (instantaneous states) of 
continuants at different times (shows several slides in quick 
succession to emphasize his point).
4D (languidly): I can show using your instantaneous states 
that C has temporal parts after all.
SSM (surprised): How?
4D: I just sum all the instantaneous states together.
SSM: But you can’t do that.
4D: Why not? I just did.
SSM: But it’s inconsistent. If C changes, then its properties at 
one time are contrary to those at another. What you get by 
summing states is not C but C’s life. That’s not a continuant, 
it’s an occurrent.
4D: Precisely. C and C’s life are one and the same.
SSM: But you can’t say that. It goes against common sense. 
It’s nonsense.
4D (sarcastically): I don’t recognize Oxford ordinary lan-
guage prohibitions. I am a scientist.
SSM (determinedly): Here’s an argument. C’s life, being an 
occurrent, has all its parts essentially. So, if C is C’s life, C 
could not have existed for a longer or shorter time than it 
did. But C obviously could have ceased to exist earlier or 
later than it did. So, there is a modal difference between C 
and C’s life, which means they are essentially distinct. Even if 
a continuant exists only for an instant, it could have existed 
for longer, but an instantaneous occurrent has to be instanta-
neous. So, no continuant can be an occurrent.
[At the word “essentially,” 3D, who had been disconsolately 
fingering his well-used copy of Liddell and Scott’s A Greek–
English Lexicon, brightens up for a moment, only to lapse 
into despond again at the word “occurrent.”]
4D (briskly): I don’t accept your modal distinction. For me 
what you call C’s life could have been longer or shorter. I see 
no need for the distinction. All objects in time are occur-
rents.
SSM (persistently): But we cannot identify and recognize oc-
currents except by identifying and recognizing continuants 
(Strawson 1959).
4D (sneeringly): That’s epistemology. I am an ontologist. 
Anyway, Strawson may be wrong (Moravcsik 1970).
SSM (recovering): I agree that we need occurrents in our on-
tology. But like Wiggins (2001), and unlike you, or 3D, I am 
a continuant–occurrent dualist.
4D: By your own admission you have instantaneous states in 
SNAP, and I have just shown you how to sum these mereo-
logically to give temporally extended things, which are in 
SPAN. So, you are hoisted by your own petard. Admit it, 
your dualism is unnecessary and by Ockham’s Razor contin-
uants should be discarded in a modern scientific ontology.
[3D groans quietly]
SSM: Let me clarify what I mean. By “instantaneous states” I 
don’t mean entities in the world, but momentary snapshots, 
consistent representations of what there is at an instant.
4D (incredulously): You mean you don’t take them ontologi-
cally seriously after all?
SSM: Yes, but not as entities.
4D (with heavy irony): Oh I’m sorry, I thought we were do-
ing ontology. I didn’t quite catch the silent quotation marks. 
That’s what linguists do all the time isn’t it? They confuse en-
tities with representations. I thought you were against that.
SSM (huffily): I am. Vehemently. Medical Informatics is rife 
with it, but I’m putting them right. What I mean is that be-
cause of change you cannot put different SNAP ontologies 
together consistently. You need a multiplicity of SNAP on-
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tologies, one for each different time, and a SPAN ontology 
for occurrents.
4D: Why can’t you put different ontologies together to get a 
bigger and more adequate one?
SSM: Because by an “ontology” I mean a consistent theory of 
things all of which can be mereologically summed.
4D (puzzled): And why can’t I put different SNAP ontologies 
together?
SSM: Because then you would have inconsistencies.
4D (more puzzled): Why? Why can’t I merge SNAP ontolo-
gies just as easily as I summed instantaneous states (before I 
understood you — er — correctly)?
SSM (triumphantly): Because then either you’d have a SPAN 
ontology, which fails to recognize continuants, or you’d have 
continuants which have incompatible properties. A single 
ontology cannot encompass both continuants and occur-
rents, and remember, no continuant can be an occurrent.
[4D lapses into head-shaking silence. At this point the fourth 
ontologist, who has kept silent until now, clears her throat. 
She is wearing elegant jeggings and top from a Milan fash-
ion house. Her laptop is metallic pink. She is agnostic about 
3D/4D but believes that ontology forms a single unified dis-
cipline or field. She is: Unified Field Ontologist.]
UFO (to SSM): So are you saying there is no such thing as 
ontology, Aristotle and Wolff ’s science of being qua being?
SSM: Yes. I used to think there was, but Medical Informatics 
changed my mind. Since an ontology concerns only things 
which can be summed mereologically, and not all things can 
be summed mereologically, there is not one ontology but 
many.
UFO: What’s wrong with the mereological sum principle, 
that any two or more entities have a mereological sum?
SSM (amusedly): Would we really say there is a single object 
consisting of the number 9, the color blue, my computer and 
the first five minutes of this year’s UEFA Cup Final? We don’t 
talk like that.
UFO (flashingly and without a trace of sarcasm): I don’t rec-
ognize Oxford ordinary language prohibitions. I am a scien-
tist.
SSM (coaxingly): Come on, you have to admit such mon-
strous (Fine 1999) transcategorial sums are absurd.
UFO (defiantly): Go ahead, make my day. Show me the con-
tradiction.
SSM: Erm … well you have to admit they are pretty bizarre 
and weird.
UFO: I don’t deny that, but so are lots of things. Anyway, 
even if I admit that there are no transcategorial sums, why 
does that mean we cannot have a single ontology?
SSM: Because by an “ontology” I mean a consistent theory of 
things all of which can be mereologically summed.
UFO: Oh yes, so you said. But there’s a lot more to ontology 
than mereology. For instance, if John kisses Mary there are 
John and Mary, both of whom are continuants, and the kiss, 
which is an occurrent. They may not (pace Lewis, Armstrong 
and others) be parts of a single mereological whole, but you 
have to admit they are connected.
SSM (smugly): Oh yes, I do. Entities in all my different on-
tologies are linked by relations. The theory of these linking 
relations is what I call “metaontology.”
UFO (puzzled herself): But surely the relations in your met-
aontology are in the world?
SSM (decisively): Yes of course. I am a realist. Well, except 
that some of the relations are internal, but let’s not worry 
about that.
UFO: So why is the whole consisting of all your ontologies 
together with metaontology not Aristotle and Wolff ’s sci-
ence of being?
SSM: Because the whole is inconsistent.
UFO: Not if you do the job properly.
TROUBLE UP AT T’ONTOLOGICAL MILL: AN INCONCLUSIVE DIALOG A WHIMSICAL POSTSCRIPT IN ONTOLOGICAL FOLkLORE
65
COSMOS + TAXIS
CO
SM
O
S 
+ 
TA
X
IS
 
SSM (firmly): By keeping ontologies confined to consis-
tent maximal mereological ones, I rescue as much of that 
doomed project as is possible.
UFO: Why privilege mereology?
SSM: Because it’s central to ontology.
UFO (pensively): I don’t disagree there. But let’s see, you pre-
sumably think that identity is at least as fundamental to on-
tology as mereological relations are?
SSM (suspiciously): Yeees — go on.
UFO: Well suppose I confine an ontology to all that can con-
sistently be said of all the things that can be glued together 
using the identity relation. Then I’d have as many ontologies 
as entities (smiles cheerfully).
SSM (outraged): But then you couldn’t even say in one ontol-
ogy that a is not identical to b, or that a is a proper part of b! 
That would be intolerable!
UFO: I could deal with all the linking relations between dis-
tinct existences in my metaontology, which would contain 
all yours does and more still, to cope with difference and 
mereology.
SSM: That would be ridiculous.
UFO: It’s no different in principle from what you do.
SSM (trying another tack): But anyway, identity isn’t a real 
relation. Your ontologies would contain only such trivialities 
as that a = a and that a exists. All or nearly all the interesting 
parts would be relegated to the metaontology.
UFO: The same as in your case. Only once all the fun is in 
the metaontology I can forget the silly ontologies and just 
rename the whole thing “ontology,” and I get what I want.
SSM: But at least my ontologies are consistent. Your metaon-
tology would not be.
UFO: Why not?
SSM: Because you can’t put all the ontologies (including the 
mereologies) together consistently.
UFO: You can if you do the job properly.
SSM: You said that before. Let’s not repeat ourselves. What 
do you mean by doing the job properly?
UFO: You admit that each of your ontologies is consistent.
SSM: Of course. It’s designed to be.
UFO: So a consistent ontology is one that could be com-
pletely true?
SSM: Yes of course.
UFO: So all the ontologies could be true together.
SSM (condescendingly): Just because some judgments are 
consistent and some other judgments are consistent doesn’t 
mean the whole lot are consistent. Take any contingent judg-
ment, say that p. Each of p and its negation not-p is consis-
tent but the pair {p, not-p} is not. In ontology it’s much more 
complicated but the principle is the same.
UFO (doggedly): Suppose one of your ontologies O1 is not 
just consistent but actually true.
SSM: All right.
UFO: And another one O2 is also true.
SSM: Yes. That could happen.
UFO: Then O1 + O2 is also true, so it is consistent.
SSM: I’ll grant you it works in that simple case, but in the 
full-blown case ...
UFO (smoothly): If you do the job properly, each of the on-
tologies is true, as is the metaontology, so the whole consist-
ing of all of them is true. So the whole is true, and therefore 
consistent. That’s what I mean by doing the job properly.
SSM: But look, it just can’t be done. I used to think like you, 
but Medical Informatics has convinced me it cannot.
UFO: Surely you aren’t suggesting that truth be relativized to 
a time, or an ontology, or a view, or in some other way.
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SSM (stiffly): Of course not. Truth is absolute. It’s just that 
some of the things traditional ontologists thought could be 
done cannot be done without getting into contradictions ...
3D (perking up, sotto voce in UFO’s left ear): You could call 
them “antinomies of pure reason.”
SSM: ... so we have to pull our horns in and be more modest.
4D (catching on, sotto voce in UFO’s right ear): You could 
call it “metaphysics within the bounds of sense.”
SSM (noticing the whispering): What?
UFO (brightly): So — you are a follower of Kant then?
SSM (affecting not to hear the name): Who? Anyway, it’s get-
ting late. Anyone fancy a glass of wine?
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Spanish translation in: Diccionario del Pensamiento Conservador y Liberal, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Vision, 1992.
2.  “Conservative Theory”, in N. Ashford and S. Davies (Eds.), A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991, 49–51. 
Spanish translation in: Diccionario del Pensamiento Conservador y Liberal, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Vision, 1992.
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Routledge, 1991, 180–183. 
Spanish translation in: Diccionario del Pensamiento Conservador y Liberal, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Vision, 1992.
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vol. 8, 1992, 1102–1113. 
Preprinted in: “Sachverhalt: eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung” (includes an extensive English summary), 
Forschungsberichte und Mitteilungen des Forschungsinstituts Philosophie/Technik/Wirtschaft, Universität Salzburg, 9 (1988), 41pp.
8.  “Aristotelianism, apriorism, essentialism”, in P. Boettke (Ed.), The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 1994, 33–37.
9.  “Brentano”, in J. Kim and E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 61–63.
10.  “Ingarden”, in J. Kim and E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 241–242.
11.  “Ontology”, in J. Kim and E. Sosa (Eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 373–374.
12.  “Realistic Phenomenology”, in L. Embree (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997, 
586–590.
13.  “Austria” in L. Embree (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997, 43–48.
14.  “Gestalt Psychology” in Edward Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge 1998, vol. 4, 51–54. 
15.  “Reinach” in Edward Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1998, vol. 8, 180–182.
16.  “Axiology” in Edward Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge 1998, vol. 1, 271-273 (with Alan 
Watson).
17.  “Witasek”, in Monika Betzler and Julian Nida-Rümelin (Eds.), Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart in 
Einzeldarstellungen, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1998, 821–824.
18.  “Ingarden”, in Robert Audi (Ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 437.
19.  “Brentano”, in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, 94–95. 
20.  “Daubert”, in Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii, Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2001, 415-418. English version.
21.  Steffen Schulze-Kremer and Barry Smith, “Ontologies for the Life Sciences”, Encyclopedia of Genetics, Genomics, Proteomics and 
Bioinformatics, New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, vol. 4, 2005.
22.  Barry Smith “John Searle”, Les sciences humaines, Ed. Patrick Savidan, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2006, 1061-62.
23.  James DuBois and Barry Smith, “Reinach”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008. 
24.  Barry Smith, “Biometaphysics”, Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Robin Le Poidevin, et al. (Eds.), London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009, 537-544.
 
trAnslAtions
1.  Translation of Adolf Reinach, “On the Theory of the Negative Judgment”, in Barry Smith (Ed.), Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic 
and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982, 315–377.
2.  Translation of Adolf Reinach, “William James and Pragmatism”, in K. Mulligan (Ed.), Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the 
Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1987, 291–298.
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3.  Franz Brentano, Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum, English translation by Barry Smith, London/
Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988, xxiv + 202pp. Reprinted Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Reviewed by Jonathan Barnes, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (2), 468-470.
4.  Translation of Christian von Ehrenfels, “On ‘Gestalt-Qualities’” and other writings on Gestalt theory, in Barry Smith (Ed.), 
Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Munich and Vienna: Philosophia, 1988, 82–123.
5.  “A Note on Brentano’s Terminology”, translator’s preface to Franz Brentano, Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the 
Continuum, London/Sydney: Croom Helm, 1988, xxii–xxiv. 
 
biblioGrAphies
1.  “Annotated Bibliography of Writings on Part-Whole Relations since Brentano”, in Barry Smith (Ed.), Parts and Moments. Studies in 
Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia, 1982, 481–552.
2.  “Addenda to: Annotated Bibliography of Writings on Part-Whole Relations since Brentano”, in P. Sällström (Ed.), An Inventory of 
Present Thinking about Parts and Wholes, vol. III, Stockholm: Forskningsrådsnämnden, 1985, 74–86.
3.  “Chronicle”/”Husserl Bibliography”, cumulative bibliography of literature on and by Edmund Husserl, in Husserl Studies, triennially 
from issue 3/2, 1986 to 8/3, 1991.
4.  “Adolf Reinach: An Annotated Bibliography”, in K. Mulligan (Ed.), Speech Act and Sachverhalt, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: 
Nijhoff, 1987, 299–332.
5.  “Gestalt Theory and Its Reception: An Annotated Bibliography”, in Barry Smith (Ed.), Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Munich and 
Vienna: Philosophia, 1988, 231–478.
6.  “Bibliography” in Barry Smith and David W. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, 487–508.
 
reVieWs And reVieW Articles
1.  Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art (Evanston 1973), Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 6 (1975), 141–144.
2.  Reinhardt Grossmann, Meinong (London 1974), Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 4 (1976), 147–148.
3.  Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (London 1978), Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 32 (1979), 365–368 (in German).
4.  Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (Frankfurt 1978), Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 103–105.
5.  Alexius Meinong, Gesamtausgabe (Graz 1971–79), Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 636–38. German version in Philosophischer 
Literaturanzeiger, 33 (1980), 236–240. 
6.  Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s ‘Origins of Geometry.’ An Introduction (London 1979), Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 638–641.
7.  R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller (Eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos (Amsterdam 1978), Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, 11 (1980), 194–199.
8.  Alexius Meinong, On Objects of Higher Order and Husserl’s Phenomenology (M. L. Schubert-Kalsi (Ed.), The Hague 1978), The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1980), 252–254.
9.  Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen 1890–1910 (The Hague 1979), Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 33 (1980), 313–315 
(in German).
10.  David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford 1979), History and Philosophy of Logic, 2 (1981), 150–151.
11.  Paul Gochet, Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions (Dordrecht 1980), Grazer Philosophische Studien, 14 (1981), 216–217.
12.  Edmund Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigung (The Hague 
1980), Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 35 (1982), 14–17 (in German).
13.  Ludwig Landgrebe, The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (Ithaca 1981), History and Philosophy of Logic, 4 (1983), 111.
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14.  Roger Schmit, Husserls Philosophie der Mathematik. Platonistische und konstruktivistische Momente in Husserls Mathematikbegriff 
(Bonn 1981), History and Philosophy of Logic, 4 (1983), 230–234.
15.  Kurt Lewin, Wissenschaftstheorie I (Bern/Stuttgart 1981), History and Philosophy of Logic, 4 (1983), 235–238.
16.  “Phänomenologie und angelsächsische Philosophie” [Review article on recent publications in phenomenology], Philosophischer 
Literaturanzeiger, 37 (1984), 387–405.
17.  Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, “Traditional vs. Analytic Philosophy” [Review article on E. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytic 
Philosophy], Grazer Philosophische Studien, 21 (1984), 193–202.
19.  Edmund Husserl, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (The Hague 1983), History and Philosophy of Logic, 5 (1985), 228–230.
20.  P. Jaeger and R. Lüthe (Eds.), Distanz und Nähe. Reflexionen und Analysen zur Kunst der Gegenwart (Würzburg 1983), Journal of 
the British Society for Phenomenology, 16 (1985), 320–322.
21.  Harald Delius, Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry (Munich 1981), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46 (1985), 
170–173.
22.  J. N. Mohanty, The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy (Dordrecht 1985), Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 18 
(1987), 299–301.
23.  Paul Gochet, Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine’s Philosophy (Munich/Vienna 1986), Grazer Philosophische Studien, 
30 (1987), 212–213.
24.  J. Macnamara, A Border Dispute. The Place of Logic in Psychology (Cambridge, Mass. 1987), History and Philosophy of Logic, 9 
(1988), 126–128.
25.  R. Bernet, I. Kern and E. Marbach, Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens (Hamburg, 1989), History and Philosophy of 
Logic, 11 (1990), 260.
26.  Edmund Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–21) (Dordrecht 1987), Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 21 (1990), 
293–295 (with K. Schuhmann).
27.  L. B. Puntel, Grundlagen einer Theorie der Wahrheit (Berlin/New York 1990), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 
(1992), 494–496.
28.  Mark A. Notturno, (Ed.) Perspectives on Psychologism (Leiden 1989), History and Philosophy of Logic, 12 (1991), 249–251.
29.  Felix Kaufmann, L’infinito in matematica (Gardolo di Trento 1990), History and Philosophy of Logic, 13 (1992), 131.
30.  “The Philosophy of Austrian Economics” [Review article on David Gordon, The Philosophical Origins of Austrian Economics 
(Auburn 1993)], Review of Austrian Economics, 7 (1994), 127–132.
31.  Ernest Davis, Representations of Commonsense Knowledge (San Mateo 1990), Minds and Machines, 4/2 (1994), 245–249.
32.  Kenneth J. Perszyk, Nonexistent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy (Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993), History and 
Philosophy of Logic, 16 (1995), 154–155.
33.  Werner Stelzner (Ed.), Philosophie und Logik. Frege-Kolloquien Jena 1989/1991 (Berlin/New York 1993), History and Philosophy 
of Logic, 16 (1995), 155–156.
34.  Edmund Husserl, Briefwechsel (10 volumes, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1994), Husserl Studies, 12 (1995), 98–104.
35.  Arnold Heidsieck, The Intellectual Contexts of Kafka’s Fiction: Philosophy, Law, Religion (Columbia, SC 1994) in Nachrichten der 
Forschungsstelle und des Dokumentationszentrums für Österreichische Philosophie, 6 (1995), 47–49.
36.  Gustav Bergmann, New Foundations of Ontology (Madison and London 1992), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 3 (1995), 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 304–306.
37.  Aurel Kolnai, The Utopian Mind (London 1995), Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 27/2 (1996), 208–210.
38.  Steven S. Pollard and Norman M. Martin, Closure Spaces and Logic (Dordrecht 1996), History and Philosophy of Logic, 17 (1996), 
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